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Dissertation Abstract:
Affective Criticism: Theories of Emotion and Synaesthesis
in the Experience of Literature.
by Edward Jayne
The "Affective Fallacy" labeled by Wimsatt and Beardsley
and denigrated by an entire generation of critics must be
restored'to legitimacy-as probably the most fundamental principle of literature.

The effect of a text takes prec~dence

over the objectivity of its "intra-referential":content since
this content is meaningful only to the exterit that it produces
this effect.

The concerted effort of formalists to deny or

somehow bypass this self-evident axiom has been unique in the
history of criticism and may be traced to a variety of causes,
not the least of which has been a conservative isolation of
literature from its social context.

But the exclusion of

politics from criticism has been itself a political act, pro~ecting literary "value" by refining it almost beyond human
experience.
The outlook of I. A. Richards has been of particular
interest because he sought to justify this escapism within
affectiv.e theory.

First employing an "impulse" theory of

psychology-and then a "projective" theory derived from ColeridgE
he defined literary• .~·esponse as synaesthesis, the refined
balance of emotions which is self-sufficient and exclusive
of overt behavior.

"Intra-referential" content was thus

removed one degre·e :from the· text to·· our

II

incipient response,"

a bundle of mutually energized impulses i-nhibi ting both

praxis and the stock response.

However, Richards also

i

investigated the "sign situation," the total matrix of
I

experience signified by language, and he proposed that
literary response involves the "choice of the whole personality."

Both these concepts may be invoked to restore

praxis, ethics, and even propaganda to the domain of literary
response.

Unfortunately, Richards has shifted to a more

clearly formalist perspective in his later criticism.

He

has truncated the paradigm of information theory to exclude
"speaker" and "hearer" except a.s the abstractions "source"
and "destination," bringing him right back. again, really,
to the "incipient response," though now mathematically
formulated.
It is my contention that

11

spea,ker

11

and "hearer" are

both vitally important to the "act" of literature, and that
their relationship must be established within a dynamic
theory of affective criticism.

Richards 1 "choice of the

whole personality" is a useful first principle, but properly
interpreted it involves unconscious displacement, archetypal
embodiment, social responsibility, and other human dimensions
requiring at least.ancillary concern with "reductionist"
critical approac.hes (Psychoanalytic, Marxist, etc.)

I ad-

ditionally propose t:hat the paradigm of information theory
may be stratif ic.ationally rearrange'd to establish a hierarchy
from (1)

11

9bjective immediacy" to (2) .our pre-verbal organ-

ization of experience·, ( 3) i•ts symbolization in language,
and (4) its further iefinement in the literary act.
..

All'

~hese levels must be activated for literature to be meaningful,

contrary to the formalist hypothesis bestowing "objective
immediacy" upon the text, bypassing our fullest resources
of experience, often even of language.
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,Chapter One:
A Polemic Introduction
"Let us restrict our. inquiry to the text itself," the
questioning student of literature has too often been admonished.

His professor has then d~screetly shifted the

topic of discussi~n back to the business of close textual
explication, and he himself has sunk ashamed with the
recognition that his contribution once again transgressed
the discipline of criticism.

This has been our common mis-

fortune in English classes for the last twenty-five years;
and though the search has begun for alternatives, rigid
tenets of textual explication survive in many conservative
departments, where they have even been regarded a sacred
professional responsibility.

The professor must expertly

steer his class discussion from one end of a text to the
other, .a sequen_ce usually coincidental with the fifty
minute hour, and all must end on the tonic' with a four or
five minute coda of broad thematic appeal.

The same sequence

must occur, more or less, in the articles he publishes, and
his professional strle must epitomize his method, an unsett:l.ed
mixture of timidity and authoritarianism, irony and scientific
detachment.

He ~eems a twentieth century counterpart to

Trollope's vicar seeking preferment, but his ambition is now
tenure, with academia, not art (as Ma~raux claimed) having
replaced religion.

Ex~gesis has shifted from the Bible to

approved secular texts of ·respected modern poets and critics •.
When undisciplined:students have been diverted from this

enlightenment, then fallacies and heresies have been
invoked as if they were sacred·commandments ..
These fallacies and heresies compose a formidable list
of prohibitions.

Poe 0 s "didactic heresy" (the flaw of the

too-obvious message) and Ruskin's "pathetic fallacy" (the
flaw of the excessive use of personificat.ion) nre relatively

.

. simple holdovers from the ninete~mth century.

To these

have been a.dded an impressive list of new flaws to be
avoided.

The "paraphrastic heresy" proposed by A.C. Bradley

is the principle that good poetry may not be adequately
paraphrased, and (its corollary) that which can be is not
good poetry.l

This fallacy was substantially adapted by

Clea.nth Brooks as the "heresy of paraphrase" in
W:r.·ought

yrn, 2 while the "formalist heresy" also

~!1~

yJe+J.

p:r:opC~ll!:-~d by

Bradley, signifying the mistaken emphasis upon art for its
own sake, has been conveniently neglected~

I.A. Richards

proposed a number of fallacies in The Meaning o~ ~1e!l~n9,
including the "Ultraquistic subterfuge," using the same
word but with different meanings, the "Phonetic subterfuge,"
the confusion of pattern in meaning wit.h that in sound, the

"Hypostatic subterfuge," the concret.ization of such abstractions as virtue, peace, love, and democracy as if they actually
exist, and "psittacism," the response to an idea invariably
in a fixed sequence or context.

He also labeled words

commonly misusEc1d as "mendicants, 11 those not fully understood,
and "nomads," those with a vague meaning that may fit any
context. 3

Richards later proposed the "fallacy of vulgar

packaging," the simplistic affective notion that the experience
of the poet is delivered in toto via poetry into the experience
·.of his readers.4

Allen Tate proposed the "fallacy of commun-

ication," t~e arousal of an affective state resulting from

an "i.rresponsible

11

denotation of words, as well as the

"fallacy of mere denotation," the neglect of connotations in
poetry. 5

Finally, Yvor Winters proposed among many problems

of modern poetry the "fallacy of imitative form," the mistaken belief that the form of poetry must (or even can) reflect
the pattern of events it describes.6

With this many fallacies

in the offing (and more), narrow has been the way for both
poets and critics to good poetry.
But by far the two most important prohibitions for
New Criticism have been the Intentional and Affective
· Fallacies proposed by Wimsatt and Beardsley.?

If we heed

the Intentional Fallacy, we must isolate the interpreted
poem from its'original act of creation.

The poet has failed

if our attention is diverted from the text itself to extraneous
biographical information about his life and experience.

His

potim should be self-sufficient with independent formal validity

after it has been perfected and launched into the public
realm.

In this very limited sense it is a public act because

it ·is an artefact of language, the universal currency of

society.

The biographical element may be acceptably brought

under control in the role of the dramatic speaker, the poet's
persona, or in his obtrusive (but controlled) identity as
a narrator.

It may be even further purified in the cultivation

of his and his readers• sensitivity to tone; but the "gross
body of life," which Wimsatt reluctantly admits lies behind

every poem, can and should be ignored, so claim the conventional proponents of textual explication~
Likewise, the Affective ~•al lacy is thE! emphasis upon
one's response to poetry rather than the poem itself independent of this response.

This fallacy _may involve simply

the shivers that Emily Dickinson claimed to feel upon reading
good poetry or the complex integration of experience defined

by I.A. Richards.

The proper response must be our apprec-

iative recognition of formal self-sufficiency, not the spurious
and usually excessive emotions we might mistakenly confuse
with this recognition.

Aesthetic pleasure is a matter of

interpretation, or to invoke Ransom's position, of cognition,
our. intellectual grasp of a poem's meaning with our pleasure
in the grati~ication of having understood it.

Avoiding

both fallacies, the basic concern of the critic should be
neither the poet nor his readers, but the technique of
poetry in its relationship with content as experience wrought
in language.

Poetry is indeed a human act--this Wimsatt

concedes--but it is an act which should be removed from,
(l) those who perform it (poets), and (2) those upon whom it
is performed (critics and readers).

We are as~ed to shake

off our personalities to attune our minds more perfectly to
the New Critical job of explication.
Needless to say, critics such as Tate, Wimsatt and

Cleanth Brooks, usually identified as New Critical apologists,

5

have avoided trapping themselves in this dogma.

They have

been f~r too flexible to have advocated such a formal
reductionism.

Instead they have acknowledged the human

factor in literature, but with an emphasis as much as
possible upon the objective text and its dispassionate
explication.

Allen Tate's theory of "tension" in which

"extension" complements

11

intension" to give poetry its ex-

ternal ref~rence at least provides an aesthetic category
for experience, however deemphasized. 8

Robert Stallman has

claimed that Tate's theory "squares" with Middleton Murry's
pronouncement:

"Art is autonomous, and to be pursued for

its own sake, precisely because it comprehends the wh9le
of human life; be.cause it has reference to a more perfect
human morality than any other activity of man. 119

Formalism

is thus transcended (for Murry, if not Tate) with the
paradox that art is autonomous because of its perfection in
not being autonomous, an argument with perhaps more aesthetic
appeal than consistency.
Cleanth Brooks would seem to have more clearly committed
himself to a formalist position, especially in his 1951
article, "The Formalist Critic," in which he proclaimed a
~anifesto of three principles for criticism:

(1) that in a

successful work, form and content cannot be se~arated, (2)
that form is meaning, and (3) that literature is ultimately
metaphorical and symbolic.10

All of these principles combined

would seem to reduce literary experience to form, with rhetoric,
'.figuration exclusiveiy. representing the.dynamics of consciousnei

6

Bu·t he conceded in a later article that values {which do have

his approval in literature) are "rooted in" or at least
"-accompanied by, the expression of emotion," though of course
he preferred "to stress the aspect of value."

He also ad"·

mitted thut there is a grain of trut.h in Winter's argument
that every poem makes a moral judgment, though asserting
that. there seems t.o be "no need of collapsing the ethical

and aesthetic realms .. 11
11

Ethics and aesthetics!'!!~ be

•"collapsed," Brooks reluctantly acknowledged, but he chose

not to do so himself.

Having ma.de ther1e concessions r he can

hardly be pinned down to a rigid formalism despite his more
doctrinaire pronouncements earlier.

W.K. Wimsatt made the same accommodation with human
experience using an ingenious rnetaphysical argument:

11

Poetry

is a complex kind of verbal construction in which the dimension of coherence is by various techniques of implication

greatly enhanced and thus generates an extra dimension of
correspondence to reality, the symbolic or analogical. 1112
In other words, formal coherence in literature refers to
experience because it correctly duplicates the coherence we
find in life, a fairly convincing explanation, though somewhat reminiscent of that quoted above by Middleton Murry.
V.• In Literary Criticism:

A ~ t Historx_, by both Brooks and

Wimsatt, the t.wo seem to have mellowed even further.

They

fpropose, "One of the main lessons of critical history would

to be that the stress of literary theory must
all on the exp~:E_iencc~ (subjective and emotive) rather than

I

on the what, the object of value so far as that is outside
any experiencing subject.

11

Thi.s is a remarkable concession

to the affective fallacy invented and labeled by Wimsatt
himself.

Their conversion is blandly explained with the

argument:

"Poetry. is a kind of reality refracted through

subjective responses.
reality. 11 13

This refraction itself is an area of

In other words, the reality_ of poetry is its

"refraction," an interpretation of the reality that constitutes
our experience.

This acknowledgement brings Brooks and

Wbnsatt a considerable distance from their earlier formalist
purity, if indeed their theories were ever "purely" formulated.
The problem is with their zealous fol.lowers, the converts

and epigones who have simplified their ambivalences and
ingenious concessi.ons to rigid guidelines that entirely
abolish~whatever transgresses the Intentional and Affective

Fallacies.

'l~hese critics (and their following among class-

room practitioners) have distilled content to become "value"
complementing form, and reduced doctrine, affirm~tion, and
all shades of experience to manageable objectifications such
as irony, ambiguity, tension, texture, and internal consist~·

ency.

They have atomized, reified, and rarified experience

so it might lend itself more clearly to formal explication.
~ave also involuted reference in literature {what the

shares with his readers on an equalitarian basis) to
become

11

intra-referential," the formal interaction of com-

onents exclusively referring to each other, a context the
·et

may autocratically dictate upon his .readers.

Eliseo

Vivas has approvingly described this authoritarian "intra-·
referential" function in strictly mathematical language as

"a discreet and closed system of mutually interrelated terms. 11 1·
Murray Krieger has likewiHe demanded an

11

autonomy of poetic

language, 11 to pre·vent a poem from functioning referentially:
"To allow the poem to function referentially is to break the
context.

It is to allow the poem to po~nt outside itself

and thus to lead me into the world of what meaning had been

for me before I came to the poem; which is to say that I
would be released from the control of the poetic context
and, unhappy_parolee, I would be returned to the uninspiring
familiarities of the workaday world~ •• 1115

The poem must

/

be interpreted as a unique, non-referential context which
"controls II us from above, an artistic i.mposi t.i.on saf c1 from
ordinary "workaday" experience.

Its unavoidable re:f.:erenti.,;il

content, the.chaff of poetry, must be disregarded as much as
possible.
Joseph Frank has proposed another ingenious argument to

justify this emphasis upon literary context.
the language of poetry is

11

He claimed that

reflexive 11 in its "meaning relation-

ships" so we must suspend the processes of individual referi".

;ences in their temporal sequence that they might be grasped
in a simultaneous spatial context.
emphasizes the

II

intra-referential

II

•rhis spatiidization
function of language te.>

he deemphasis (though not exclusion) of its ordinary
ferences. 1116

Roman Jakobson uses virtually the same

gwne'nt in his proposal of two axes, of contiguity (sequential

9

and similarity (referential), with poetry imposing one on the
other, an argument we shall take up in more detail in Chapter
Six.

Though these arguments might be valid as a matter of

degree, the dimension of space obviously cannot enti.rely
replace that of time, especially in poetry, as Lessing convincingly demonstrated two hundred years ago.

In the terms

proposed by Joseph Frank, though, this ~as been exactly
the purpose of formalists such as Vivas and Krieger, who
have wanted to replace process with "context," a substitute
excluding the human experience commonly shax~ed by all.
For dedicated New Critics, literature thus . becomes
.
objective in the sense that it itself is the proper object
of our interpretation, rather than mediating an interpretation
of human e:itperience for us.

This bias not only tells us how

to submit ourselves to the authority of a text, but also
selects for us the texts to which we most profitably might
pay this allegiance.

Poetry has been preferred to fiction

because of its tighter formal coherence, while poets and
novelists with a formal bias have been preferred to those
who emphasized a realistic (or surrealistic) depiction of
life.

Donne and Keats have been preferred to Spenser and

Shelley, Austen and James to Dickens and Dreiser.

Whatever

texts depended upon exterior contexts for their interpretation,
~hether biography, psychology, history, or politics, have
ieen rejected for their "ulterior purpose," a "separable
ntent" which might be an invitation to non-literary "reductnism'," for example psychoanalysis and Marxism.

Any critical

.!.U

epistemology has accordingly been rejected (or, more likely,
has languished unexamined) which might demonstrate that all
content of literature .is

11

separable," first displaced {with

modifications) f::com .;;,he1;.;on'th«t of the poet's ideas, valuc~s,

and experience to the poem itself, al'l.d then (again with modifications) to a relatively new context in the reader, who

.

must actively recreate the poem from the fund of his own

experiencep

Any Cfitical epistemology has also been ignored

that m.ight show all experience of J.i terature to be necessarily

reductionist, imposing the reader's re-creation upon the
poet's creativity to arrive at a matrix of insight, an

intersection of experience involving a necessarily unique
response.1 8

Instead, the unexamined common assumption has

been that a text constitutes an immutable objective truth
accessible to textual explication and approaching absolute
identity in its competent interpretation.

Unique and idio-

syncratic interpretations have been considered deviations
from this ideal, usually vulgar excursions into irrelevant

By about 1950 this New Critical objective to reduce
liteJ:·ature to questions of formal coherence ceased being
.xclusively the preoccupation of independent critics and
and then, inevitably, institutionalized.~
was accomplished, as Cleanth Brooks proposed

his l<'orewo:r:d to Stallman's anthology, by books such as
Stanley Edgar.Hyman (1948), The Im;eoftctr.!..££
by Eric Bentley (1948), and Stallman•s

11

anthology itself, Critiques and Essays in criticism {1949) .19 ·
The Well Wrough"t Urn, published by Brooks in 1947 must be
added to this list as well as his immensely influential text
written earlier in collaboration with Robert Penn Warren,
I

Uriderstanding Poetry (1938), and the college anthology,
Criticism: The Foundations of Modern Literary Judgment,
edited by Scharer, Miles, and McKenzie, published in 1948.
These histories and anthologies brought a variety of critical perspectives, earlier considered random and occasional,
into a coherent aesthetic outlook.

Moreover, they made

this outlook available ·to every college sophomore in the
country.

Formalism (justified as classicism) had been

first proposed by T.E. Hulme, P,ound, and Eliot as an elitest
aesthetics, but' now it became democratized., taught in every
college English course.
A new objective emerged beyond the wildest ambitions of
Ransom, Tate, and Brooks (or even of Hyman and Stallman)~ to
make criticism a science.

If a foundation for criticism

could be established in objective, verifiable principles of
textual explication, the argument ran, then criticism could
become a genuine discipline instead of an amateurish pastime.'
The text wou_ld be trea_ted as an empirical body of facts, and
criticism an assortment of hypotheses tested by_ these facts.
of criticism would become scientific and, who knows,
as infl~ential as other sciences have been upon
Most cr.i tics and scholars of this persuasion
Uld hav~ avoided so blatant a suggestion of positivism,

whose scepticism and mathematical rigour generally offended
them, but, more than they would have.admitted, they shared
. its concern with precision 6 testable validity, objectification
of data, close observation, and standardization of language.
In effect they wanted to establish a "discipline" in the realm
of human experience free from subjective bias.

.

Richards

had proposed these objectives throughout his career, even

------

as late as 1935, when he said in Coleridge on Imagination,

----·- -

" •• etha.t the theory of literary analysis is at an extremely

interesting point in its development, on the point of making,
through experime11t, those contacts with actuality that would
transform it into a science, and a science from which very
important practical utilities may be expected to result. 11 20
He claimed in.the same context that good theories at least
protect us from worse.

'I'hough rejecting the

II

scientism 11 of

Richards, Murray Krieger shared his views upon the scientific
purpose of criticism:
• • • the dedicated literary man is cursed with a rather
curious and, he may like to think, old-fashioned empiricism.
It is one which is dull and dogged~

It requires that

theoretical statements about poetics, if he is to appreciate:

them as relevant to his interests, must have immediate
reference to the facts of his experience with poetry.

It

may be expressive of an unscientific bias in him that he
feels constitutionally obliged to ignore more general
investigations into such realms as those of psychology
and semantic analysis unless, as they rarely are, they

are centered about what he feels to be the peculiar
powers of poetry in his constant experiencing of it.

This

fact of his poetic experience is for him the inescapable
starting point of all theorizing; he clings to it as
surely and as relentlessly as does the scientist to his
laboratory-controlled facts~21
Here Krieger himself seems to have fallen victim to the
affective fallacy, but he paid little more than lip service
to his axiom of ernperience.

He was trying to establish the

experience of poetry as·an empirical basis for the objective
and systematic study of its form.
Perhaps the most remarkable manifesto for scientific
objectivity was the "Polemical Introductionu to

~.~~

9f

Criticism, by Northrop Frye, first published as an art:i.cle

in 1949. 22

Frye proposed making criticism into what amounts

to a hurnanistic positivism, if this does not seem a con.t:ra-

diction of terms.

To reaffirm the necessity of eliminating

the roles of the poet and his readers, Frye extended the
theory of fallacies by attacking the conception of l:i.t:E~ratu:re

as conununication rather than artefact.

He also assigned a

new fallacy, of "determinism," to all supposedly "rhetorical"
'efforts to find a causal relationship between criticism and
odes of inquiry proper to other fields and wi~hout direct
earing upon textual interpretation~

He emphatically

reductionist approaches which are internally consynthetic, and based upon a model of some kind,
r example the Freudian and Marxist approaches, since they

were to be regarded as "extra-lite:r:ary schematism."

He

similarly discouraged value judgments and questions of
taste that could not be objectively verified.

None of these

could be fitt.ed in a systematic theory with the authority

of science and structu:n:l and permanence of what might seem
a modern counterpart to scholastic philosophy.
What Frye advocated was establishing a discipline
devoted to literary interpretation alone withil). a uniquely

critical taxonomy.

'l'oward this end he proposed the search

for a central hypothesis in criticism, one of "total coherence,11 presumably in both poetry and its criticism.

He

advocated bringing as much of the currently disorganized
body of criticism as possible into the scope and symmetry
of this cohe:r.·ence, but recommended el.i.rni.nc1ting that which

would not fit except in external taxonomies such as those
mentioned above.

In other words, he proposed establishing

a consistent frame of reference for literary criticism with

the definable limits of science.

To do so, he rejected

the intentional and affective fallacies, eliminated the
. dynamic~s of communication from literature, and banished

\intellectual inquiry of other fields from the proper domain
A science he might have had, but unnecessarily
few of its advantages and most of .its disadHe fortunately did not practice what he preached
his archetypal criticism.
But what Richards and Frye iconoclastically proposed
an unthinking orthodoxy by the early sixties.

The

thematic explication of poetry and fiction according to
New critical guidelines became commonplace in English
journals; special bibliog~aphies such as Kuntz's Poetry
E:>tpl.ica:Lirm
and i,cl.l :.i:1.nd Kfrigb:,;' s The
English Novel were
...,.,..,.,~------·~---- . . . ~ ---

compiled to catalogue much of this criticismo

One part:i.c-

ular journal, Th§: !E.~plicator, was devoted exclusively to
this approach, mostly with exegetical s~ippets supplementing
previous explications.

Some scholars extended the tenets of

formal criticism to stylistics, while others gingerly applied
themselves to a saniti2:ed historical approach to sources
and an~.logues o

Their assumptions were codi.f ied in T. S.

Eli.ot 1 s early essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent,"
and brought to the brink of parody by "f:?eR. Leavis in forcing
the artist to strive toward the extinction of his perscm-

ality in order to gain admittance to literary tradition.

Any

significant contribution to literature was considered a
product of its tra~ition rather than an expression of private
experience or one's sense of identity and relationship with
those around him.

The anti-historical bias of this supposedly

hist6rical approach has been correctly attacked by Edmund
Wilson because it extracted literature from the real history
of soci.ety--histox:y ma~..9-ue' was proposed to abolish real

from literature.23
It was fu:i:.·ther a common New Critical belief that authors

primarily influenced by other authors and not their
. sonal experience t env.ironment., or intellectual milieu.

enabled the literary historian to connect texts otherwise

.Lb

free from history on the basis of stylistic and thematic
congruence, with some attention paid to chronology in order
to distinguish sources f:cpm analogues.

could trace Vaughan's

11

For example, he

The Water-Fall" through Herbert to

the prototype of metaphysical poetry in Donne without concerning himself with the social turmoil in the Commonwealth
or Vaughan's enormous sense of isolatio~ resulting from
this turmoil.

In the rare circumstance that history had to

be assigned- a little more "body" beyond the sum of its texts,
he could invoke the "Spirit of the Age," distilled from the
"History of Ideas" approach earlier proposed by Lovejoy,
Tillyard, and others, though he usually watered down this
approach to explain a text tautologically as the consequence
of its own themes.24

Historical importance was also accorded

those authors and poets whose works easily lend themselves
to thematic historical analysis, while those whose works
eluded explication were deemphasized and often banished to
-Obscurity.

A "vital" poetic tradition often skipped from

. Shakespeare to Donne and Pope and then to Keats and Eliot,
'. while the novel was shown to really begin with Jane Austen,
'Sink to George Eliot,. and rise again to Henry James, James

oyce, and D.. H. Lawrence.

Meanwhile, Spenser, Milton, Shelley,

:ennyson, Richardson, Scott, Dickens, and myri.ad others:
discarded from seriou~ consideration as
or typically formless British writers oute the "essential II tr:adi tion ~

thei:r.:·

11

Efforts to revive them

irony" in formlessness or their hidden

17

form to be divulged with a more thorough explication.

Textual

criticism revived a few figures from history but downgraded
most; what was left, a radically attenuated history of
English literature, was universally taught in American
colleges to illustrate this critical approach, and of course .
the approach was employed to explore this history.

The

circle narrowed, and literary criticism found itself begging
4

the question.
But the question needing most to be answered is how
this particular orthodoxy ever got started, how it flourished despite our national disapprqval of orthodoxies'.
Religion was slain, it seems, and like dragon's teeth exegesis
came up from the soil.

Matthew Arnold had wanted poetry to
I

replace religion--instead we got its stepbrother, formalist
criticism.

How did it happen?

There are several possible

explanations,
a coupl.e of· which may be proposed ·here.
I

We

can first of all appreciate how p~ofessionalism in the field
of English might have jealously guarded i~s autonomy as a
"science" and thus sc:>ught to dissociate itself from lines
,/

'

of inquiry more adequately treated by the advanced technical
research in other fieicii:;, for example psychology, sociology,
and even aesthetics.

Every field understandably

.own Lebensraum, and critical scholarsnip, with
its share of insecurity, would seem no exception.
>can als'o under·stand how explication might have seemed

· roper escape from the te.chniques of German philology
I

h4:lps exhausted in the research of Kittredge, Tatlock,

Lowes, and others.

Their work was a pinnacle of scholar-

ship which left little room for further inquiry except to
belabor the methods they had defined and thorou9hly applied.

Newer modes of historical inquiry likewise must have seemed
useless, whether the doctrinaire Marxist. formulas of Calverton
and Hicks or the bland, popularized vagaries of the later
van Wyck Brooks whi.ch were banalized in the teaching of
literature through the thirties and early forties.

These

must have seemed as unproductive then as New Criticism does
now.
We can also recognize that critical explication has been

a useful methodology while the profession of English letters has
rapidly and cancerously grown over the last three or four
decades to include practitioners with necessarily less
encyclopedic ba.ckgr.ou.nds than Kittredge or Lowes.

If the

main task at hand could be agreed upon to be textual intci;;:-~

pretation, then most of the tools of philology might be
properly set aside as redundant pedantry.

The scholar-

critic could actually pride himself upon his ignorance of
special knowledge in properly evaluating a text.

An expert

he could insist, is the educated "normal" reader,
overeducated scholar distracted by irrelevant informIgnorance thus conveniently found its v~ndication at
the time when the profession of letters increased so

as to suffer an unavoidable decline in competence •
.l;'ican manhood returning from world war II and Korea had to

.auaated, and their hastily recruited young educators,

also from the wars, had to find a raison d'etre for their
inadequacies.

Whatever was lost in philological brer,dth was

supposedly regained in technical competence and critical
sensitivity.
There is also a political explanation of New Critical
f.>Cholarship..

Ji,,.

studiously myopic concentration upon textual

cri ti<::ism has conveniently protected the innocence of its
practitioners f r:om t.he uncertainties of politics and history.

If our ultimate authority is t:lH~ sacrosanct literary context,

we might justifiably turn with gratitude from difficult
social issues to an intensive investigation of this context
and its profound ramif ica.tions.

This was of course an rm:..

spoken response, omnipresent though never directly acknowledged, except perhaps vaguely as a ttloss of spiritual order."
Nevertheless, it seems more than a peculiar historical
coincidence that the advancement of textual explication has
been closely parallel to the development of the Cold War.
The origin of New Criticism is usually fixed at the publication
of The Sacred Wood by T .s. Eliot in 1920 and Princ:i.pl_es. o~

Litera~ Criticism by I.A. Richards in 1924, roughly three
and seven years after the Russian Revolution and during the
when conservatism was shaken to its roots by the imminent
ossibility of Bolshevik revolution across Europe.

This was

when Russian formalism emerged, a parallel movecandidly acknowledged its reaction against the
trusion of politics in criticism.

New Criticism was next

ought to our country by the nsout.hern Regionalists

11

at

Vanderbilt during the depression years of the thirties when
America itself seemed threatened by 'the spectre of Bolshevi.sm.
Finally, New Critical methods were institutionalized as
the dominant orthodm;;y of our English departments in the late

forties and early fifties, when our country was in the throes
of McCarthyism 0 again panicked by the spectre of communism.
It was then clearly prudent to lapse in~o impenetrable
silence about political issues, busily engaged in the more
serious and scholarly responsibility of "objective" textual
explicationo

During this era in France, where intellectual

trends have traditionally been better articulated (and as a
result more confused), this silence was acknowledged and
even proclaimed by such figures as Camm;, M<~rleau .Pont.y,
and Robbe-Grillet~

It happened here too, but even the issue

was left unspokenr except perhaps in the editorial contro=
versies of. t.he partisan g~:}?,, which had fruitlessly sQught

an accommodation between politics and criticism for twenty
years.25

Only with the decline of the Cold War in the

middle sixties did the stranglehold of New Criticism begin
to be loosened.
Not accidentally, then, have New Critical methods had
most appeal through these years to critics of u conservative

T.S. Eliot repeatedly avowed his support for
ction Francaise, a conservative French group advocating
eocracy, and dangerously approached endorsing Italian
scism in his Criterion editorials of 1928 and 1929.

I.A.

~hards generally avoided political issues, but he did attack

21

collectivism several times and seemed to advocate a nineteenth century brarid of individualism in his concept of
synaesthesis.

The Southern Regionalists collectively pro-

posed a return to the

II

agrarian•" virtues of the Old South

in I'll Take~ Stand (1930) as did Ransom in God without
Thunder (1930) and Tate in Reactionary Essays£!! Poetry
(1936).

Brooks and Wimsatt are· said to have come out in

open support of McCarthy, and they, as wel:l as Wellek and
Kriege~ seem to have reserved their most trenchant disdain
for social criticism with progressive implications, particularly
of the Marxist school.
Likewise, the opposition to New Criticism seems to have
found its most strident voices on t~e Left, whether on the
pages of New Masses in the thirties or by ambivalent renegades
of the fifties such as Trilling and Fiedler, inspired by the
example of Edmund Wilson.

Fiedler's articles, "Archetype and

.Signature,'' and "My Credo," spelled out the absurdity of New
Critical assumptions with crushing insight as early as 1950-52,
at the heyday of. critical explication. 25

An underground of:

opposition has persisted since then, and "old leftists" such
as Weimann of East Germany and Sidney Finkelstein in the United
States have continued to express this opposition.

With the

plitical upheaval ·of the s1xties, however., the a.ttack has
'

'

.en renewed with vigour. by Fred~rick Crews, Lewis Kampf,
'

their "Emersonian" New Left faction in the MLA.

Louis

declared, "The :i;unction of poetry, Matthew Arnold

J said, is to criticize life.

Surely criticism should do

no less," and, "By its very nature, in spite of our academic
merchants, literature is not a commodity, but the sign of a
creative act which exp1«esses personal, social, and historical
needs.

As such it constantly undermines the status quo. 26
11

This point need not be considered an empty slogan if "need"
!eso facto represents the inadequacy of the status quo, in
contrast to fulfillment, its accomplish~ent.
~

In a recent

diatribe, "Do Literary Studies have an Ideology,"

- Frederick Crews has proposed that the ideology of li tera:r.y

studies currently doe~ have an ideology, but "less in what
they say than in _what they refuse to consider," which, we
may presume, would be of the needs of society and their
representation in·literature.

Crews attacks the "escapism"

of "capi. talis-t scholarship" and questions,

11

whether a good

political anguish may not be essential t:.o good critici.sm. 11 27
Apart from these attacks, New Criticism gives the appearance
of declining of its own weight, perhaps like water slowly
<_ receding from the bathtub--its decline seems to have caused

these attacks more than they did its decline.

New Criticism

does not seem pertinent to the malaise of the sixties and
seventies, while our country seems tottering at
of latter day Weimar uncertainties.

So everybody

vigorously searching out alternatives, but without fresh
issues having arisen to help lead us to a different
land.

Our transition seems to be occurring without

~ble signs or any definab.lH eff.icient cause beyond the
in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, we can define our intentions to a certain
extent as a reaction against the proscriptions of New Criticism.
We can deny that man is

II

limited and imperfect n as '1~ .E. Hulme

maintained, since human experience is almost infinitely
complex.

No standards of perfection exist against which we

may validly measure ourselves without diminishing this complexity.
tion.

We are paradoxically both more and less than perfec-

There is a rnul ti-dimensional breadth of human t1xperience,

and it is the proper function of literature t.o explore these
dimensions without exacerbating our puritanical anxi,~ties.

we paradoxically want to declare Fallacies fallacious (Fallacy,

thou art Fallacious} in order to express ourselves once again
as we please, with approval reserved for whatever seems
successful without necessarily fitting particular guidelines.

A tentative manifesto to this effect might be proposed:
1. Literature is pleasure:

there is gratification in

representation £md vicarious identification.

The withdrawal

from raw Ernperience to .its surrogate fulfilled by dynamic
acquiescense is pleasurable to most who are able to project
into language.
2. Literature is assessment:

we shape and structure

experience in literature; our sense of purpose and
herence is bodied forth in llterature, in which we compare
we see with the artefact we further want to impose.
3 • Li te:rature !-,S ~r~~~i.ol!:

to express it.

our experience is shaped

The stream.of language along

'dimension of ti.me and our exertion to keep even wi.th its

24
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progress gives coherence to what.we say and projects meaning
upon the random universe ~bout us.
4. Literature is communication:

we use language to get

- our ideas and experience across, primarily that they might
effect changes in emotions, attitudes and behavior.

In this

--

sense literature
. is propaganda, as Sartre proposed in What
.

is Literature? .overtly propagandistic literature (Christian,
Marxist, social-realis~ic, etc.) cannot be rejected except
to the extent that it fails as propaganda.
5. Literature is competence:

competence is not the

only criterion, as formalists often try to make it, but it
remains an important one--without formal skills, the other
values of literature might be lost.

But competence alone is

also inadequate, as may be seen in the novels of Sarraute
and Robbe-Grillet, French authors who escaped the Cold War
by articulating silence.

Competence is pleasure, assessment,

and expression adequately wrought in form to be shared with
readers.
New Criticism has neglected the first, third, and fourth
these dimensions in its emphasis upon the second and fifth,.,
assessment and competence.

We must reject these inhibitions,

but without abandoning its formal·discoveries.

Leon Trotsky

0

nceded the ~sefulness of formalisci as a meth6dology in the

0

ntext of social ci;-iticism, and we must do the same with

ew Criticism, but in a c~ntext more comprehensive than
.ither. formal or social approaches .• 28

New Criticism· has

ought us a wealth of critical insights, in fact a renaissance

25

in explication unmatched in the entire history of criticism.
However circumscribed their views, ·figures such as Richards,
Eliot, Empson, and Leavis in England, and Ransom, Tate, Brooks,
and Blackmur in America have made a brilliant contribution to
'

the "job" of cri,ticism that we cannot ignore.

The techniques

of explication they have given us are the first task of
criticism, the preliminary spade work to be done before we
,

launch into the questions. they have evaded.

Our job is to

sift the good they offer from their inhibitions, the valid
insights from their/Procrustean negativism.
/

We must salvage

'

what we can from the cul d e ~ of their orthodoxy, the
welter of Fallacies they have invoked to justify their evasions.
In a word, we must bring our concern with breadth to bear
.upon their int~nsively defined methods to find a new synthesis
meaningful for criticism.

But in this effort we must also

recognize that New Criticism might be the best that this
country can offer:

its demise might very well end our modern

renaissance of criticism, a mortification occurring in two
stages, first in its institutionalization since 1950, arid
then in its aggressive but equally uninspired academic rejection since perhaps 1964 (to set an arbitrary date, the year
Susan Sontag published "Against Interpretation").

We can see

,ts faults well enough"'.'-the qu~stion remains whether we can
(

~,:ne

,-_:,

.

up with something better for ourselves.

Our inspiration

to be more than the recognition of their faults.
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Chapter 'l'wo:
I.A. Richards and some of his Critics
The most influential figure in the history of New
;• ·-,j,;,,.:

Criticism has undoubtedly been I.A. Richards.

His books

established an aesthetic model against which others of the

movement measured their own theories.

Thqy usually disagreed

with his ideas but almost always proposed their own as a
response, a more satisfactory am:,'<l.rer O presumably, to the

questions he rai,wd.

,John crm..re Ransom acknowledged in

•rh':_ !,'Jew Critichnn (1941) that,

"Discussion of the new criticism

must start with Mr~ Richards.

'l'he new criticism very nearly

began with him." 1

Allen Tate likewise acknowledged his own

"Nobody who read I.A. Richards' Practical Criticism when it
appeared in 1929 could read any poem as he had read it before.
From that time on one had to read poetry with all the brains

one had and with one's arms and legs, as well as what may be
inside the rib cage." 2

Finally, from many examples, Stanley

Edgar Hyman broadly declared in The Armed Vision that,

11

What

we have been calling modern criticism began in 1924, with

the publication of Principles of Literary: Cr.i.ticism."3
none accepted his theories at their face value.

But

Theii response

was a reaction first to his "impulse" theory of ·affect

in the twenties, though accepting his call.for a
critical apparatus interpreting poetry, and then to

is projective theory of the imagination proposed in the
hirties, though accepting his proposal that a theory of

,JV

knowledge is fundamental to the problems of critical e,,pli-

cation.

Unlike the cautious, universally admired criticism

of Eliot, muc~ if not most, of his theory was rejected, but
he raised a broad variety of questions to which other answers
became tenets of New Critical orthodoxy.

Without this neg-

ative encouragement, Eliot would very likely have S((~ttled
into the role of a latter day Matthew Arnold, and American
fi9ures such as Ransom and •rate r.,muld probably have devoted
mor,:'.l time to poetry and less to criticism, which, it may be

speculated, would have become less explicative and less
theoretical in emphasis~
But there is a paradox in the influence of Richards.
Almost all have successfully defined themselves relative to
his theories, nut nobody has yet been able to deal adequately
with these theories in their own rather elaborate context.
Whatever fragment of his scaffolding critics have chosen to

explore, other and often more important parts have been
excluded from consideration that would seem to bring their
conclusions into doubt.

Logicians like Ma:,{ Black and Manuel

Bilsky have vigorously assailed his theory of knowledge from
a positivistic approach, overlooking the organicism in even
earliest books which successfully complements his affinto behaviorism.

D.G. James, a Kantian ideal~st, reason-

bly questioned his affective principles in general terms,
..
l-lt neglected the many passages in which he seems to have

·

sufficiently to avert such a broad refutaRansom and Tate adopt·ed his frame o·f reference by

somewhat simplifying i.t and denying its basis in psychology
(Tate freely admitting that he had little understanding of
psychology) , thom;L. tli'""' absence of psychology led to a sterile
formalism which Richards u:n.'uerstandably wanted to avoid.

Finally, epigones of the New Critical faith such as Stallman
and Krieger more drastically simplified Richards' theory to
make of it a parody they could easily re?_fute.

Of cr.i tics

morc-;1. positively indebb,~d to the influence of Richards, Empson
and Clei:l.nth Brooks took particular branches of his theory,
respectivt~ly h:is conct1rn with arnbigui ty a.nd irony, to propos~3!
formal theories apparently outside the context of affective

criticism, and his two most devoted apologists today, W.H.M,
Hotopf and Jerome Schiller, seem to have floundered somewhat
in the effort. to find a synthesis they could defend..

Hotopf

haB laborioutlly emphasized questions of epistemology at the

expense of aesthetics, the heart of Richards' theory, while
Schiller is both thin and obscure in what is obviously his
first book. 5

Even Wellek' s thoroughly docu1nented assesBment

in a recent article seems to have excessively simplifi<.~d tht?
essential theories of Richards& 6

The responsibility for this history of misconceptions
ultimately be laid upon Richards himself.

He complains

none of his late essays that his critics appar~ntly do~not
ad hi.s books, 7 and this might be partly true, but .the major

lies, I think in his tantalizing suggestion of organwhich never quite becomes fulfilled.

In his early

chapter exudes clarity and structure upon its

particular topic, but the relationship among chapters is
often almost random and their topics seem to cut across each
other without sufficient explanation.

In Principles of

~iter~ criticisn:., which most obviously exemplifies this

inadequacy, though a brilliant contribution to modern criti-

cis;m, thirty-five chapters average eight pages apiece, and

.

there often seems little explanation for their sequence.

As

Hotopf has proposed, Richards must have gathered all his

insights in notes organized according to categories, without
having tried ve.ty hard to or~ranize thc!se categories .into a
sequence with a beginning, middle, and end.

In his later

books and essays, his lack of organization unfortunately
creeps into his sty le, hi theirt.o a model of lucidity, which
has become almost impossibly elliptical and discursive, a
peculiar contradiction to his insistence upon clarity and
simplicity in Basic English.

Really the best analogy for

the organization of his theories would be the image clusters
in Shakespeare's plays.

Theory incessantly erupts in vital

new metaphors to be integrated with what went before, but

often. obscurely and in unpredictable transformations.

Organi-

•:.zation is insisted upon, for ex,imple in thE:1 Preface to the

edition of The Meaning of Meanin9, where he proposed
credible explanation of the relationship among his early
this organization is superficial, usually the
topics or perspectives, and 6ften barely in
ntrol of its material.

The reader is spurred on by the

fusion of insi.ghts but denied a comprehensive understanding.

He has only the assurance that even a partial understanding
is fertile soil for explorations of his own.
Our own approach, likewise necessarily limited, will
justify his theory of affect

be to explore untt

rejected by the New Critics and unacceptable even to Hotopf
and Schiller~

The former mostly ignores the issue and the

.

latter proposes that Richards came of age in turning from
his
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impulse 11 theory to Coleridge's concept of. the projective

imagination, a metaphysical application of this theory which
Richards has earnestly (and correctly) declared to be a
consistent extension of h.is earlier views:

"I changed my

vocabulary and my metaphors somewhat • • • to present much
the same views again~ 11 8

It should be noticed in this remark

that Richards himself is willing to discuss his theories as
metaphors, models proposed to define the experience of read-~

ing poetry.

It is our contention that the rejected affective

principle underlying these metaphors justifies and integrates
the technical concepts he proposed that have been more
acceptable to New Critical theory.

As useful as these con-

cepts have been, this affective principle is more important,

particularly as the basis (perhaps the only correct basis) for
establishing a synthesis among the wide variety of critical
advocated today.

Our affective resp~nse to

may easily be established as the valid common
enominator for all of these approaches, upon which their
i~ferentiaa may be explored in mutually applicable terms.
Ut more of this later.

In this chapter his books will be

treated more or less in th(-dr or.igirnil sequence frankly as

our concession to the usefulness of enumeration in grappling
with his ideas.

His affective principles fairly clearly

defined in his early books will first be explorE~d, and then

their extens:i.on durin9 the thirties$

We shall finally attempt

to refute a few of the New Critical misconceptions about his
theories.

His later articles collected _in ~culative

! _ n s ~ (1955) and So Much ~e?-1:£ (1968) will be touchE~d

upon i.n the next chapter.

· 'l'he Foundation of Aesth~!::;!,~_§.., co=iiuthored by Richards
in 1922 w:i.th C.K. Ogden and Jam.es Wood, was his firHt book,
a slender ninety-two page comparative study of current theod.es
of beauty.

It has been neglected by critics of Richarde,9

though it first presented in relatively lucid fashion the
essential theories he later expanded, especially the concept
of synaesthesis.

Richards typically began his inquiry wit.h

a multiple definition, a list of sixteen possible definitions
· for beauty compiled in three groups progressively more affective in emphasis.

'I'he first was composed of purely objective

theories, the second of pragmatic and functional theories,
and the third of psychological theories, the most sophisticated of which being of synaesthesia:
I. Anything is beautiful which possesses the simple

A.

quality of beauty.

II. Anything is beautiful which has a specified form.

III. Anything is beautiful which is an imitation of
nature.
IV~ Anything is ~0autiful which results from success-

ful expl<}l:tation ·of a medium.
V. Anything is beautiful which is the work of genius.

VI. Anything is beautiful which reveals (1) truth,
13.
(2)

t.he spirit of nature,

(3}_ the ideal,

(4)

the

universalt· (5) the typicale
VII. Anything is beautiful which produces illusion.

VIII. Anything is beautiful which leads to desirable

social·effectso
IX. Anything is beautiful which is an expression.

x~ Anything is beautiful which

caut'5es pleasure.

XI. Anything is beautiful which Etxcites (;.'!motions.

XIIe Anything is beautiful which promotes a specific

emotion.

c.

XIII. Anything is beautiful which involves the processes
of empathy.

XIV. Anything is beautiful which heightens vitality.
XVe Anything is beautiful which brings us into touch

with exceptional personalities.
XVI. Anything is beautiful which conduces to synaesthesis.l

argue that theories VI through IX belong to part

c,

, ile XV properly belongs to part B since contact with "ex·-

Ptional personalities" does not necessarily imply a profound
:'feet upon consciousness.

But the point is probably not

worth debating.

Richards fairly quickly dismissed the theories of
beauty in groups A and 13.,often wit.hout seriously consider-

ing their implications, and moved to the psychological
theories in group C for closer e,mminatic.m.

He associated

the doctrine of pleasure, category X, with Santayana's

principle that beauty is "pleasure regarded as a quality
of a thing,

11

and criti.cized it only been.use it provides

too restricted a critical vocabulary ..

He later proposed an

explanation essentially similar when arguing against. the
obverse position that beauty is "inherent in physical objects,
not a character of some of our responses to objectse"ll
he likewise criticized Clive Bell's theory of
form,

•i

11

Here

significant

pattern in art which produces a unique aesthetic

emotion, since he could not accept the' view th.at our re-·
sponse to art is a qualit:at:tvely singular experience

Q

He

·.expressed a great deal more interest in the empathy (or

Einf8hlun~) theories of Lipps and Lotze, nineteenth century
German aeetheticians, especially in their treatment of

aesthetic experience as the interaction of impulses when
we project our feelings beyond ourselves to eliminate the
antithesis between self and object.

It is interesting to

note that he discussed the concepts of both impulse and

in this cont.ext, long before he supposedly
Coleridge's projective theory.· He has been

idely praised for abandoning his behaviorism for a proective theory with the publication c>f Col~~..idge £!!

_gn~ginati.on in 1935, as if he shifted his choice between
these mutually exclusive concepts.

Actually, both concepts

had been initially found by Richards in the scientific and
ti

metaphysical theory of ginfuhlunJI. developed in Germany.

The

''

best that might be said is that he later shifted his emphasis

from one aspect of this theory (impulse) to another (projection), but without abandoning behavi~rism for organicism,
neither alone adequately describing his views at any phase
in his career.

In Foundatiorm o!~ Aesthetics he did expn~ss

reservations a.bout the empathy theory, especially in its
extreme view of a mystic union with the objective world,
but acknowledged its importance ,;when correctly described." 1 2

Richards proposed that the most successfully inclusive
theory of beauty (and the principle of inclusion also excludes
non-aesthetic modes of experience) must be that of synaesthesis,
the equilibrium and harmony of impulses bringing the whole of
the personality into play.

In the early, presumably prim-

itive stages of aesthetic response, these impulses combine

to produce emotions, but with increased equil:i.br:i.um we become impersonal and disinterested, aware of our differenti· . ation and isolation from things around us.

With a partial

ordering of impulses, the resulting.disequilibrium is stim-

ulative and leads to either irresolution or action, as
Proposed for example by Marxist critics in.the propagandistic
Yalue of art; but with our equilibrium approaching perfecwe achieve an Apollonian synaesthesia, the aloof and
emote experience of beauty.

Richards claimed this principle

.j

ultimately derives from the Chung Yung of Confucius:

15

"Having

no leanings is called Chung, admitting of no change is called

By Chung is denoted Equilibrium; Yung is the fixed

Yung.

prindiple regulating everything under heaven." (p. 13)

But

his concept of synaesthesis had other sources as well.
Wellek discloses that the word

11

coenaesthesis" might have

been acquired from ~ycholog:i.cal Princl:E_l<:.:?.., by James Ward,

a Cambridge professor during Richards' undergraduate years,13
and Richards himself acknowledged the importance of Friedrich
Schiller's theory of equipoise between life and shape in
art.

Richards dutifully reported Schiller's denial that

purely aesthetic experience is possible as well as his inclusion of dispositions toward action among proper aesthetic
responses, but without exploring these concepts very thoroughly.

He obviously preferred Ethel Puffer's explanation

of a passive response, which he quoted at length:
The only aesthetic respose is that in which stimulation

resulting in impulse or movement is checked by its antagonistic impulse, combined with heightening of tone.
But this is tensio~, eg~!librium, or bal~~ of for£es,
which is thus seen to be a general condition of all
aesthetic experience. 14

(italics in original)

Richards, agreeing with both Miss Pµffer and
another contemporary, synaesthesia inv<,lves

equilibrium among our greatest number of imUlses, an aesthetic balance preventing us from breaking forth
The effect of beauty is the accomplishment of

equilibrium, the catalysis of the entire personality into
stasis, the opposite of praxis.
"for-itself,

11

Intentionality, the Hegelian

is metamor:,hized into what James Joyce cur-

rently found i.n thc-~pip:t'i.any, the

11

of-itself," the satis-

faction of a perfHct moment which would be vitiated by

additions or pragmatic applicationso

Neurotic gratification,

pol:i. tics, religion r and cmy other mode ~f belief and its

implementation must be excluded from the proper domain of
aesthetic response.

We are left with what F.R. Leavis de-

scribed in another context as "naive Marxism inverted," the
.
J in
. d'1v1'd ua l'ism o~f b a 1 ance d sens1J1
'J ' l'1 t '1es. lS
ra d 1ca.

The four th book of Richards t Science ~n<! ~.X.., pub-

lished in 1926, four years later, may be profitably examined
next since he simplified his ideas to address himself to a
general audience.

his

II

We find here the clearest extension of

impulse 11 theory of synaesth(~sis.

The political context

of his aesthetics was also clarified in his warning of
economic, social and political

11

dangers, 11 presumably of

an impending twentieth century upheaval.

Apocalypse had

undoubtedly been suggested, as proposed last chapter, by
Russian Revolution as well as World War I, labor conflicts,
a general malaise throughout the early part of the twen-

century.

rrhe root of these social problems,. Richards

lay in the psychological inadequacy of the individual
is ultimately, he felt, a

11

biological.crisis."

Man's

illingness to countenance and even participate in reessively barbaric collectivization lay in his inability

'""3.V

as an individual to organize hir1 personality toward satisfactory ends.

His impulses have become disorganizede ran-

domly scattered, and unproductively pitted in conflict with
each other, a conflict entirely different from the salutary
balance between Chung and Yung.

'l'heir disbalance has en-

couraged destructive modes of behavior to such an extent

.

as to.be recognized the "greatest evil which afflicts mankind.1116

The central importa,nce and responsibility of c:ci tics in

the twentieth century, Richards felt, is consequently to
make the adjustment and reconciliation of impulsE~s in.
literature available to our alienated public so th<;;;y might

bring their dissonant impulses into greater harmony.

The

static equipoise to be gained would be neither an ill considctred pr axis nor torpid inactivity, but, most appropriately,

an "incipient preparedness, 11 a readiness for action that
would substitute for actual behavior.17

If this sustained

condition of alertness were regained, most other problems,
both social and individual, would be easily resolved.

Poetry

would serve as a "perfectly possible means of overcoming
chaos," in fact a new Hindenburg Line defending our traditions
from the onslaught of barbarism (p. 82) •

'l'his social ob-

to have provided the basis for Richards' later
of multiple meanings, his ardent concern with
Ucation, and even his efforts to establish a Basic English.
Was vitally concerned with the preservation of the senent individual as a benign unit of a similarly benign

culture.

He felt the individual primarily (but not exclu-

sively) gains his equilibrium through a heightened responsiveness acquired-'<?:tt}m the experience of literature.

To explain our·responst'!. to literature more specifically,
Richards proposed a hierarchic theory of aesthetic consciousness interconnecting the impulse, a unit of experience, with
the text of poetry, the raw data uni.que+Y appropriate to the
SC i

ence

f
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suggested a sequential process in

our response from words to images and then ideas and emotions
(composed of impulses):
ideas
words

images
emotions

This sequence would occur simultaneously in our experience
and understanding of words.,

For this reasoi-1 a word could

be understood in one of two t-3enses, either as a sensory

stimulus, the recognized sign, spoken or printed, or in its
"full body 11 involving the entire process through images,
ideas, and emotions. (p. 11)

In the second and more compre-

hensive sense➔, the sign becomes a word when it resonates

with implications through the impulses it stirs and gratifies.
association with intricate pat.terns of impulses enables

adult using it t.o stimulate these patterns and newly:
them within the creative matrix of langua~e.

The

·• rd begins as a sign, the Pavlovian response j_nduced by

but in its complexity it soon becomes "the key"
experience, "a mere welter of disconnected impulses."

In

42

poetry, with its additional resources, ·the word finally becomes "a means of ordering, controlling and consolidating
the whole experience."

(p., 26)

Images, second in the above

diagram, betwt;e:n words c:1.1:.d' itl;;;;:•:,s and emotions, were only
suggc1sted by

igatea .18

Richards and in fact never tlu:>roughly invest-

At the i::ight end of his paradigm, then, Richards

divided the poetic response into two co~ponents, ideas and
emotions, establishing a dualism which led to most of the
controversy about his theories. 19

Ideas were described as

an "intellectual stream" or "realm of· thought 11 which prima-·

rily functions as a "means" to direct and excite the emotions:
"Our thoughts are the servants of our interests, and even
when they seem to rebel it is usually our interests that
are in disor·d.f1r." (p. 11)

In contrast, emotions were made

the active branch of consciousness, the seat of our interests
and source of energy in consciousness.

Here lies the realm

of impulses to be structured by ideas, eidetically bodied
forth in images, and consolidated in language.

Man's quest

for assurance in a homeostatic balance of impulses leads him
language and poetry for outlets of emotional fulfillment
experience.

Language, imagery, and themes are objective

modes of organization integrated in poetry to create an
quilibrium among the unsettled impulses in his mind.
Chapter VI, "Poetry and Beliefs," was the most contro(e\ren notoriom~} in Science and Poe:try and, for that

in Richards' entire corpus of criticism.

Here he

· d the dichotomy of emotions and ideas to distinguish
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between statements and "pseudo-statements."

Statements, he

claimed, are the proper concern of science in their reference
to facts which may be verified; but fiction, religion, metaphysics, and most human beliefs have consisted of pseudostatements, expressions arousing fe~lings and attitudes rather
than stating verifiable truth.

The word "pseudo-statement"

has been a pejorative term devised by logical empiricists
such as Ayer and Carnap to describe statements lacking objective validity because of tautological self-sufficiency,
emotional gratification, or, most commonly, the combination
of the two.20

Richards tried to adopt the term without

these implications in order to show how pseudo-statements in
literature serve the emotional needs of religion without
its defects in unsubstantiated belief.

By concentrating

upon the primary function of literature, the creation of a
static equipoise of impulse's, he felt, we abandon verifiable
truth to· science, and in doing so establish a clear, valid
foundation for the job .of criticism.

Belief, the confusion

of pseudo-stateme_nt with fact, has been removed from literature, replaced by "suspended disbelief," an "experimental
submission" we grant the poet to benefit from his organization
experience.
Richards had first proposed this radical distinction
etween the referential and emotive aspects of language in

--.;.=,

of Meaning, published 1923, again in joint author-

ip with C.K. Ogden.

He there claimed that the symbolic

e of words, what he called "statement," is "the recording,

.

e support, the organization and the communication of

references," while the emotive ut:a~, "probably more primitive,
expresses feelings and attitudes-

11

Poetry exclusively concerns

the latter, he said, because its emphasis is not verifj_cation,

but the arrangement of language "for the sake of attitudes
which their acceptance will evoke. 1121

This second use, the

"evol.":!at..i.ve function". of: words, has dominated human communi-

.

cation in religion, art, and ordinary social intercourse
since the prehistoric origins of language.

It is only re-

cently that the "symbolic function" has been sifted out,
isolated, and purified to divest empi:ric:al science of human

motivation.

It would be similarly useful, he suggested, to

purify the evocative function of poetry.in order to improve
the "range and delicacy" of human experience .. (p. 159)

As

the empirical methods of isolation and quantification eman·~

cipated science from belief and reliqion to bri.ng it of age,
so might criticism be brought to comparable levels of sophistication.

Aesthetic experience would become concentrated

perceptual activity freeing the memory "to widen and amplify
sen,sitiveness 11 and evoking emotions presumably to be balanced

and refined through heightened perception and memory. 22
Though it has been generally overlooked, Richards ac'knowledged in The ~~ani!),S, of Meanin~ that the symbolic and
':-,,_-

evocative functions of language cannot be entirely ~eparated.
e ridiculed the compa:r.ablt';1 ant:i.thesis between Intuition
(p. 241) and appt·ovingly quoted Vendryes, a con-

linguist, to the effect that

11

the logical element

. d affective element mingle constantly in language .. " (p., 152)

He even declared, "Not even matlH:mmtics is free as a whole
from emotive complicat:i.ons

(p. 153)

11

6

He consciously acceph~d

the paradox of trying to separate the inseparable as an in-

tri.nsice unavoidable problem oft.he "sign situation," as he
indicated in his diagram in the first chapter:
Thought or Reference

Symbol

e

•

•

•

~

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

"

._

Referent

With this triangulation of the "sign situation,

11

he sought

to demonstrate that thought or experience, the triangle's
apex, mediates the relationship between a symbol and its
referent., respectively the two legs of the triangle.

Their

tripartite relationship represents our association of a
symbol with a particular context of experience--we learn to
remove i.t from this context to be combined with others in

the context of language. (p$ 53)

The symbol thus becomes

an act of reference, a partly separated component of ex-

(the left leg of the triangle generated with its
fulcrum) which vitalizes the recollection of the

We are. required to respond once again to our
,arlier response, while the objective referent, wha~ever
aused this experience, remains one degree removed to be
scribed in its recollection.

An inductive gap exists

(represented by the dotted base line), and to close this
science must minimize the capricious behavior of thought

or reference, the triangle's apex, through the careful
verification of meaning.

Consciousness must be standardized

in its ct1.pacity as med-l.ator so the inductive leap between

symbol and referent {the base of the triangle) can be made.
What Richards defined as the

11

Utraquistic Subterfuge," the

confusion between qualities of things and their emotional
effect, must be reduced and, if possible, eliminated. 24
0

In

contrast, poetry and the arts must make a virtue of this
subterfuge by emphasizing the wealth of human experience im-

pinging upon the sign situation, including the speaker's
at.ti t.ude toward the referent and whomever he is addressing,

his intention, and even his response to the ease or difficulty of whatever he is saying. {pp. 223-27)

Emotion and

intuition would be properly involved as effects competently
managed in the context of poetry.

But this process emanating

from the triangle's apex should be distinguished from the
horizontal iriductive equation at its base.

These essentially

different uses of the identical sign situation should not
be abortively combined either through belief or its inHtitutionalization in religion and the state:

both science and

poetry must reject this fallacious confusion of purposes.
Science emphasizes the relationship between symbol and refwith the act of reference restricted in its c~pacity
empty, lucid mediator.

Literature properly emphasizes

his act, tho regnant process of human consciousness sufcommunication (radiating down both legs of the trigle) ·but not making the inductive leap (its base), with

the st:ring·ent c.::anons of verification it obllges.

Beli.ef,

the misguided effort to propose inductive validity for intuitive processes, can only lead us dangerously astray.

As

Richards later declared, "We need a spell of purer science
and purer poetry bf~fore the two can be again mixed, if in-~

deed this will even become once more desirable." 25

.

In Principle~ of Literary Criticism, published a year

-later in 1924, Richards sought to expand this concept of
aesthetics with an "impulse" theory of value bringing current
psychological investigation to bear upon the task of criticism.

His broad purpose was to find a synthesis among psy-

chology, ethics, and aesthetics that might justify beauty,
the pleasurable experience of art, as a moral act, the more

finely attenuated organization of the personality.

Here as

befot·e he uncritically accepted the thE-~ory of the impulse,

(according to Btooks and Wimsatt, reducing all experience
to "stimulus a~d response

11 )

26 as a useful reification of

aesthetics, the unit of conscious experience whether for
pleasure, pain, conation, memory, insight, etc.

The impulse

was not considered as small as the either-or response of
the single neuron nor as comprehensive as a motive or attitude, but loosely an aggragate of nervous activity whose
combination with others composes our conscious experience.
Richards occasionally fell prey to this reification, for

example when he warned against the "distorted" impulse,27
he nevertheless used it to erect the superstructure of
is theo1.·y with remarkable success.

He proposed that man is

a congeries of impulses to be integrated and balanced for
intelligence, sensitivity, and good taste.

Maturity and

fulfillment maximize their gratification, and whatever personality frustrates the fewest is qualitatively superior
because it is least wasteful of human potential.

Sacrifice

is conversely the. frustration of some impulses in order to
gratify others, and both the debauchee and victim of conscience must sacrifice too many.

Most of us make a "muddle"

of enough conflicting impulses to fall short of creative
potential.

Our inadequacy results fi:·om disequilibrium, the

exclusion of impulses we ca.nnot manage, and manifests itself
in overt behavior (praxis) and "assertion," the vulgar simplification of ideas because we otherwise lack the skill to
justify our experience.28

The poet is indeed our "unacknowl-

edged legislator'' 'because he possesses the genius to liberate
and justify his most fugitive impulses in the context of his
expression.

He possesses the normalcy and equilibrium to

orchestrate these impulses to the subtlest extent of human
experience, but his appeal may also universally gratify
relatively crude impulses.29
The crucial question for Richards, then, became the

· problem of communication between the normal, highly organized
poet and his properly receptive readerso

The poet must be

able to capture the subtlety and profundity of his experience
communicatE-:!d form, and the reader must be en ti.rely alert,
._.

..

II

•

•

1

v.1g1. ant 11

(a term borr.·owed from Dr. Head) , to be ade-

, ately responsive to this organization of experience.

The

problem the two must surmount is the gap between their minds
preventing an actual transferrence of this experience.

This

gap is similar to the inductive leap between a symbol and its
referent, but it exists between interpretations of the same

symbol within two "sign situations" (of the poet and reader)
and thus supplements the inductiv·e gaps both must respt:1ctively

.

surmount.

This "multiplied" symmetrical relati.onship may be

diagrammed with two adjacent triangles on the same base:

Thought of

Thought of

the Poet

the Reader

Referent

Referent
Symbol

The intersection

t,

11

symbol" represents the point of contact in

communication, while the entire base line represents three

·. inductive gaps in poetry, the

II

sign .situations II of the poet

reader as well as the leap in communication from one to
other.

To bridge the third of these ga~s (and in doing

the others as well), the poet must voice his own exwell enough to induce the effect of comparable ex-

in the minds of his readers. 30

The experience of

the poet and his readers cannot be identical, even in the
poet reading his own lint:::s, so the ideal reader :i.s an unattainable perfection a-r:id we are left with the distinction
between a "qualif iedt,,re:;-;;;;:di:.t'r; and th(:i range of actual re-

sponses mostly inadequate for one reason or another. 31

But

failure of the poorly equipped reader is matched more often
than not by the shortcomings of the artist in either his
organization of his experience (for example in the popular
poet, Ella Wheeler Wilcox, whom Richards unmercifully dissected) or his inability to communicate this experience.

To

overcome these inadequacies, Richards proposed a qualified
acceptance of Tolstoy's "infectious" theory of art:
1. Poetry is "inf ect.i.ous II in consequence of a grea tE~r or

lesser peculiarity of the sensation conveyed.
2. In consequence of a greater or lesser clearness of the
transmission of this sensation.
3. In consequence of the sincerity of the artist, that is,
of the greater or lesser force with which the artist
himself experiences the sensations which he is conveying. (p. 186)

second and thi.rd principles clearly embodied Richards'
communication and the normal organizati9n of:imin fact the word "sincerity" was lat<~r adopted

~ractic~l Criticism to define the personality with balimpulses.

Richards found the first principle unaccept=

however, because unusual experience_rnay-be expected to
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detract from the probability of art originally advocated by
Aristotle.

But if "peculiarity" were identified as original-

ity in the eJ<cpression of common exper i.ence, "what oft was
thought but ne'er so well e:x:p:ressc~d, 11 I suspect Richards

would have accepted it as an important complement to the
third principle ..
Finally, Richards was concerned wit;h the importance of
form as a mode of communication between the poet and his
readers$

to the

II

F'orm involved "technical 0 questions complementary

critical II componcmt of aesthetic judgment, but theSE!

questions were of considerable importance in the interpreta-

tion of poetry.
as

T~~

He had recognized this .importance as early

Foundations of. AErnthetics, when he proposed that the

"psychological story of the organization of our impulses"
must be balanced against the study of forrn, f!a physicophysiological account of the work of art as a stimulus." 32
He later speculated in Practical Criticism that perhaps half
the feeling of poetry comes from form. 33

Here, in Pr:LnciE..t~r;;

2f Literar;L_ Criticism, he defined form as objective pattern
in art that facilitates the stimulation of coenesthesia:
"As it {form] varies, so do our further or deeper responses
of feeling and attitude vary. 1134

He thus more or less treated

form as a stimulus evoking our response, and emphaticallj
ejected its autonomous objective context having independent
He found this to be an artificial imposition of
ckean secondary qualities upon the primary qualities of the
scribed experience.

F'orm ls not, he said, a "simple,

52

unanalyzable virtue of objects," (p. 167) and to think this
is to fall victim to the fallacy of "projecting an effect and
making it a quality of .its cause," (p. 21) what might be
labeled the '°Projective Fallacy.

Instead, he defined form

11

in terms of the pattern of response it induces, the "interplay
of effects" aroused in the reader.

173)

(pb

Formal elements

are the features of poetry creating the.effect of pattern,
"the stimuli, f3imple or complex, which can be most depended
upon to produce unifox:m responses~

11

(p. 193)

Rhythm and

meter were explained as a. subtle interaction bc1tween <.1xpectation and surp:d.ses 8 and metaphor as a

II

semi-surrept:i. t.ious

method by which a g:r.ea.tt~r variety of elements can be wrought
into the fabric of the experience. 11 35

The genre of tragedy

was similarly explained as a radical expansion of consciousness totally releasing suppressed experience through the

reconciliation of pity, the impulse t.o app:r.oa,ch, and fE:ar e
the impulse to retreat. (pp. 245-45)

In short, all form was

interpreted as the use of objective pattern (a sequence of
expectations and surprises, as was explicitly said of rhythm)

to maximize and harmonize the impulses of the reader.
In Practical Criticism, published in 1929, five years
later, Richards shifted from theory to applications, the
;study of typical problems of inadequacy in the interpretation

He reinterpreted Tolstoy's theory of sincerity
ccording to the Chung Yung of Confucian philosophy {also,

~cidentally, repeating the strange epigraph from the Bubis
'f Fernando Po already cited in The Mc:~anin[ o~ ~1eaning:

"Lt1t us go closer to the fire and see what we are saying o

11 )

to define good ta.ste as a matter of sincerity, the greater

complexity and finer differentiation of responses in the
creative·· i::nd:i vidct;:;;.r-;

_,r;;,,~'-;:;.ci ty was found to be expanded

consciousnessf the delicate inclusiveness enabling us to be
true to our judgment and intuition.

In~tead of rejecting

our fugitive and tangential flights of ~magination, we gain
the freedom to explore unafraid whatever occurs to us, with
the paradoxical result that we become "more appropriately
responsive to the outer ·w01".'ldo"

Our subjective confidence

gives us objective insight different from that of science,
but in a sense more valid through the additional resources
of intuition.

We have somehow, almost mystically, bridged

the inductive gap to "effect a union of the ~xternal and
int:ernal, 11 a feat which science may accomplish only through
the most rigid procedurese

(pp. 284-89)

Contrary to the

frequent accusation of his critics, Richards here proposed
that poetry as well as science enables us to escape the
solipsistic dilem1na of subjectivism.

Sincerity and good

taste enable us to merge the subjective and objective aspects
of experience as well as combining refinement and breadth
of consciousness:

"Being more at one within itself the mind

:,:hereby becomes rno:t·e appropriately responsive to the but~r
(p~ 287)

Inner harmony enables us to find harmony

our environment as well.
ThE:~se qm:ist.i.ons of taste, sincerity, and intuition led

fo:nnulate one of the most radical principles of
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affective criticism, that poetry is too complex to be judged
entirely with objective criteria.

Instead, he proposed, we

must read it carefully, with understanding and feeling, and
then judge it by evaluating our experience:

11

Value in poetry

turns nearly always upon differences and connections too
minute and .·unobtrusive to be directly perceived.
them only in their effects." (p. 302)

We recognize

ijut these feelings and

attitudes to be consulted must also involve the entire personality:

"The choice of our whole personality may be the

only instrument we possess delicate e:noug.h to effect the
discrimination." (p. 302)

Santayana had defined beauty as

our subjective response, and now Richards extended this
principle to its logical corollaries, (1) that criticism
must be the study of this response and (2) that this study
would involve the

11

choice 11 of our entire pex:sonali ty since

no part may be compartmentalized from the rest.

There was

also a paradox Richards was fully willing to accept, that
the entirety of our subjective experience must be consulted
.,

~~-

to make the most subtly refined objective distinctions in
judging poetry.

Narrowly cultivated analytic skills and

· . simplistic criteria, for example of irony, tone, or textu.re,
result in crude interpretation because they lack this re·. finement.

In fact, Richards said, any fruitful critical

of this sort is more likely to be misused than
;0

t because it will probably be hypostatized as a suppos-

ly infallible criterion independent of conscious choice,
e genuine act of critical judgment.

Richards also pro-

posed a third corollary of his affective principle, that
any presumed lapse in poetic technique breaking a parti.cular rule (for example he mentioned nonsense, vagueness,
mi.xed metaphoru and the pathetic fallacy) is justified if it
produces a satisfactory effect in the sensitive reader.36
The ultimate question of formal technique for Richards was
its effect, the subtlety and human apprqpriateness of the
response it evokes.

Technique was subordinated to human

response, defined by the effect it produces.
Richards proposed that the effect of poetry has four
aspects:

sense, feeling, tone and intention.

our failure

in the interpretation of poetry is a consequence, he said,

of our inability to respond properly to one or more of these
aspects.

Sense is the thought in poetry, the intellectual

content which is necessary to control our feelings.
274)

(pp. 191,

Feeling is the attitude we have toward what we describe,

our usually fugitive emotional response which we try to
anchor defined by sense. (pp. 181, 210-11, 217}

Tone (as

rediscovered by Richards) is our attitude toward those whom
we address, which in poetry is that of the poet toward his
.' readers..

Richards suggested that tone is the most difficult

of poetry to define since it is'thoroughly intermingled
the other aspects of meaning, but he emphasized that
•. it is probably the most important ingredient .of style, and,

Unfortunately, the most common source of failure through
such as over-insistence and condescension.

(pp. 182,

Finally, intention is the aim of the poet, the "effect
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he is endeavoring t.o promoteq" outside and yet controlling
the relationship among the other three aspects.

It is the

purpose to be accomplJ..shed throuqh their instrumental:i.ty.
(pp. 182, 356)

Richards believed that all four of these

aspects must successfully interact in good poetry and that
the competent reader in a high state of vigilance must be
sensitive to this interaction.
The shocking disclosure of Practical Criticism was that
the great majority of readers fall grotesquely short of this
ideal&

Misinterpretation is not only commonplaceu but much

more frequent than good o:r. even adequate intexpretaticm.

In fact, Richards proposed, "We must cease to regard a misinterpretation as a mere unlucky accident.
as a normal and probable event.cu (p. 336)

We must treat it
Richards e::,tab-

lished ten primary difficulties leading t~ misinterpretation,
each posing a separate problem though he found they usually
"depend upon one a.nother like a cluster of monkeys":
1. The difficulty making out the plain sense of poetry,

its overt meaning*
2. The difficulty of sensuous apprehension, of experiencing

the form and movement of poetry.
3. The difficulty in visualizing imagery&
4. The intrusi.vE~ influence of mnemonic irrelevances.
5. The intrusive influence of stock responses, "views

and emotions already fully prepared in the reader's
mind.

11

6. A proneness to sent:i.mentalityp the "over-facility in
certain emotional directions."
7. Inhibition, the fear of acknowledging a particular

experience.
8. Doctrinal adhesions, the intrusiveness of irrelevant
beliefs.
9~ Technical presuppositions, the ac~eptance or rejection
of a style because of its technical qualities, usu-

ally through identification with the styles of other
poets.
10. General critical preconceptions, the judgment of poetry
according to a particular critical theory. {pp. 13-17,
180)

Perhaps the most basic item for Richards in ,, this catalogue
of temptations was the fifth, the stock responser the crutch
of average intelligence in modern civilization.

Richards

conceded that the stock response is convenient and even
necessary in our daily behavior:

if we cannot rely upon the

habitual certitude of the stock response our lives would be
troubled by a plethora of Hamlet-like indecisions and unresolved sensitivities, and we would be unable to act. (pp. 240-

In poetry, however, he maintained, the stock response
at the expense of genuine experience.

It encourages

impersonality (except in false echoes of other poets),
and a general withdrawal from experience
another

e

It i.s a "premctture fixation"

leading to facile conclusions the very antithesis of poetry,
though too often proposed as its virtue, gaining credence
in external conventions and expectations~

E:itamples would be

the metrical regularity and archaic diction of nineteenth
century poetasters and Eliotesque juxtapositions in modern
academic verse.

In contrast, Richards said, "Nearly all

good poc:'lt:r.y i.s disconcerting, for a mo1nent. at hJ:ast, when
we first t,ee it for what it is.

Some dear habit has to be

abandoned if we are to follow it o 11 (p. 254)

Good poC'-,try

disrupts our expectations to expand our potential for experience, just as this potential must be expanded that we
might respond to the unique validity of poetry.

There i.s

mutual feedback, a reciprocal interaction with riothing to
gain but sincerity and, collectively, civilization itself.
In Mencius on the Mind, published in-1932, Richards
shifted his concern fr.om criticism to the problems of multiple definition, but in 1935 he returned to criticism in
Coleridge 2!l Imagination with a modification in his

Vi(:!WS

which has been treated as a recantation of his earlier radical distinction between science and poetry and his

11

impulse 11

theory upon which this distinct.ion had been basea. 37

In a

passage quoted earlier, Richards himself insisted upon t.ht~
continuity in his ideas, with a change merely in their
"metaphors," and this would seem to have been the.case.
anything, he was shifting his emphasis from the discreet
II

•
•
sign
si.tuat.ion"
to the metadynamics of consciousness, in

Psychology to the gestalt and in semantics to the total

If

projected meaning.

He was clearly rejecting s.imple behavior-

ism (which he had always avoided though sometimes dangerously
approaching it) for a more sophisticated materialistic theory
of effect in poetry6
What most intrigued Richards in Coleridge's criticism,
vast repository of undifferentiated insights, was his theory
of the imagination.

He found the integ~ative capacity of

the imagination explained by Coleridge to combine the objective and subjective realms in a unity of experience:

"The

subject is what it is through the objects it has been~"
(p. 57)

A new possibility thus offered itself, extending

the principle of sincerity to bridge (or bypass) the inductive gap of the "sign situation" without resorting to
scientific verification, this time through unity in the
coadunated and "esemplastic" act of experie'i'1ce.

Accordi.ng

to Richards, this unity would settle the rivalry between the
"regulative" and "constitutive" epistemologies extending
back as far as Plato and Aristotle with a synthesis in the
equation between our statements "I am" and "t.here are things."
(pp. 65, 184)

consciousness would be entirely a matter of

projection according to A.E. Powell's theory of romantic
imagination, the mind an "active, self-forming, self-real-

izing system" which both generates and discovers reality in
projection of meaning beyond itself. (pp. 69, 146)

In

synthesis of subject and object, the mind would also
ntegrate experience according to an

11

all in each" principle

at the units of meaning surrender their inde~endence to

ti \J

their cooperative purpose. (pp. 81, 97)
and its subjective counterpart in the

11

An isolated object

unit 11 of experience

would be abstractions we project according our interests into
t.he realm of "things. 11 (pp. 144-46)

Richards propoi;ed that

our projections of nature may be divided into four basic kinds
often confused with each otherz

(1) all influences on the ,

mind, (2) all the images of nthings" we _take to be the world
we live in, ( 3) the _images of "things II conf inned by the universal experience of mankind, and (4) the images of ''things"
verified by scientific procedures.

He found us to be pres-

ently embroiled in a futile conflict between false empiricism, the confusion of Nature in the third sense with its

first sense, and an equally false intuitiveness, an inadequate
projection of nature in the second sense.

What we need, he

said, is a rigid scrutiny of nature projected in the fourth
sense, of science, in order to establish the proper :r:·elatio:n-·

ship among the other three. (pp. 157-58, 170)
Richards proposed a theory of "mythology" to explain
coherence of experience we project upon nature, even in
science.

He def:i.ned mythology as "the utterance of the whole

and, as such, inexaustible to meditation."

What

a myth, he said, is what we put into it, the
that explai.ns and justifies our experienc~.

Myth trans-

us from beasts to men·and actually gives us what may
e construed as soul in the value.and purpose we find in our
ives. (pp. 171-74, 181)

It is the pattern, embodiment, and

manization of our projected world of experiencee

Richards

61

not surprisingly clai~ed that poetry is the most satisfactory
vehicle for myths, "the myth-making which most bring "the·
whole soul of

man

into activity," but without evoking action,

desire, will, or intellectual assent, the inadequacies he
had combated in his earlier "impulse" theory. 38

Like syn-

aesthesis, poetic myth transcends a Lockean "regulative"
meaning which is vulgarly didactic and an unjustified incursion upon the methods of science.

I_nstead, it is pro-

jection epitomized, not entirely understood or translatable
into prose, a journey which is its own end with no destination beyond ·itself. (pp. 173, 213-14)

We, its willing

readers, must exert ourselves to integrate it with our
repository of commonplace myths.

In a restricted sense,

of projection di$tilled and purifi~d, belief may be iccepted as the credibility we vest in our myths,though this
concept yet excludes belief as a commitment toward simpli-

.

fied goals and ideals.

Thes~ are mythic, but not of poetry •

.

An ancillary concern of Richards in Coleridge on
Imagination was the reiationship between words and experience.
I

,

He challenged popular·· ,'linguistic a,f3sumptions by claiming
that a word is not a unit of meaning, but an "abstraction
,from an utterance"· which of itself, artificially isolated,
/

/'

'

many possible meanings to be useful for communication.
He repeated his ;position in The Meaning of M~aning that the
ost important factor in _the speech act is meaning, the
of experience, not the symbol transferred to the
ntext of ~yntax which has been only one component of the

.,,. ..,

V -"•

"sign situation

11 :

"Apart from the speech act," he said,

"there are no words." (pp. 101, 104, 107)

He was primarily

interested in the organic interanimation of words as symbols
of experience, and even wEmt so far as to claim that the
absence of syntax is often favorable to the imagination.
(p. 91)

He did find in the single word at least a modicum

of projected imagination ("The projectiqn of its meaning
into a word is an instance of Imag.ination"), 39 but the
cluster of such projections in the. speech act obviously
seemc-:id the key t.o the fullest ret:1otu:ces of the ,imagi.n.ation.

In Th~ Philos9.eh.x_ of Rhetoric, published a year later

in l.936, the last of Richards' books to be treated in this
chapter, 40 he explored more thoroughly this relationship
between language and the imagination.
he labeled the "Usage Doctrine,

11

He attacked what

a prevalen't: attitude of

the thirties that words are "fixed factors 11 combined in a

sentence as a mosaic might be put together
independent tesserae."

11

of discreet

Instead, he proposed, words and

their meanings result from the wide

II

ir1terplay of the in-

terpretive possibilities of the whole utterance."

(p. 55)

, Meaning organically shifts and flows to adapt itself to

any particular context of this utterance, and the definition of particular words is part of this process in~a
of experience through the interpenetratioh of
11 • •

olanguage, well used, is a £2~letion and

oes what the intuitions of sensation by themselves cannot
o.

Words are t.he meeting points at which regions of
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experience which can never combine in sensation or intuition, come together.

They are the occasion and the means

of that growth which is the min.d's endless endeavm; to
order it.selfo

Tha.t is why we have language.

signa.lli.ng syst~>:m. 1141

It is no mere

Words may not be separated from

experience, what we might call the "images" of words, but
they do bring meaning to these images t~rough their interaction (not necessarily visual) afforded by the context of
language.

Words cannot be separated from their context of

e,,perience in the "sign situation, 11 but they bring meaning

to the experience they symbolize.

Metaphor particularly

interested Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric and should
be briefly mentioned in this connection.

He proposed that

thought itself is metaphor because it "proceeds by comparisons, 11 the mind primarily acting as

(pp. 94, 125)

a

"cormect:i.ng organ e

11

For this reason the figurative device of

metaphor in poetry may be understood as the superimposition
of metaphor upon metaphor. (pp. 108-9)

two senses or images,

11

The combination of

teno.r 11 and "vehicle" (their names

here proposed by Richards and now generally accepted), in
a single word or phrase leaves each sense individually meta-

. Phoric as an act of consciousness, but in their interanimation

creates an unusual new experience, an image exceeding and
Yet controlled by the language evoking it.

Throtigh metaphor

Poetry becomes the consummate embodimcmt of human experience,
control and definition of experience is experience
tself.
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II.
As I propose~d earlier (and this brief survey has un-

doubtedly shown), the wealth of theories proposed by Richards
in all their modifications and metaphoric transformations
have made it difficult for his critics with rival theories
to defend.

His total corpus of ideas in nine books of

criticism looms llke an enormous elephant whose shape is
to be judged, according to the parable, by the touch of
blind men, each lc1d to a different part of its anatomy.

And,

to be expected, the results have been less than satisfactory.
The more restricted the view, the more likely the assailant
has commitb.~d errors in interpretation, and his only pro-

tection (but a good one) has been the relative ignorance of
others.

11

'1.'hci Golden Rule of Scholarship" quoted by Richards

or co:mment on anything in a book which you have not read

from cover to cover, 1142 would seem to apply in his own case
to h.i.s entire output of books, a formidable task indeed.
And ft.1x· those who have read and studied his books r<;imains

the even mo:ce formidable task o:f: unravelling critical metaphors as superimpositions reinforcing each other where they

might seem inadequate by themselves.

t and

The task is difficult

perhaps best undertak(m first in a sympathetic light

lto gain a sufficient understanding for its later critical
{\f·,1,·

!; evaluation.
1

Those who have not taken this arduous route but leapt

~o define their broad differences too hastily h~ve unneces-
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sarily brought their own critical competence into quest.ion.
For example an attack by Montgomery Belg:i.on was scathingly
refuted in detail by Richards simply through Belgian's
evident inability to understand Richards' ideas:

he pro-

posed an interpretation which Richards ironically suggested
had been itself "a. contribution towards the study of interpretatione 1143

It seems doubly remarkable that Robert

Stallman later quoted Belgian approvingly in one of his more
flagrant misinterpretations of Richards, that he "equates
poetry with life," an explanation so vague and meaningless
as to be safely ignorea. 44

More recently, to turn to a

typical formalist assessment, Murray Krieger has zealously
attacked the

11

vitalism 11 of Richards' theories compared with

a "contextualist

11

position generally advocated by the second
,,

generation of New Critical apologists, including Vivas, Wellek,
Heilman, and Unger, among others acknowledged by Krieger as
mentors and teachers .. 4 5

In defense of the1r views, Krieger

resorted to simplifications and categorical generalizations
to such a.n extent that one asks why Richards might not have
recognized the patent absurdity of his views.
is quite simple:

The answer

they have not been the views of Richards,

but of Krieger's conception of Richards, an altogether different matter~

For example, Krieger clai1ned, "For Richards

of all experience is the arousal of attit~des, the

of the e:Kperience depending upon the extent of
omplexity in the cluster of attitudes. u46

(italics add<:1d)

n this thoroughly misleading simplification, Krieger
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neglected to mention that the admittedly quantitative difference proposed by Richards between art and common exper.ience
usually leads to quali 't,$ti.ve distinctions, for example in
the "stock response'' ;,acceptaiHe to Richards in our daily

behavior but decidedly not in poetry.

Different "attitudes"

would thus be involved in the experience of poetry and that·
of daily living.

"attitude"?

But what did Krieger niean by the wo.rd

If he was referring to synaesthesis, sincerity,

or myth :tn poetry, as proposed by Richards at one point or
another in his career, there might be a grain of truth in
this explanation, though Richards himself severely criticized Max Eastman for exactly this undifferentiated enthusiasm for experience. 47

But if Krieger is referring to

"attitude" as an opinion or belief, as the common usage of
,•

the word would imply, then he is attribut.in9 to Richards a
position exactly the opposite of what he has held.

Through-

out his career Richards has consistently sought to define
and encourage the experience of poetry that cannot be boiled
down to attitudes.
Krieger also claimed that Richards' obsession with the
relationship between a poem and its experience "forced" him
~to deny" the relationship between a poem and reality. 48
Krieger here repeated the common argument against Richards
.With somewhat more than thfJ usual exaggeration, but ignored

~as have the others) that Richards proposed the inductive

w' ap
1

in the "sign situation" fully conscious that the emotive
referential functions of language cannot be entirely

ti/

isolated from each other.

Furthermore, also ignored by

Krieger, Richards subsequently proposed a number of pos~d-

bilitiec for bridging {or bypassing) this gap, including
his theories of mythic projection and Confucian sincerity,
both of which have been mentioned in this chapter.

If

Richiu:ds correctly extcmded this fundamental problem of
epistemology to aesthetics, he was hardl,y victimized by
his awareness.

In fact, with his theory of the "sign situ-

ation" he proposed exactly the subject-object relationship
Krieger says he denied, but with full recognition of the
problems compe.lling its thorough .investiqation.

His effort

to grapple with these problems has been far more successful
than that of formalists with their simplistic, unexplored
epistemology of a perfect equation between experience and
rEHlli ty.

Krieger additionally claimed that Richards has fallaciously presented us with an absolute choict~ between mech·-

an.istic psychological analysis, his own approachf and no
approach at all, the absence of analysis through a "self-

wil.led mute" idealism. 1149

His implication was that Richards

would not accept the value of formal analysis, what he
considered the fruitless pursuit of fictive Platonic forms.
But Richards has imposf.:id no such absolute choice.

Through·-

out his career he has treated "technical" analysis as a
necessary supplement to affective criticism, and in fact
his approach to explication as well as his theories of
etaphor, tone, ambi.gui ty, and irony have betm rea.di ly

b8

adopted for the usos of formal criticism.

He emphasized

their importance in the context of affective criticism, but
he certainly did not proscribe their use in a strictly
formal (or

11

technical 11 ) approach to criticism.

If an abso-

lute cho:i.ce has been e:;;tablished between formal and affective

critic ism, it has been impos1;:;d by others O not Richards him·-

self, who tried to maintain a

11

dualist 11 _critical outlook.

Our last example from Krieger I s imposing supply of misinfo:cma=•
tion is his claim that Richardt,' affective approach pre-

vented him from finding any norm for the experience of
poetry except a clat:rn of responserj relatively close to an

author 1 s, which, Krieger claimed, is

11

merely the regulator

of tlH,! lowest denominators ranged about it~ 1150

In other

words, the only standctrd Rich,,.1rds could find to judgt":! tht'!

validity of poetry I s ex.plication was i t.s common e;;cperienoe
"relatively close" to that of the poet, too imprecise a
standard to be useful to the critic.

Again Richards seems

to have been attacked for defining a problem of criticism
that would otherwise have been overlooked.

Richards was

of course quite concerned with finding a "norm," or at

least a range of adequate responses that might be considered
normative, and he devoted an entire book, Practic~! Criticism,
to this question..

He proposed a choice of four possible

:norms, of the artist himself, the perfect reader, the qual':;._

lfified
reader , and our actual flawed experience (too oft,~n)
~
$,

rf in
1

the e:>cplication of poetry.

tf the ideal reader,

He recognized that the second,

(!),

provides the best norm, but also an
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impossible one; he alr;o recognized the advantages of the
first, the artist himselfu but also its unavailability to
the p'..:.liL.:- at large.

He therefore chose the third as a

practical goal and began grappling with the fourth to bring
our inadequate reading habits up to the level of competence.
His presentation of a choice did not mean that he lacked a

suitable norm; quite the contrary, he had a thoroughly
sophisticated theory of norms that forced him to reject that
of the

11

pe.rfect" r.ea.der t1pparently required by Krleger I s

contextualism.

These manifold errors of Krieger would not

be so irritating but for his condescension toward presumed
errors in Richards and the fairly widespread circulation of

his views.
Krieger seems to have owed his attitude toward Richards
,,

primarily to Eliseo Vivas, whose 1935 article,

I.A. Richards 1 Aesthetic Theory," 51

11

Four Notes on

first represented this

formalist position, fully as erroneous but with a good deal
more sophistication.

Besides the several a.rguments he

furnished Krieger, Vivas additionally proposed that Richards'
theory of aesthetic response is Apollonian in the Nietzschean
sense and excludes the entire range of Dionysian response.

He insisted that art is important as "stimulus to the yeasaying qualities of existence,"52 in other words as the
arousal of belief and encouragement to action.

We would con-

this "vitalist" position but must postpone the
until next chapter.

Vivas also claimed, however,

a delicate reconciliation of impulses in literature does
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not necessarily reproduce itself in the minds of its readers,
nor, for that matter, does it necessarily have a salutary
effect, as would be indicated by the many neurotics and criminals in the craft of letters. 53

His point cannot be en-

tirely denied, though Richards would reply (ignoring Lukacs'
excellent arguments about decadence) that normative value in
literature cannot be judged by the exceptions inevitably to
be found.

The reader benefits from exposure to a variety of

poets so idiosyncrasies may cancel each other in his accumulated experience.

As for reproduction of sensitivity in

the act of reading, Richards would insist that reproduction
l·.s
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inef f ic:i.ent and subord.inate

to the projective imagination, and this duplication at least
somewhat modifies tht~ structure of person·ality in whi.ch it
has been received~

Only the computer perfectly isolates its

operations from the modifications of information so this
input may be entirely erased.

If this premise is accepted,

and to deny it is tantamount to solipsism, precisely the
radical "subjectivism" of which Richards has been accused,
then the question of sensitivity evoked by poetry is a matter
of degree, exactly the point he has repeatedly tried to make.5 4
The angriest and most hostile early assessment of
Richards• also written in 1935, was the review of Coleridg~
~

~ination by F.R. Leavis, "Dr. Richards, Bentham and

Coleridge. 11 55

It was probably this review more than any other

le critical evaluation that put the stamp of orthodoxy
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upon the New Critical disparagement of Richards' theories.
Once Leavis opened the attack, it became fashionable to treat
Richards as a beneficial ~~rly influence whose flaws were
nevertheless too eg:i..c:~ivusifor his theories to be taken seri-

ously.

Leavis devoted a good deal of his argument to Richards'

presentation of his theory (his philosophical predisposition,
exclusions, abstractness, and lack of c~arity and concrete
evidence) rather than the theory itself.

Instead of treat-

ing Richards 1 views as a proposal or prolegomenon to a theory,
he attacked their organization and presentation with the
rigours of explication usually reserved for poetry itself.
Many of his arguments may be granted, for exampl,~ upon

Richards' utter neglect of the social, conventional, and
historical backgrounds of literature, but the question remains, "So what?

Warm I t

Richards neverthc;less correct. upon

the topic he dealt with?"

Questions raised by Leavis upon

the epistemology of aesthetics were relatively few, and seem
to have mostly involved the concept of myth.

He challenged

the usefulness of a theory of myths so "generously" in-·

elusive as to embrace both poetry and science, and lacking
the specificity to differentiate even myths of different
magnitudes.

But in doing so, he apparently failed to rec-

ognize exactly this purpose in the four projective·theories
of nature proposed by Richards.

His attack also provides us

With a fine example of our difficulty with Richards' overlapping critical metaphors.

There is "not even a beginning

in the serious critical analysis of poetry," as Leavis
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claimed, simply because Richards had exhaustively presented
this part of his theory in Practical Criticism, the book
whi.ch introduced the r.s.erious critical analysis" pursued
today.

In Coler:i.dqe :~n· Irnac}i.nat.ion, Richards did not repu-

diate his earlier specificity, but shifted to the projective concept of myth to define the epistemological basis

..

of his theory.

Lea.vis thus seems to ha.v.e been pitting

Richards against himself, employing e~rlier standards of
specificity against later abstractions intended to be
complementary.

Richards' earlier books had often been

criticized for being too behavioristicr ironically, now
that he proposed an organic theory to defend himself from
these charges, he was immediately pounced upon for being
too broad and ab i:..; tract •
,'

The critical assessments by D.W. Harding and Max Black
were a good deal more balanced and included a point or two

upon Richardt,;' technical competence that may be ment.ioned
in passing.56

Harding principally objected to the confi-

dence of Richards' psychological amateurishness, particularly
in his theory of the "impulse," a hypothetical entity of
dubious value for criticism.

However, granting this short-

coming, no critic except Aristotle has y<'?.t transcended the

· limitations of amateur psychology with greater success than
Richards.

He was expertly familiar with current trends in
and managf.?d quite successfully to simplify them

for his layman audience.

It is true he did not adequately

efine many of his technical concepts (most obviously the
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"impulse~ 11 )

,

but here his a.mbi tion merely exceeded what he

accomplished, which remains vastly more thorough and consistent than the Platonic vagaries most critics have confused with aesthetic response.

Max Black similarly attacked

the amateurish nominalism of Richards' early theory of
meaning, claiming that Richards had relied upon too narrow
a definition of "referent" as a thing tq be signified with a
name. 57

But int.he "sign situation" defined by Ogden and

Richards, the referent is a total body of experience stimulated by myriad

11

things 11 in the physical universe, and the

symbol is me.rely one component which is given the independence to interact in the context of language.

This hardly

seems a narrow definition, or the naive behaviorism assailed
by Black elsewhere in the same article._ As Ransom had

correctly maintained earlier, the nominalism of Richards was
actually his emphasis upon the psychological context of a
symbol being its

11

referent 11 rather than the "things" ex-

perienced that might have caused or stimulated this context,
and this seems an entirely different matter.

With much

more justification, Black also criticized Richards' neglect
of syntax, the full

11

assertion 11 of an idea in contrast to

the sense of particular words which is merely "presented."
Black showed Richards to have treated "presentod 11 -symbols as

if they were "asserted," prematurely imposing syntactic
standards of truth in order to include a greater number of
in the category of emotive, non-referential disAnd indeed it seems true that Richardst general
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neglect of syntax might have led to this difficulty, though
it had little direct bearing upon Richards' theory of affec-

tive criticism.

Black himself fell into a comparable trap,

however, when he declared that. the :resolution of ethical
issues with a thecn:y of the
influence" is almost

11

II

interplay of gc-merated emotive

mischievous. 1159

'l'he attempt to eliminate

emotion from ethical judgment seems the _same· kind of pre--

mature categorizing, and in fact an impossibility hypocritical
to maintain.

The standards of verification might be two-

fold and more elaborate than Richards had calculated, but
the affective phenomenon is equally impexvious to the effort
to simplify and eliminate it.
The most important theoretical response to Richards
seems to have bet1n the long first chapter (131 pages) .in New

Criticism by John Crowe Ransom, published

ln

1941.

Ransom

was not so interested in refuting or discrediting Richards
as in reassessing his ideas in order to incorporate what he
found of value in a more acceptable theory of aesthetic
response.

He disliked the

11

nominaliem" of Richards in frankly

preferring the affective response to poetry to its objective
interpretation.

It seemed an unnecessary repetition to devote

our analysis first to a description of the text and then to
that of its duplication in the mind of the competent reader.
our affective response beyond this duplication becomes
and inchoate, introducing dangerous temptations and
Uncertainties, he proposed replacing affective theory with a
new approach, "cognitiv(~" criticism, c~mphasi.zing our inter-
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pretive understanding and thus the text itself as directly
understood.

Our total response, the

11

choice of our whole

personality," would be left to occur spontaneously and appropriately if the cognitive problems have been adequately
dealt with.

'!'his neglect is thoroughly justified, he in-

sisted, because the experience of art is in fact primarily
cognitive and its cognitive interpretati~n gains for us the
acumen to differentiate among our emotional responses.
Emotions-in-themselves are fictions and "all but unintelligible for us in their supposed independent purity."

With-

out cognition to attach themselves to, they would dissipate

and very likely vanish.60

Ransom's shift in emphasis from

affect {not denied but clearly subordinated) to cognition
appa.r:f.Hltly solved the plethora of difficulties Richards

brought upon criticism.

Truth, logic, and belief were re-

instated as qualified virtues of poetry, and formal interpretation was given its freedom since the cognitive response
merely replicates the formal properties of a text in the
mind of its ideal reader.
Ransom's proposal has considerable appeal and not sur-

prisingly furnished the basis for a "New Criticism," as he
proposed it to do, a methodology benefiting from Richards'
insights but liberated from the muddle of subjectivism imposed by his affective framework.
Wimsatt

SE!em

Others like. Wellek and

to ha,ve mer<."!ly elaborated and justified in

Schol,irship tlH-lse foundati.ons proposed by Ransom.

However,

are dangerous pitfalls in the theory of cognitive
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criticism.

Affect is indeed consolidated and differentiated

in its co~p1:Lt:i.V<l! embodimentp but, as I

lat.er try to show in

~hapter Five, it also activates and directs our cognition.
~

dialectical interpenetration exists between the two that

prevents one from being artificially isolated from the other.
Richards cannot investigate affect isolated from cognition,
as in fact he does not try to do, but R~nsom and others have
the sam(:! impediment that they cannot trcjat cognition inde-

pendent of affect.

Such a compartmentalization does not

occur in consciousness, and to propose it in theory invites
error.

Ransom himself has avoided serious mistakes, but

his theory has encouraged the formalist reductionism art.ic=•

ulated by Cleanth Brooks, its most respectable practitioner,
and generally pursued in academic scholarship.

Formal

,'

questions were pursued to the exclusion of personality and
even history (the collective inter~ction of interests and
personalities), supposedly "reductionist" byways from the
essential responsibility of contextual interpretation.

How-

ever, we must agree with Richards that the objective text
itself is not of primary importance since it i.s a meaningless clutter of hieroglyphics if we do not share the language and experience to understand it.

Nor is our strictly

cognitive response of primary importance since it is,·in
fact, a feat of radical abstraction impossible in human behavior.

What is of primary importanc(i is our cognitive-

affective response, and here, whether we like it or not,
a11 the subjective difficulties proposed by Richards arise
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as if from Pandora's box.

They cannot be brushed aside and

arbitrarily excluded from criticism, nor need they be, for
Richards has shown how at least some of them may be quantifi.ed,
sorted, and brought into a little more order.

Poetry involves our total response to the text of poetry,
so its study must b e ~ facto the study of this response.

Any theory diverting us from this essentjal task is (I respectfully submit) thoroughly misleading.

•rhe "Affective Fallacy 11

labeled and delivered by Wimsatt is hardly a fallacy, but
in fact the first principle to be taken into account~

The

real fallacy beguiling us from the job of criticism might
be labeled, as I earlier proposed, the "Projective Fallacy, 11
what Richards explained in P~!E£ip).es of Liter~y Criticism
to be "projecting an effect to make it a quality of its
cause. 1161

or we might reconsider (as Richards asked in The

Philoso.E.!".!X. of Rhetoric, p. 116) what William James called

the "Psychologist's '.r"'allacy," the confusion of our method-

ology with the material investigated.

The objectification

involved in both fallacies is perfectly acceptable and even
desirable for the ~~p__~rie~ of beauty, as Santayana insightfully explained in his principle that beauty is pleasure
regarded as a quality of a thing.

But it is not acceptable

unrecognized in the !>_tudx: of this experience.

Here is exactly

Where the unexplored assumptions of formal (or "contextuali.t:;t"}

rcriticism arise~ in the "projective" confusi.on of a formal
rtethodology with the objective text it supposedly explains.

~Wherea.s
,. ·v,,.
r4
'
• Int ries
'
t o c'l e f':t.ne tl·1t~ C,oIl:\-p 1.ex1.' ty
,
- d··ff ec,.:.1
.. c ....
,. t·1.c1.s

l
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of this relat:ionshi.p, formal criticism treats a subjective
need, the analytic (and authoritarian) quest for shape, as
if it were simply an intrinsic and sc~lf~.. sufficien-t feature

of the text.

Not so--the teleology of form is experience:

form is imparted by the poet to be recognized by his readers

.

for effects surpassing whatever gratification lies in pattern
it.self, as Richards cleverly demonstrated i.n his Jabberwocky
parody of "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity.»62

Without

the experience of meaning, form tumbles into an empty chc1os

of hieroglyphic iterations.
The ignorance of New Criticism ultimately

lif;!S

in a

dubious theory of psychology, moi-:e erroneou13 than the

II

impulse"

theory of Richards, that cognition may be isolated from
affect.

Its arrogance lies in the thoroughly misguided belief

that its methodology justifies this ignora~ce and the unexamined reductionism it encourages.

'I'o the contrary, the

experience of poetry is multi-dimensional, requiring considerably more breadth in its interpretation.

Many realms

of experience may be profitably brought to bear upon poetry,

beyond even the limits of interpretation imposed by Richards.
We may conditionally explore the unconscious response emphasized by psychoanalytic and archetypal approaches as well as
the social response ernph,isized by the Marxist, and,· most

recently, Structuralist approaches.

All of these are in-

Volv~d, however ancillary, in the experience of poetry, and
thus may be properly brought into account.

The particular

contribution of Richards, aside from having provided the

initial inspiration for much of the valuable theory in New
Criticism, has been in giving us a means to escape the cul
de_ ~ into which this theory has led us·.

The "choice of

our whole personality" raises questions beyond any abstract
theory of cogni.tion and whatever formal guidelines of explication it serves~

'rhis

II

choice, 11 our affective response,

is properly the common denominator of al.1 cri ti.cal approaches

(including the formalist), affording the basis by which their
differentiae may be synthetically explored.
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Chapter Three:
Richards' Later Criticism and a Stratificational Alternative
The inadequacies of Richards' early theories that concerned the New Critics were his pseudo-scientific reliance
upon the concept. of the "impulse II and hi.!3 dichotomy of affect

and cognition-·-they accepted the dichotomy but rejected his

choice in affect to explain aesthetic experience.

Instead,

they emphasized poetry as a refinement of knowledge and
shifted their sights to the "facts" known to criticism--the
objective text as a composition to be explicated.

Here we

claim they were in error, for in this dichotomy neither of
tho two componEmts 1 affect and cognition f may be?. extracted

and purified to the exclusion of the other. 1

Richards had

first proposed the dichotomy, but throug~~ut his career
tricJd to f i.nd a. suitable harmony between the two, succes~·
sively in the concepts of Chung Yung, 'I'olstoyan sincerity,

and mythic projection, whereas the New Critics uncritically
accepted its compartmentalization, leaping to a naive epis ...
temological equation that ~hat we empirically observe in a

text must (and can) be duplicated by a mirror-like aesthetic
response.2

They wanted this response to be devoid of affect

so our interpretive skills would not be distorted by subjective bias, and with a passive intensity so the text would
b1;1

duplicated accurately.

However, this ideal is beyond

human capabil:i. tic~s. and, for th:i.s reason, extraneous to

aesthetic experience.
II

To his credit, Richards conceded this

·. Perfect." re~1ponse to bE~ an unattainable one, though he has
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apparently encouraged our effort to approach its perfection ..
But there is a more fundamental problem in Richards'
affective theory ignored by New Critics, who in fact have
been even less equipped than he to rectify it.

Richards

proposed a poetic response more dynamic than theirs, but by
no mean:1 dynamic enough and without involving enough of the
personality in this response.
"active

11

Richards µid propose an

theory of meaning, one which he could defend from

Bertrand Russell's distinction bc~tween active and passive
meanings, respectively "that of man uttering a word" and

"of man hearing the word."

The active meaning, he said,

is the more fundamental of the two for it "explains much"
in the passive meaning of our response. 3

This we must en-

tirely agree with, but we have to go further to declare
that the so-called "passive" meaning of the reader is both
as active and creative as the
sition by the poet.

11

active 11 processes of compo-

The reader is initially a passive

respondent to the "speech utterance" as an "interanimating"
collection of words, but all of the:ise compose a '' sign situation" which he must then recreate as well as possible in
the-context of his own experience.

This necessitates his

active involvement, his maximum freedom to move about both
in the context of poetry and his own background of experience
to find whatever might seem of value in his ."transaction"
With poetry. 4

Richards has apparently rejected this degree

of freedom, as would be indicated by such remarks as,

11

The

identity of the addressee is irrelevant to the poetry as

poetr;y. 5
11

But we must reply that this freedom of identity

is essential,

e'vtm

crucial to poetry; the "choice of the

whole personality" proposed by Richards himself necessitates
total involvement, not the distillation of attention he
proposes. 6

Richards' dynamic principle conflicts with his

st.atic limitations excluding personality, for our identity
is ultimately what we do, the choice we make.
It should be added here that our choice-making activity
involves enormous realms of experience Richards wanted excluded from our response to poetry.

The unconscious is

involved in this "choice," particularly with its dynamics
of repression and displacement, as well as mu: sense of

social identity, the values and aspirations we share with
those around us.

Both realms influence language and poetry:

"Words, said Bul{harin, "are the depository,, of the whole
previous life of mankind."

"Within the microcosm of the

word," he claimed, "is e.mbedde;::d the macrocosm of history.

The word, like the concept, :i.s abridged history, an 'abbrev.iatux·e,

1

or epitome, of soc:icil-historical life." 7

Norman

Holland has also pointed out the "defensive" nature of words,
their counter-cathectic value in protecting us from an unacceptable oral passivity. 8

Both these concepts of language,

respectively Marxist and Freudian, are relevant to .the choice
we make in the language of poetry, and thus deserve serious
consideration in the context of affective criticism, as
do other, comparable reductionist approaches, whether thematic,

archetypal, existential, or structuralist.

Ari eclectic

working hypothesis may be proposed, in fact, that eaoh~cif
these approaches is valid to the extent that it defines a
particular area of

making activity.

:i-urn;:2n

experience involved in this choice-

They may be more or leBB listed on a scale

ranging from conscious particularity to unconscious universality:
..
~,
our discovery
o:f s1gn1f1cat1on
in

l. 'J:hematic

9

;\

•

themes and patterns.
2. Structuralist

pattern synchronically imposed upon

literature in our futile struggle
against entropy.
3. Ex.h,t:ential

personal comrni trnent and fulfillment:

tested by literature.
the contradictions of our role in

4. M.ar:x:ist

history expressed in literature.
5. Psychoanalytic

the unconscious dynamics of fantasies

in literature.
6. Archetypal

our expectations of character and
story-outcome shared with others.

These categories are not mutually exclusive, and this
list is certainly not exhaustive, for other reductionist
approaches may easily be added, for example Christian ex-:

egesis, currently of waning popularity.

But each of these

approaches occupier. territory in ml:tpping our "whole person-~
~lity," and thus helps explain the dynamics in our experience of poetry.

Its topographical particulari~y suggests a
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model to help define our aesthetic response.

It cannot be

pre-emptively rejected as reductionism precisely because •it
is proposed as a model, not an inclusive "objective" assessment.

If poetry were a static collocation of aesthetic

properties, then we could make our choice among these reductionist approaches as fiefdoms of inquiry, or, more
likely, we could reject them all for formal reductionism,
one more fiefdom, of the "intra-referential" context.

How-

ever, poetry is dynamic, not static; and to the extent that
any approach might~ objectively sufficient without involving the others, it is indeed reductionist, a misleading
reification.

When acknowledged, nevertheless, the taxonomy

in any of these approaches may be highly useful, qualified
by the understanding that no model thoroughly defines experience or excludes the use of other models''·

To make

either claim exceeds the benefits of reductionism.

Each

critical· approach is thus a "tool," an activity defined by
Levi-Strauss as "bricolage," our pre-scientific craftsmanship, in this cas.e to 0build" a definition of aesthetic
response.9

Our aesthetic response of course remains a mental

process independent of its model, and should not be confused with any of these reductionist approaches, as has often
occurred, particularly with formalism.

'l'his confusion is

precisely the Psychologist's Fallacy mentioned.last chapter.
Every critical approach, however impressive, also has paradigmatic limitations essential to be recognized.

The most

important of these is that our.aesthetic response doesn't abide
\
\

\

\
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by reductionist boundariesv but sweeps across them all.
These boundaries are only useful to the extent that they
help chart its nwvement.

Sartre proposed a dyna,mic theory of language which dr:ama.t-

.

icnlly contrasts with the exclusionary passiveness proposed by Richar.ds ~

Sc1rtre claimed sl:mpl,y,

11

•.ro speak is to

act," and, without contradicting himself, "To write is to
give,,"

He also said, "By speaking, I reveal the situation

by my Vt;1ry intention of changing it,

to which .lanquage involVE:S purpose~

11

su9qesting the extent
"'I'lrn engaged writer,

he added, "knows that words are action.

1r

He knows that to

reveal is to change and that one can reveal only by planning
... n,-...
to ,,..._h
~ ...
«J.
~\'.::;:.,, ulO
0

He propoged thf;; wr:i. ter I s e:n~1,a,geny2:nt. v his
•'

comm.i tmc-mt to this change in a social (and specif i.cally

Marxist) context, but the principle applies to other dimetisicmr; of experience as WHll
11

a wag(~r--a r.isk assumed 6

11

c

He claimed that each word is

and he personified and projected

this «risk" in our dynamic relationship with language, giving
it almost superhuman proportions:

Thus, regarding language, it is our shell and our anten-

nae; it protects us against others and informs us about
them; it is a prolongation of our senses, a third eye
which is going to look into our neighbor;s heart.
are within language as within our body.

We

We feel it

spontaneously while going beyond it toward other ends,
as. w.:~ feel our hands and

OUX:'

feet; we perceive it when
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it is the other who is using it, as we perceive the

limbs of others.

There is the word which is lived and

the word which is met.

But in both cases it is in the

course of an undertaking, either of the acting upon others,
or the other u.pon n1e. 11

For Sartre language asserts purpose, behavior, assessment,
and our entire identity.

It is not the .distillation of

sensitivity in a speech utterance, but an "expressive cosmology," the world defined in its projection by the speaker.
This dynamic conception of language proposed by Sartre
was rooted in a theory of communication.

He considered

language a socia.l act, a "collaboration" between the writer
and hi.s readers, 12 the "appeal.

11

made by the writer to the

reader's freedom,9 uniting the two toward a social goal, "the

subjectivity of a society in permanent revolution. 11 13

The

writer "mediates II this revolution in the self-awa.rent~ss he

instills in his readers:

"If you name the behavior of an

individual, you reveal it to him~ he sees himself.

And

since you are at the same time naming it to all the others,
he knows that he is seen at the moment he f:rnes himself. 1114

The reader is thus both a victim and accomplice of the writer;
his ·act of reading is a "dialectical correlative" of that
of writing in their "co-joint" exper..ienceo

Reading is an

activity making itself passive in order to recreate the
experience of the writer, but in this re-creation, paradoxically,

11

passivi.ty becomes an act.

11

The writer· "takes ad-

V'antage11 of what the reader knows II in order to tl:'.!ach him
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what he·does not know":

the reader passively acquiesces to

their sh.a.ring of knowlc.:dge, but rm.u;t actively make his own
further discoveries ca.tal.yzed (or "mediated

11 )

by the writer $15

Any alternative to this communication of discovery is an
eva.sion, exis rather than E_-!_'.'-51.xi..s • 16

In s~riarch for a ME'.!thod

he later defined the particular evasion of formalism as being
fetishist:

II

• • .we simply make a fetish out of the book

(which often happens) just as one may do with a pi.ece of
merchandise by considering it as a thing that speaks for
itself and not as the rt'?ality of a man objectified through

his work. 11 17

This reality must be

11

objectified 11 through

its shar,~d act of communication, and if comrnunicat.:i.on breaks
d·own or is discarded for false objectivity in formalism,

then art becomes neurotic--a fetish.

It is not necessary to agree entirely with Sartre to
recognize the comparatively static (and fetishistic) limitations in Richards'

tl:H?.OI'Y

of communi.cation

$

Richa:t.~ds

deemphasized the factors of collaboration and of the reader's

active assimilation of aesthetic experience.

In the paradigm

of information theory commonly used,

Speaker -- encoding -- message -- decod i.ng -·- Hearer,
he emphasized "message-decoding, .an improvement over-the
11

formalist :i:eliance upon "message" alone, but in doing so he

comparatively reduced the~ role of the

11

hearer 11 to the abstract

Process of "making a choice," a relatively passive experience
compared with the "Dionysian II response d(:1f ined by Sartre.

i.chard.s also deemphasized the total process of communication

apresented by the entire paradigm, which would open critilsm to the variety of ':i_·~proaches mentioned above.
nessage·~df.?Coding

I

With his

tL unca,.:io~.~, he was able to ignore them.

In his criticism published since World War II, Richards
Lmself has been profoundly concerned with information theory,
1d in fact has proposed a new tlrnory of. literature elabosting the paradigm represented above to emphasize even
.1.rt:her the

11

m,;'lssage-decoding II truncation.

His views have

!come more static and exclusionary than before, dangerously
cirting the temptations of formalism, while he has increas-

igly neglected the question of affect, but without necesi.rily denying its in1portanc(~.

In his article,

11

Emotive

!aning Again," (1948) he took pains to concur with Max
Lack that, "The bandying about of 'emotive' has done more
1rm than good 8 11 and, in fact, confessed t.hat his own use of
1e word "emotive" had b,~en a useful n~dficat.ion "encap-

1lating11 its topic. 18

He proposed that metaphor is a

~e useful vehicle for the study of our affective response

ian emotion, and that the essential polarity in language
Lght more profitably be considered referential-metaphoric
1ther than referential-emotive. 19

But since no idea is

:rictly referential, he said, even theory must be partlj
~taphoric, a principle certainly true of his own, as shown
:1st chapter.
~

'l hus the presumably "referential" explanation
1

aesthetics is metaphor (as theory) about metaphor (as

Jetic figuration) of metaphor (thought itself, as proposed

in Coleridge

~

.!E~~-t:.i.on).

Richards did not exactly

abandon emotion, though, as may bE, more clear J.y seen in

~Emotive Language Still," an article published the next year
(1949}.

Here he a.cknowledged, as mentioned above, that lan·-

guage does not usefully sort into emotive and referential
components since they are cor.nbined i.n speech, and a purely

.

emotive or referential utterance does nat exist.

The dif-

ference between the t·w·o may only be us<2ifully applied to
determining their balance~

A predominantly ernoti ve expresr;iu;;,

would tend more to rec,lll prior occurrences of the words.
w:i.th less sorting f combining, and econo:mizing characterir,tic

of the processes of abstract thought. 20

Emotive language

would also resist paraphrase, its effect depending to a
greater degree upon the evocation of experience.

Richards

thus continued to support the affective theory of literature,
but with two modifications favoring more of a cognitive
approa.ch:

(l} he abandoned the popular ide.a of emotion fo:r

its embodiment in metaphor, a rhetorical concept easier to
handle in criticism, and (2) he clearly recognized that
emotion and reference (or cognition) are inseparable, but
apparently had concluded that predominantly emotive utteranct'"'
are both phylogenetically and ontogenetically primitive,
falling short of poetry.
In "The Future of Poetry," (1960) Richards went even
further on the road to formalism.

He took pains to acknowl-

edg·o his respect fm:- Rene Wellek and particularly Roman

Jakobson and tried to incorporate Saussure's concept of
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signifier and signified into his explanation of aesthetic

commun::Lcution, in marked contrast to his earlier attack upon
this dichotomy in 'I'he Meani::1rr of Meaning, when he objected to
making

11

thi.ngs 11 t.'he l.<i~,1uedicn,;c:.!d object of signification. 21

He retained vestiges of hie earlier affective theory, though,
in several important respects.

He emphasized the importance

of a thr1:zefold Bloomf .ieldian hi.era..rchy j,n the study of meaning,
of the phonologic, morphologic, and semantic levels, all of
which mur:it be adequately combined in the "poet:l.c plaiting"

of expression.22

The semantic level obviously would include

affective questions beyond formalist inquiry, but again
mostly as a matter of rhetoric, which in modern linguistics
too often reduces to a vacant semiology such as those proposed by Barthes or !?odor and Katz. 23

Richard!.~ also at.tacked

the Structuralist obsession with opposition ( "mutual prt~clusiveness") in analyzing the ''limitless variety" of potential interanimations in language, and similarly attacked
their. emphasis upon the interrelationship among words alone,
to the neglect of their initial acquisition in childhood. 24
Finally, he expanded the paradigm of information theory to
introduce several affective complications:

source

000-

des ti.nation

R

D

DV
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In this scht;;1mati:r.ation, he multiplied the procc1sses of en-

coding and decoding to include respectively four and three
selecting (in two stages--.. s 1 and

phases~

s.,},

encoding (E),

,<,

and transmi tt:L:ng {'i'} •' .,.,~:~£: .-t:~'::::'.H1'··:i·ecei ving (R) , decodin9 (D) ,
0

and developing (DV) • 25

'l~his expansion was necessary, he

I

claim1.';d ,\ since the selection of words is a complex process
. involving several iJtages of feed-back a.11;d feed-forward (or

"eddying").

;r;:;ach word affi::.ets tht? probability of choice

among the otht~ra, itnd many words desira.ble in every sense

but one wist often be irrevocably-rejected for that one
reason~

Similarly, words first selected must later be

rt1-

jec.-::ted because they soµ-iehow conflict with other words

selected~

He included both s 1 and S2, disbalancing the

symmt:1;try of the paradigr.nr to indicate the cy::lic interde-

pendence of the selective process, a choice-making activity
the reader might e.xpt:;,,rience only in the closest examination
of a text.

These stager:; all seem to have been profitably

sorted out by Richards to represent the gemrration of word£.!,

what he called "cajoling an unembodied something into its
incarnation. 112 6
Where Richards seems to have become more formalist was
in his depersonification of "speaker" and "hearer" to be
"source" and "destination," and thus deemphasized compardd
l\rith the expanded processes of "encoding" and "decoding."
l'his abstract nomenclature was not accidental, but intended
to eliminate the human being from these categories, for, he

Saia, one cannot actually send or receive an idea:

such a
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transaction involves a mystical or Vedantist idea of transubstantiation.27

But we must emphat.:i.cally disagree!

By resort-

ing to this formalist equivocation, Richards was under.mining
the whole purpose of information theory represented by its
paradigm, the axiom that communication between real people
indeed does take place, though modifications (what we might
call a process of "refraction") occur at each stage of its
progress.

But real sound waves do convey ~eal symbols which

~a;.!x_ do involve comparable "sign situations" for the
speaker and his listeners.

Without our faith in this trans-

mission, nominal.ism becomes a solipsistic extravagance.
Richards apparently made a straw man of mysticism to establish
the independence and self-sufficiency of language in poetry,
a typically formalist preoccupation:
The over-all point, however, is that a poem is responsi.ble
to the resources of the language as regards its task--not
to any public (except a public in command of these resources).

The independence of language from poet or

from reader (or critic} is remarkable.

No one can wish

anything into, or ~ish anything out of, a composition-though we authors and critics may differ indeed upon
In the end, however, it

what it admits or excludes.
decides for or against us. 28

Richards accordingly proposed an emendation· of Shelley's
principle, from poets being our "unacknowledged legislators 11
to the formalist creed:

"~~s are the unacknowledged

legislation of the world. 11 29

He likewise claimed, " • • •
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behind a line of verse may stand, not the mere experience of
the poet, but the.immense reserves;• the accumulated potentials
of language, due to the equivalences, the oppositions, re-

.

inforcements, resistances, and so on of phrase to phrase
within it. 1130

(italics added)

These words might just as

well have been spoken by a Structuralist such as Barthes
6r Jakobson, the latt.er of whom seems to have had an en.ormous
influence upon this a~d ·s.imilar articles by Richards.
Finally, Richards ridiculed the "Fallacy of Vulgar
Packaging," the commonplace
notion that the poet has a
_.,,,,,,,,,,,
'
I

"poetic experience," wraps it up in a "verbal package," and

I.

delivers it to his readers so they can unwrap it to enjoy
for themselves.

Richards· denied both the artificial notion

.of "poetic expt'\!rience" (which he found in both Wordsworth

.
~I<•

and Shelley,· though not Coleridge--perhaps overlooking his
"conversational poems" influenced by Wordsworth) and the
idea of its communicat.ion in toto as a gift from the poet to
his readers.

"Poetic experience" thus misunderstood implies,

he said, "a sort of catching a nonverbal butterfly in a·
verbal butterfly net," and then releasing it in the reader's
act of comprehension.

This would be a patent absurdity

because words remain in our experience with their various
interdependencies, not.to be caught and released, transferred
from one repository to another.
Again we must vigorously disagree, though with certain
q:ualif:i:cations ..

!~ Meaning

The "sign situation" defined by Richards in

of Meaning involves a relationship between thought

n:

.

ll

-'
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and language that transcends the butterfly net parody and yet
involves the

11

ca.pturing 11 of non-verbal experience in verbal

structures, a process shared by the poet and his readers.
The logic here seems impeccable:

there is more in our ex-

perience than language--in fact our most creative experience
seems visual and intuitive, particularly in our youtho
-.Takobson has somewhat conceded this poirJ.t:

II
~

.

Even

.but internal

thought especially when creative, willingly uses other systems of signs which are more flexible, less standardized
than language and lc~ave more liberty, more dynamism to ere~

ati.ve thought. 1131

But if our thoug·ht is different from

language and yet language has the metaphoric flexibility to
express almost all we think (gaining in sentential coherence

l'lhat it loses in eidetic vividness)
11

coupling 11

fWemt:;

u

then a p~ocess of

nf}Cessarily involved v and the impression

tve have of searching or groping for words

(and they waiting

?assively to be taken up) might justify the use of the ex?ression "catch II or "capture. n

Indeed, this expression seE,ms

to describe more adequately our process of speech than the
Ldea of words coupling and locking together spontaneouf:ily

iccording to their own rules-~..wi thout our ass is ta.nee a.nd

dth only our consent.

Returning to Richards' analogy, then,

ie claim that butterflies are there to be caught, but the
Lepidopterist perpetually tying and untying the webbing of

tis net is not likely to gather much of a collection.
:u:rther point:

One

the "mc~re exper hmcl.:"J II of the poet and his

:eaders prejudicially represented by the ephemeral butterfly
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exceeds the "accumulated potential" of language.to the extent
that behavior exceeds its explanation, history its chronicle,
and novels such as 'I'he
Brothe:es
Karamazov
o..nd Ulysses
their
--------~
""'"'"''"
- - - -,...,., _ _ _ ... , _
_,..,.,.,,.,J,..,._,_.,.,,,_.. _
""~-

resources in the dictionary. 31

In its symbolic function,

language is as much a tool as a finished product, and, as
a tool, it i.s less than its expt~r:Lence conv(~yed..

'l'o the ex-

tent that it ie referential, it is no more to be confused
with this experience than a carpenter's equipment with the
house he builds.

Its emotive (or metaphoric) dimension

likewise involves a pre-lingual process of affect and conation

ot.u: choice of wordtJ, Richards would have to return to his

hi~:1 intc:;:.ref;t in psychology 1.m.d eoncent.:r.a.t:ing on cmcrmuni.cat.ion

theory, and then further truncating that, he has unfortunately
drifted from potentially synthetic critical metaphors to a
paradigm which is formalist and exclusionary.

It would seem profitable to return to the rudiments of

information theory, avoiding as best we can the "fallacy of
Vulgar packaging," a genuine mist~ce to which affective
theory har:: been as vulnerable as stylhitic analysis has l:.Hco€!n
to tlu~

11

fo1Tr1,1.list herc!sy 11 proposed by Bradley.

A rn.ore ere···

ative use of the paradigm in information theory ~an be proPosed not only to restore affect to aesthetic response but
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also to E.wtablish a

11

stratifica.tional 11 relationship between

experience and poetry.

'l'h<~ text of a poem may be simply de-

fined as an instrument to a certain extent recreating its
creator's ..:.rn:pc.,ri.ence:: in the consci.ousne~rn of readers having
comparable language skills and a some·what comparable body

of experience.
Speaker

n•-

The paradigm,
encoding -- messag<.:i -- decoding -- Hearer e

applies equally to poetry as other acts of communication, for
though it:::;

11

1nessage 11 miqht. seem rnore objectively self-suffi·-

cient, it is also (for this reason) a more efficient mode
of conunun.ication

o

But the entire circuit rnust be complet;;;1d,

for without it the printed page becomes a jumble of hieroglyphics and its recitation a phatic babb}.ing.

~rhe inb~g:r.ity

of the "messw;..re" is valuc)less unless it stinmlate~:. a similar
integrity in the rei:::;ponse of the reader.

Though the poet

cannot pe::i:fectly communicate his feelings to the reader,
there must be a percentage of accuracy in its replication
of meaning for communication to occur, and we may assume
that this percent.age increases by employing rhetorical
techniques known since classical civilization.

Whether this

proportion is high or not, however, exactly the same processes are involved in both the poet and his reader, though
in an inverse order:

the poet selects words to represent

experience, while his reader. selects experience to "body
forth 11 the~ meaning of the '\.1Wrds.

In fnct the S1-~s2 feedback

Proposed by Richards in the poet's selection of words should

be counterbalanced by a DVr-DV 2 1n the reader's comparable
selection of experience.

As Joseph Frank suggested in his

theory of "spatialization," the reader must keep utterances
in mind to test them out agifa:nst each othc-3r before arriving
at a definite thematic interpretation~

.

For our·purposee, then, the five stages of this paradigm
may be profitably divided into two phases, (1) speaker -encoding -- message, and (2) message -- decoding -- hearer,

respectively the composition and experience of poetry:
message

message

encoding

decoding

speaker

hearer

The second phase is an inversion of the first, supposedly
the passive response of understanding, though the reader
actually proposes his own meaning, duplicating the first
phase in CJrder to compare his mrperience with the poet's,
just as the poet resorts to the second phase while composing·
poetry in order to judge and control his expression.

The

first phase is gen(~ra.lly emphasized by the poet and the

second by the reader, but both are involved in both acts
of creating and responding to poetry.

Each phase has three

components, a human being, his search for words, and his
completed expression.

For poetry these may easily be re-

stated as "stratificational" obligations:

(1) the poet and

his readers must experience life, (2) they must be able to
translate this experience into language, and (3) they must

10-.

cooperate in organizing this language as poetry.

The fir.st

and second sta9es are clearly shared by all society, whih1
the third involves a discrepancy favoring the particular
gifts of the poet in degree if not kind, justifying his
poetry as "unacknowledged legislation" to the extent that

.

he meaningfully experiences life, fruitfully expresses his
experience in langu.age, and successfully; combines experienci::
and language in poetry

e

Even here, though, he must som.ewhttt

defer to the consent of the governedp his readers, for the
circuit to be completed.

These three phases may also be

stratificatiopally interpreted as .levels of regression from.
ob~jective immediacy 33
e

In art this immediacy li.es in the

art object, the objective painting, as well as othE":?r exper.iemce of the viewer v

In poetry, however, it is the t(~J~t r

the meaningless hieroglyphics mentioned above.

None of thfi

three phases :i.n this stratif icational regression from im.mE?-·

diacy (experience, language, and the

11

message 11 of poetry)

may be eliminated from poetry without apparently reducing it
to meaninglessness.
Roman Ingarden has proposed virtually the same "stratificatiQnal" explanation of aesthetic experience in the con~··

text of phenorncnology. 34

He distinguished between cognition

and what we perceive, and then, at a new level, between
cognition and aesthetic response.
vancenwmt, from

11

In.each stage of this ad-

objective immediacy" to cogniti.on and then

to aesthetic response, he indicated a new and qualitatively
·. Unique process of selection.

Cognition sifts out the random
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and chaotic aspects of experience to give it a degree of
shape and pattern.

Then our aesthetic response, likewise

an active process elimi!.1<:1-t-i.n.? the inessential, gives enough

in itself rather than a commonplace manifestation of experiEmceo
We interrupt our normal pattern of response at the "conviction moment.," whcm we discover that our ,experience can be-

come even further refined to be "aesthetic:," and a transition
occurs as we seek a new, more refined harmony of qualities.
This activity involves a "narrowing of our field of consciousness," and, to a certain extent, withdrawal and quasi-oblivion
of t.he real world.

'l'he experience becomes a matter of

essence, a "secluded whole," though we gain a heightened
conviction of its real esistence.

Its qualities "crystalize"

in their interaction, and it becomes transfigured as an
aesthetic object through their selection and intensification.35
Unconsc:ious "projection" is involved in this choice, and
there is likewise a "community of experience," since we all
are predisposed to make roughly similar aesthetic selections
of experience, though obviously benefiting from the better
selection of the artist.
Ingarden proposed a complicated theory, much of which
need not be explored in this context, but its basis lay

in

!

a threefold stratification of objects, their cognition, and

thei.r aesthetic embodiment, the latter two stages occurring
through the elimination of inha:r.monie>us elements.

His theory

agr(.~es with ours in every respect except its exclusion of
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language~
bining

11

Ingarden emphasized the visual arts, thus com-

encoding" and "message" in aesthetic experience,

whereas our model separates the two, first in language and
then poetry, a final stage comparable to that of art but
following the interm,:!dia.te p:icocess of symbolization.

Both

theories are "str·a.tif icational," however, and may be accounted

for in infm::mai..:ion theory@

They ag·ree u.pon an

11

objective

immediacy" and cognitive and aesthetic transformations in
the speaker and hearer.
The New Critical quest for textual ob;_jectivity has by=

passed these intermediate sta9es by equating

11

nH:,H-:,sag{~ 11 with

"objE-:ctive immediacy," and this has led to disai::trous con·-

sequences in both poetry and criticism.

Aesthetic interpre-

tation has been reduced to textual explication, excluding
the multifarious dimensions of language and,. consciousnc1s:::;

underlying the text.

ance act

11 )

~rhe inclusion of language (the

11

utter=

by Richards helps rectify this inadequacy, yet.

excludes the role of consciousness.

The formal critic must

reject the option to digress from the poem in order to return

with a larger, more adequate frame of reference justified
by the conunon experience of the poet and his readers.

For

example, he must usually ignore the social implications of
a text, at best subordinating them to

11

themes 11 apparently

mor<.~ sign:i.f icant, thoug-h these implicati.ons may be extrap-

olated to establish a social vision often of vital importance
in understanding the text.

The pseudo-objective quest for

internal consistency may thus lead to the neglect of larger
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though nebulous patterns of consistency in our consciousness-to which poetry almost always mt:tkes its appeal.
textual

11

Apparent

flaws 11 (contradictions and irrelevanciE)S} have been

deplored by formal critics, though they may be treated more.cl

often than not as shortcuts, conscious or unconscious, which
may easily be br:Ldg{;">.d in our r(:,1sponse.

castigated for his

11

Sh,elley has been

mere tumbled out. tBpatcz! of poetic,ili ties 11

barely held together by h.:i.s "pervasive lyrical emotion, 1136
though he obv.iously di.d not seek the textual unity demandt;1d
by formal criticism.

The narrative prose of Defoe has like-

wi.se been criticized for its incoher(mt point of view, t.hat
i

of Scott for its inconsistent romanticism, that of Dickens
for its episodic structure and lack of credible character
development, and that of Dreiser for its un~ieldy naturalism.
'.rhese have been :r.:ej (➔ ct.c;:!d becaw:rn their corn.munica tion de-

emphasized the

11

message 11 (formal coherence) and "decodi.ng"

(our aesthetic sensitivity advocated by Richards), and instead
concentrated upon the collaboration between "Speaker 11 and
11

Hearer 11 in their feelings and values, their identity and

membership in a community.

These additional questions

frighten the proponent of textual explication, who prefers

truncation to the "risk" of creativity~
•ro explain the communication of creativity, we rimst tmder-

stand the poem to function as a catalyst (much as Eliot proposed) to help the reader sort once again through his own
fund of experience.

He largely shares with the poet the

first tw~ stages toward the creation of poetry (experience

and language) since they both live in the same world and

speak the same language.

The more they share, the more

I

likely he understands t.he insights of the.poet.

However,

much of his exp~rie~ce and vocabulary lies dormant and
relatively unsatisfactorily integrated until he recognizes

a better organization of language and experience in the
poem and respond~:; with a comparable adj1.1:stment.

Even if

the poet's organization i.s not clearly better, its dift'erences 1.:rnually encourage comparison with the result that

some adjustment occurs.

If not, the poem may be considered

worthless for thi.s particular reader.

'rhis act of adjust-

ment might seem a passive response, except that it is an

~<:~ of recognition, not simply an implantation or evoked
sensi.tivi.ty.

What we see we~ lar.·gely know already, but: .it

gains a new light that obliges us to modify our understanding.
'l'he poem functions as a "mediator" in its capacity as
between of artist and perceiver, 11 37

f.t

11

go

record of the poet's

act of discovery which leads the reader into maklng a compa-

rable discovery of his own.

It mediates discovery in the

sense of shaping and perfecting one act, the poet's, in order
to encourage a comparable act similarly to be shaped and
perfected by the reader:

the poet works out a satisfactory

meaning for himself in order to encourage the reader to do

likewise.

But there is a second and less obvious sense in

which a,,. poem functions as mediator. It breaks down compartments in the mind of the reader and vitalizes separate, rel-

atively dormant ideas by bringing them to the threshold of
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insight in thc~ir combination.

We may see this process most

clearly in the effect of metaphor, which evokes a fresh understanding of both tenor and vehicle through an unusual but
apt comparison.

rrhe same ('.!ffect is produced by other mode:rn

of figuration, by dramatic effects I even by language in it~1

usual combination of words.

At all levels the poem spear-

heads the reader's challenge to his own static frame of ref-

erence, initiating a liberation of "potential energy 11 in him
through his active response.

But we must recognize that

poetry merely provides the efficient cause of this act: the
final cause lies .in the inteJ.ligcmce, ·sensitivity, and

doggedness of the reader.

In a simultaneous effort he takes

what he can from the poem to do ·what he can ·with his own

feelings.
,

Contrary to the view of New Criticism, we find little
in poetry beyond what we are already conditioned and willing
to see.

This is the way it is, and the way it should be.

The exact replication of a text, neither more nor less,

would be a useless, abo:ctive experience, itself a compart-

mentalization.

It would be squeezing ourselves into a strip

of film in order to peer one-dimensionally through lense
and aperture with total recognition but no particular insight.

Instead, we should and do treat poetry with the

freedom we do sculpture, viewing it from several an9les and
distances, squinting at it, touching it, sizing it up as a
presence, and taking stock of its flaws as well as its attractions.

W<:;! must similarly make our. own use of poetry,
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recombining whatever seems meaningful in our own synthesis
similar to, but also necessarily different from that of the
poet.

'l'here is no primary virtue in exactly duplicating

the text not even in approaching this exactitude.

The

best reader is not the perfect reader, if such a paragon
exists or can exist.

What we should encourage is the ex-

ploratory reader, whose alertness and wealth.of relevant
associations lead him in and out of poetry at will.

He

takes what he presently needs, building his own vision somewhat comparable to that of the poet.

Discovering the way

he does this and the way the poem helps him do it are what
I consider.· to be the more useful and even the more ambitious

task of criticism.

This job is made difficult by confusion,

vagueness, and enormous variety among our responses (even
in ourselves at different readings) to a pafticular text,
most of which (as Richards has proven) are entirely inadequate from a professional viewpoint.
reader undeniably experiences poetry.

But the most inept
The rejection of

his experience from the purview of criticism, as well, often
enough, as the full range of responses between his and the
"professional" interpretation, seems just one more example
of "expertism, 11 isolating the domain of literary criticism
to justify its existence, even, perhaps, to make it a career.
To illustrate the difficulties of a dynamic, stratificational approach to affective criticism, it seems fruitful to investigate in detail the effect of a particular
Passage of poetry.

For thiB purpose, the third stanza from

"Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening" may be used because
of its deceptive simplicity which eliminates extraneous
critical implications, disclosing the matrix of poetry with
particular success.

In its prose explanation, the stanza

tells of a sleigh horse's impatient behavior questioning the
poet's judgment in pulling him to a halt during a snowstorm
late at night in a desolate part of the woods:

He gives his harness bells a shake
To ask if there is some mistake.
The only other sound's the sweep
Of easy wind and downy flake.
Reverting once again to our paradigm, we can see that the
reader largely shares Frost's background of experience and
language in this stanza.

'rhe vocabulary is commonplace

(76% monosyllabic and almost entirely Anglo ~axon} and the
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events described arouse a wealth of at least indirect associations in most readers.

Those who have directly observed

horses impatiently shaking their harnesses might enjoy more
rapport with Frost than others, but the behavior of horses
is widely known in the cinema, particularly westerns, and

in children's stories and eighteenth and nineteenth century
fiction$

Likewise, even the lifetime citizen of Los Angeles

or Phoenix has at least received snow scene Christman· cards

from conventional relatives, played with crystal balls that
simulate falling snow, and ·watched television reports of

major snowfalls elsewhere in the country.

Perhaps a native

Panrunanian or Congolese has not assimilated this indirect

experience, but his ignorance must be considered deleterious
to his appreciation. of this stanza.

The words swEH3J?.., ~-¥2XJ

and -downy
would arouse irrelevant exotic associations not
----"~
connect(:.d with ,21.n CY{)erience of snow to anchor. their use.

For the American audience, however, the language and experience of the stl'..mza arE! commonplace.

It is la.:cgely .in the composition of the stanza as
poetry, at the third phase from objective immediacy, where
crucial differences emeige between Frost's and his reader's
accompl.ishment which make the poem an aesthetic experience
for the reader.

Here we may begin with versification, con-

ditionally a.ccepti.ng the simple tetrameter and heavy rhyme
because they reinforce the quiet, acquiescent tone of the
stanza.

The rhythm makes old men of those who can suspend

disbelief and it at least brings out qualities of patient
maturity in the rest of us.

The voice moralizing this scene

with a sing-song rhythm echoing in ourselves is probably the
true subject of the poem, for the scene described, a tableau,
merely locates and embodies its stoicism.

We might not

entirely appreciate this voice, but it is genuine human experienc~ fit to be put to poetry.

On the other hand we are

pleasantly alerted to the personification of a horse which
communicates with i. ts driver by shaking its harness ..

A ,..

dialogue thus occurs between two simple natures, the resignation of the poet wanting to watch and perhaps join the
peaceful lifelessness about him and the pragmatic impatience
of his horse wanting to resume their journey homeward.

The
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pragmatic and pasteral roles are reversed here, though the
poet later reluctantly agrees with thE1 horse, but of course

for more profound reasons.

In another sense, the narrator

(whom we presume to be Frost) seems a modern Everyman wearily

making h.is choice between the horse's impatience and the
beckoning woods, also personified as an advocate.

In a.

silent dialogue suggesting the A:ci.stotel_ian dynamics of
discovery and peripety, Frost prepares to resign himself

to one of these personified choices but without being certain
which, immediate communion with death in the peaceful scene
befon~ him or a long journey through lif~ with "miles to go

before I sleep."

In the context of poetry each possibility

is expressed beyond words, the retaining visual sweep of the
scene debating the auditor:z impatience of the horm~ ringing

his harness bells.

Both advocates express their views with
0

restraint and moderation, a quiet, sober project.ion of con·~

flicting feelings harbored by the aging poet and also presumably by ourselves.

The horse does not demand, insist, or

impatiently rear its head, but makes a brief motion of i.ts
head "to ask if there is some mistake," really an indulgent
and sympathetic act.

Likewise, the wind is

11

easy 1 as might
j

be expected during snowfall and the falling snow "d.owny,

11

suggesting the quiet descent of snowflakes and eidet.ically
reinforcing the effect of deliberation in the advancement of
age.

The :juxtaposition of "easy wind" and "downy flake"

might slightly bother us because of its heavy repetition,
but its simple conjunction more likely reinforces the tone
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of quiet resignation mentioned above.

In this particular

stanza the horse is a respectful minority, but the issue is
really debated elsewhere!' in the mind of the driver, beyond
him (let us take this inductive leap) in Frost himself, and,
most important, in ourselves, his fallible, striving readers,
for the question concerns our lives.

We must later regret-

fully concur with Frost and his persona,_the driver, to
continue the journey through life.

But we recognize Frost's

projection of this question into a scene of wordless dialoguer
we abide by his decision to reject immediate suicide in
order to perservere, though we are not. e.:icactly certain why.
Our literary experience at the third phase from objective immediacy, the poem, thus liberates a profusion of
implications which seem to create:~ an immediacy of their own,

for example in the syna.esthesia irnplied by the word "sweep"

or the debate, a non-verbal psychomachia, between two beckoning alternatives.

We would not be able to understand or

appreciate Frost without having (1) a preliminary fund of
comparable experi.ence, including our ambivalent attitudes
about aging, direct and indirect contact with horses and
snowfall, and (2) a similar basic facility with the connotations of language used to describe this experience.

These

shared realms of consciousness, rudimentary and thus too~
often neglected in criticism, may be compared .with the under; Water part of an iceberg--the stratum of literary experience
ii,
:--

t· at top mostly concerns us, but it rests upon a vast bulk of

li

common experience essential to its support.

Without this
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shared back9round, communicat.i.on breaks down in literature.
Frost 1 s stanza (and poem) presumably stimulates sufficient

common experience to gai.n universality, but if and when his
poetry ceases to yield "underwater" meaning to readers (as
Longfellow's al:t:t:1ady has, though he conj:idently addressed

himself to posterity), no matter how excellent i.t.s formal
virtues, it shall rightly fall into oblivion.

Though the

cri ti.c must primarily concern himself with literary expc~ri.ence r

his too common neglect of language and shared experience as
the foundation of literary expression encourages formalist
extrava9ance .i.n the explication of poetry, for example the
late theories of Richards or, to a greater extent, those of
Jakobson and Barthes treated in Chapter Six.

All three phases

(or strata) a:r.e crucial in the communication of poetry-otherwise it ceases to be read meaningfully ~nd pleasurably,
and instead becomes historic document exclusively the concern
of literary scholarship.
Richards would not particularly disagree with this

Vi(.:!W •

Our departure from his theory lies in the recognition that
there are a_large variety of valid approaches to poetry beyond
its rudimentary explication.

Everybody has a different fund

of experience, for example regarding horses, and a different
repository of associations for any particular word, for example
"sweep. 11

'l'he context of the poem somewhat anchors these as-

sociations within a specific combination, for example in Frost 1 s
putting the horse in a halter to pull the sleigh and having
it nod its head impatiently 6 but for each reader a great many
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associations remain free and untied.

These are not an ex.,.

traneous nuisance, an irrelevancy, but give body and vividness
to the experience of the poem.
refe1:ence above to the

11

For example, my f ar--fetched

psychomachia" suggested that the

horse's behavior makes it seem an allegorical representation
engaged in debate as had been common in Medieval morality
plays.

This specific comparison strikes_ my own attention

though Frost undoubtedly had no idea of its applicability

when he wrote the poem.

But who is to command by edict and

prevent my free exploration of this possibly useful connection
in my own experience--! doubt Frost would have.
Dewey correctly maintained in ?i,rt

~

As

John

Ex_perience, the weal th

of associations I relate to my understanding of a poem are

necessary to particularize and individualize my interpretation:
But experience is a matter of the interaction of the
artistic product with the self.

It is not therefore

twice alike for different persons even today.

It

changes with the same person at different times as
he brings something different to a work.

But there

is no reason why, in order to be esthetic, these ex-

periences should be identicai. 3 8
There is an enormous range of possible interpretations for
any poem to be fruitfully explored, and the two st_andards

of choice among them are the text itself and.the total scope
of human experience relative to this text.
The reader should not vainly exhaust himself searching

for an ultimately "correct" textual meaning, an j.gnis fatuus
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bearing scant productive results accompanied by too much
anguish and arrogance.
that he

1.1,

Instead he should insist upon parity,

a somc"what 2:ormal human being with somewhat normal

responses in a somewhat better than usual state of order

while reading poetry.

As Aristotle maintained in the

~icomachca11:. ~ ' h:is human condition. is his major responsibility, and, we might add, his strength and limitation,
before, after, and during his experience with poetry, though
we may share Richard's hope and expectation that his normalcy
will improve a.s a result of his reading experience.

He

should recognize that the responsibility of his interpretation
is his own, that its ultimate validity lies in himself, not
the text, which is mer<~ly a catyl.ist v however imprErnsive
its re~sult.s.

•rhe poet composed his pc,em largely by a process

of autoscopy, judging his expression in the progress of
its effect upon himself.

It is incumbent upon the reader to

respond in a similar spirit, with a kind of inverted or
doubled autoscopic response.

His benefit might simply be

in expanding his imagination or attaining greater resources
of vocabulary, for example (among a thousand) in using the

word

11

sweep 11 as a noun to describe the fullness of a scene

as a synaesthetic response.

But with a modicum of effort

he might also expect to find the voice of the poet t6 be~
addressing him as an equal in the act of mutual discovery

and even deferring to his final judgment, a democratic
gesture necessitated by feedback in autoscopy.

To put him-

self in thin qood company at its better moments, the reader
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must indeed sharpen his sensibilities, but he need not
sacrifice his identity or. supinely abandon his own resources
of experience.

·rhis would be sycophantish and neither pleas-

urable nor useful.

Feedback, the mingling of voices, his

own and the poet's, will profit him.the most.
One cannot help noticing here the applicability of
M.H. Abram's paradigm in Th~ Mi.rror !!_nd .~h~ La,~ comparing
fundamental approaches to criticism.

He divides the total

aesthetic experience into four distinct components--work,

artist, audience, and universe, arranged as follows:
universe
work
artist

audience

He then distinguishes four basic critical approaches, each
•

of which emphasizes one of these components.

'I'he

11

mimetic"

theories of Plato, Hurd, and Lessing emphasized the accurate

representation of the experienced universe; ·the "pragmatic 11
theories of Sidney and Hobbes emphasized the effect upon
the audience both in pleasure and utility; the "expressive 11
theories of Longin us, Wordsworth, and Coleridg(; emphasized

the expression of the artist; and the supposedly "objective 11
theories of Ransom, the New Critics and European formalists
emphasized the composition of the work itself.
11

The 'tqord

formalist 11 might more appropriately designate this last

component rather than

11

ob:jective 11 because the hypothetical.

objectivity of these theories is two d€:grees :removed from
object.:i.ve immediacy, separated by intermediatE:1 levels of
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meaning in· experience and language.

According to Abrams,

the transition· from, eighteenth century classicism to roman-·

··

ticism involved a shift from the Lockean perspective combining mimetic and pragmatic emphases to the expressive
emphasis upon the identity of the poet in the romantic movement.

But this paradigm may be appli~d equally well to

current trends in criticism to help explain our defense of
··affective criticism from New Critical attacks.

The prag-

matic emphasis of Victorians, first preferring "utile" in
Browning and Tennyse>,n· and then "dµlcell with the fin de si~cle
reaction of Pater; Wilde, and thei:t: coterie, was challenged·
by Richards in his proposal for a combined pragmatic and
objective (or "forma·list"} approach in affective criticism.
Then Ransom's cognit:i:-ve approach with subsequent New Cri~ical
•

modifications almost totally eliminated the pragmatic component, bringing criticism into a strictly formalist realm
apparently for the first time in the history of English
literature.

The pragmatic and expressive approaches have

been denounced respectively as the affective and intentional·
fallacies, and the mimetic theory has been all but forgotten,
an eccentric obsession in figures like Auerbach and Lukacs.
Composition and te~hnique have removed aesthetics a safe
dis~ance from experience. 39

Without minimizing the.· importance

of the expressive or mimetic theories, though, it seems time
to return to a more balanced critical outlook by restoring
the pragmatic appr.o~ch in affective criticism.
however,

we

This time,

should emphasize the active response of the
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read.er.

'l'he pa.ssi vi.ty recorrunended by Richards pa.ved the way

to formaliBrn,, "contextualism, 11 New Criticism, o:r: whatcwer we

want to call it.

Our purpose is to retain as many of Richards'

productive insights as possible, but within a broader and
mon1 dynamic frame of referc~nce.
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Hegelian context.

"Objective immediacy" is here proposed as

·raw experience ·undifferentiated by pattern (or gestalt).

I·

obviously ~annot ~efine poetry, the.final stratum removed
from objective immediacy, as Absolute Idea, which would be
neces~ary in a strictly Hegelian sense, and.would be somewhat justified in Ingarden's theory.

My own proposal is

actually much closer to Plato's conception of poetry in
The Republic, as explained in Chapter Four.
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39As·I proposed in Chapter One, this trend has at least
its partial explanation in .the qualms of timid artis·ts and
critics, "fai·thful to their ambivalences" (as Leslie Fiedler
proposes) but unwillin~ to admit it, who have tried to escape
_the ideological struggle dominating our century.

I believe

Lukacs to be essentially correct, though, in his oft-repeated

I
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premise that nineteenth century bourgeoise novelists like
Balzac and Tolstoy could affm:·d to be realistic, while their

counterparts in our century must divert their attention
from the real world about them to symbolimn, expression:Lsmr
and other exotic approaches in order to escape unpleasant
social and political eonclusions.

Those·who have kept at

least. a measure of rEialism hav4:1 either ,.trr.ived at a Leftist

or apocalyptic underst:a.nd.ing, or, like Ayn Rand, t.l1e·:iy have
escaped this dilemma through an ic,;,morance that vitiates their

art~
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Chapter Four:

A Brief General History of Affective Criticirim
The history of affective criticism before I.A. Richards
is piecemeal.

Most critics accepted its rudimentary tenetst

particularly upon catharsis in tragedy, but they mixed the
cathartic hypothesis with mimetic, expressive, and formal
theories to such an extent that few useful insights were
explored very thoroughly.

More often than not, even those

as eminent. ,1s Sydney and Dryd,~n were moutJ.1i.ng principles

they found in earlier theories, all of which may be traced
to Plato 6 Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus, when affective
criticism was first proposed.

The only modern periods of

innovation have been the eighteenth century, when Addison,
Hume, Burke, Alexander Gerard and others were influenced
by the philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes, and Shaftesbury,

and the twentieth century, when Santayana, Dewey, Richards
and others fell under the comparable influence of modern
psychology.

The interlude of the nineteenth century seems

to have been generally dominated by metaphysics and expressive theories of art.

These may certainly be integrated

with affective theories of criticism, as Richards tried
with a measure of success in Coleridge on the Imagination,

----·-·- -- -- -

...~~...

---..---

but they raise entirely new questions beyond the scope of
our present inquiry.
Plato and Aristotle began the history of affective
criticism with what amounted to a dialogue upon the effect
of literature, suggesting important questions yet to be
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sati.sfactori.ly f~Xplc:dned.

In the !..9.!l Plato briefly pro-

posed the "inspirational" theory of poetry that the poet
sings not by art "but by power divine,

11

and in fact th,1t

his mind is t.hc.':! minister of God (or the power of one).

The poet rapturously communicates divine wisdom that he

.

himself does not entirely understand, and we respond in
kind likewise without necessarily understanding his meaning.
Poetry is a communication from the gods (might we not call
them archetypes or fixations?) with the poet addressing us
as an inspired, uncoinprehending intermediary. l

Here Plato

seems to have been sympathetic with the presumed ignorance
of poets, but in a. cel~~brated portion of Book X in ~he
Republic he shifted his pos.ition (anticipating Tolstoy) to
advocate the abolition of poetry from the ;dli';)al state ex-

cept for

II

hymns to tht::! qods and praises of f a.mous men. 112

Ironically, his argum.ent may easily be adopted for the

defense of political censorship replacing the gods with
the state, particularly the censorship which has been
imposed in China and the Soviet Union.

But his logic is

difficult to refute either regarding propaganda or the
modern tenets of affective criticism, upon which it bears
important implications.

He disdained poets as imitators

of imitators three degrees removed from reality.

He

claimed that God (or "one-ness") creates the prbtotype of
the chair, the artisan imitates this prototype, and then the
Poet, a poor third, imitates the artisan.3

His theory was

not as absurd as it first might seem, and to adapt it to our
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purposes, we need only eliminate God to establish experience
(obj,~ctiV(::. immediacy) a.s perceived one-ness at the first

level, then introduce language as the finished product of
our entir0 .Gulture at the second level, collectively
11

fabricated 11 i.n a manner comparable to the artisan's chair,

and finally treat the mimetic principle in poetry as the
third level:
Translated

Plato
idea of chair

physical things and events

1. created by God

imminently experienced

2. imitated by the artisan

expressed in language

3. imitated (once removed) by

compm:;ed in poetry

the poet
Thus reinterpreted, this hierarchy is exactly the strat-

ificational rearrangement of the paradigm. from information
theory we proposed last chapter.

Poetry is an imitation of

an imitation in the sense that it formally rearranges
language, which itself is a rearrangement of experience.
Metaphor defined by Richards similarly fits this hierarchy
because it combines experience which itself is a metaphoric
combination.

Plat.o claimed this many degrEies of remove from

reality makes poetry useless in the discovery of truth, an
opinion we cannot accept because the intermediate levels
add more than they detract from the truth of the final
Product.

Language and art eliminate the apparently in-

essential in order to give more coherence and expression to
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this product, so we may accept Plato's premises though rejecting his conclusion.
In the second pa.rt of his argument, more difficult to

refute, Plato ··maintained that poetry should be abolished
bf;-':!Ca.use the

11

:cehell:tons principle" is encouraged rather

than a "wise and calm temperament 11 which is "not easy to
imitate or to appreciate when imitated. 11 •

Wisdom and virtue

are more difficult to evok<) thc:m the "pas:tdonate and fitful

temper" and do not arouse as much interest, particularly
among average readers.

Literature appeals to our baser

emotions and accordingly diminishes our ability to reason
competently.

Moreover, Plato claimed, .i. t. inci. tes and

intensifies these emotions, undermining our ability to control them:

"• •• poetry feeds and waters the passions
~

instead of drying th.e1rn up; she lets them rule, al though
they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to in-

crease in happiness and virtue." 4

As a result, speaking an

"inferior degree of ti:uth" (the imitation of imitation) to

an "inferior part of the soul," poetry is more harmful
than not and }3hould be abolished from the ideal state.

Plato's

conclusion seems validly derived from his premises and is
corroborated by the success of censorship in modern totalitarian societies.

But with our Anglo-American respect for

the freedom of speech, we are almost universally repelled by

Plato's argument, unable to judge its merits even with regard
to the particular question of affective critici!:lm.
We gladly turn to Aristotle's concept of catharsis in

Poetics which t,.ras undoubtedly proposed to defend emotional
release in poetry from the cri ticis:m by Plato. 5

Pe:r.hapi:,

anticipating Freud, Aristotle suggested an allopathic explanation of catharsis, that the pure vicarious experience
of tra~5edy ha.rm.onlzes and then relc1ases our jumble of pent-

up emotions$

We scapegoat a tragic figure by identifying

with him, projecting our conftrnicm upon _his pure, single·-

minded quest, and then by reveling in his destruction.

The

result is supposedly the control and reduction of our feelings
in a socially acceptable manner.

Whereas Plato ha.d charged

that po,s:try incites our emotions and is thert~f ore bad,
Aristotle i.mpliff:!.d that tragedy r cmf-J mode of poet::.1:y, controls

emotions through their channeled release and therefore serves
a useful purpose"

Both ccmcurred in advocating- the control

of emotion and rEwognizing its importance 'i.n poetry, but

poetry's effect was seen to be primarily excitatory by
one and cathartic by the other.

As indicated abovE'~ t we

cannot t1asily make a final decision which v;Lew is correcto

The truth probably lies in the middle, with literature
both intensifying and releasing emotions, though Plato 1 s
theory of intensification would

SEH?m

dominant.

A useful

indication of the difficulty in making this choice would be
the current rivalry between conventional psychotherapy
and so-called "behavior therapy" techniques to eliminate
obsessions and comparable p:r:oblem.s through the Pavlovian

inculcation of new habit patterns.

Psychotherapy is cath-

(Aristotelian) in its strategy to release repressed
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feelings, while behavior therapy is excitatory (Platonic) in
its strategy to replace destructive channels of expression
by others supposedly healthiere.

Againu Iwould•stresa

that a compromise m~E,~ms necessa:t:y, though none has been

convincingly proposed since Plato and Aristotle 0 with the
possible exception of Collingwood' s theory treated ltater in
this chapter.

The contribution of Longinus to affective criticism was
not as important as usually thought:.

His conception of the

sublime was essentially rhetorical, of the power an orator
exerts over his audience.

Emotion (ekstasis, or enthusiasm)

was relegated to being one of five sources of elevated
language, and Longinus car€~fully emphasized the importance
of avoiding

11

tasteless turni.dity 1• 11 the unccmtrolled bombast

of an excessively emotional deliver.yo

Nevertheless, his

brief (;1:icplanation of· the connection bc~tween emotion and
imagery remains useful:
• • • the word [image} is predominantly used in cases
where, carri.c1d away by enthusiasm and passion, you think

you see what you describe, and you place it before the
eyes of your hearers.

Further, you will be aware of the

fact that an image has one purpose with the orators and
a.nother with t.he poets, and that the derdgn of the

poetical image is enthralment, of the rhetorical--vivid
description~

Both, however, seek to stir the passions

and the emotions. 6
llis distinction. between entlu::alment in poetry and vividness
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in rhetoric seems to have been academic since imagery
would involve vividness to produce ~nthralment, the usual
effect of the sublime in literature.

In this passage,

however, Longinus did suggest the paradigm of information
theory •with a slight, though useful modification:
emotions~-imagery--message--imagery--emotions
The static, computer.;..like "speaker--encoding" relationship is represented in a more human an~ poetic fashion by
"emotions--imagery, 11 which he properly inverted in the
hearer's response.
'

.

·Longinus also stressed the importance

of the relationship between the sublime and harmony of
composition, whose "blending and variation" recreates the
proper emotional effects in the hearers.

He suggested
~

that language expressed with emotion by a competent poet
spontaneously cr~ates the form to evoke comparable emotions
·. ("the echo of a great soul") in his readers·.

This echo

response seems an important principle, a valid extension
of Plato's theory, but it was not really explored yery
thoroughly by Longinus, who emphasized questions of
rhetoric in the c~mmunication of emotions.7

Finally,

among the ancients, Horace's contribution to affective
criticism in Ars Poetica was his distinction between
du lee and utile, pleas.ure and instruction in poetry.

Both

are "pragmatic," .as Abrams claims, defining and polarizing
our response to poetry into two basic kinds:

with dulce,

We have gratification both through the intensification

(Platonic) and rel.ease (Aristotelian) of emotions; with
utile, we have the lesson learned, the "message" of. poetry.
The· latter: is what Platin~.,~ought but: ,d-esp.~ired of _:fi'nding .
in suff i.cietd: arnount1;,': ,:bi'''poetry; though. !1:t-~.l(:: may be

observt~d in th(~ concluding stage of catharsis, and, more

impo·rtant, it is intrinsic to the synaesthetic response
proposed by Richards.

Though by now thr~adbare, this

dichotomy thus continues to be useful--it has received
lip service throughout the history of western criticism
and seems likely t.o survive the twentieth century as well.
Since Horace and Longinus, little was added to the
theory of affective criticism until Minturno, Scaliger,
and others of the Italian Renaissance who returned to the
cc.mtrmrersy bt·:rbmen Plato and Arit1totle upon the balarwe
betw<:]E:m grief a.nd aesthet.ic pleasure o

With Hobbes ,1n.d

Descartes, though, a theory of psychology was proposed

which stimulated a more profitable recrudescence of
affective criticism.

The Hobbesi.an emphasis upon appetites

and self-gra.t.iLi.cation led such critics as Addison and

Samuel Johnson to identify tragic pleasure as the assurance
of the audience that it escapes the destruction of the

hero.

The Cartesian emphasis upon the stimulation of

"animal spirits," propounded by Descartes in ~_!.ise
the Passions -of -the Soul
------...,.,."'

.....,,._..,_

on:

(1650), led such critics as Dennis,

. Akenside, and Edward You.:ng to a.dvocate the harmonious

stimulation of the passions for their own sake, to want
to increase them, not flush them out with cathars5.s.

This
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"stimulat.ive 0 theory legitimized the Platonic conception of.
literature with the assurance that passionate "stirrings"
~av$.· a ~alu~:ary_· effect~·· With the prevalent Shaftesburian

· emphasis· upon benevolence arid sentimentalism in the· eighteenth

century, thet•H?. stirr:i.ngs were prima:d.ly of sympathy, or,
in its extreme, pity, apply:i.ng thE! stimulative theo:t·y to at

least one part of the .A.ristotelia:n formula for tragedy.
Lord Ka.mes and Hugh Blair advocated the pure intensification
of pity alon.e in a "luxury of woe 11 ; but in .A. £.!l~lo~oeh:l..cal
En~x_ ~ E n ~ ~ o~~ ~f 9.1.u: Ide3:!!~ 9f

!:h.~ SubL~m~

!ln<!. ~~~utiful (1757) F;dmund Burke sought to find a b1:1.lance

among our passions, selfish (Hobbesian) and soci.al (Shaftesburian) , whi.ch mingle as pleasure and pi-dn in our E.~xperience
of tragedy.

In a more organic vc~i:n, Hurne ingeniously pro•

posed in his essay "Of Tragedy" (1757) that our affective
experience of literature, specifically of the pleasure
and pain of tragedy" involves the absorption of subordinate
emotions by those which are dominant, intensifying their
effect even if the two are directly contrary.

Thus the

graveyard scene:of ~~maybe construed as intens.i.fying its tragic effect, not in its contrast, as has been
generally proposed, but through absorption, the assimil-

ation of comic gratification by pity and fear, the dominant
emotions of tragedye

Finally, the theory of the association

of ideas by Locke and Hartley was introduced to criticism
by such figures as Abraham Tucker and Al.e,rnnder Gerard.

'rucker' s theory of the synthetic coalescence of idea~1 ant:lc-
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ipated Coleridge 6 e theory of the imagination, while Gerard
bx·oug·ht em<Ytion into this explanation "-'Ji th his proposal

that pass.ion gives ui-iity to related idc~as by k@epin~J the .
attention "f.i.xt

011.

the ob:ject.S ~.,;trictly connected with it. 11

Gera.rd 0 s insight anticipated the modern theory of affect,
treated in Chapter Five, that it energizes and selects our

.

interests, and, in fact unavoidably helps determine our
cognitive processes, even in the act of perception itself.
In the early nineteenth centuryf Wordsworth, Coleridge,
Hazlitt, and Shelley were somewhat concerned with the emotional effect of poetry, but entirely in the context of the
expressive theory cmmnonly associated with romanticism..

lis

considered the experience of the poet more significant than
the recreatE~d expf.u:ience of h.is readers.

'They we.re slightly

91.dlty in thi.s respect of the formalist asHwnption. t.hat

the

II

ideal II reader passiv,?ly stereotypes exactly the im-

pressions he receives, though for them these impressions
were of the genius of the poet rather than the formal context
of his poetry. 9

In the Victorian era affective criticism

was revived with the popular HQratian concept of ~ l e .

ThE!

Longinian concept of the sublime was also revitalized in
Ruskin's quest for

11

noble grounds for thei noble emotions,"

wh:LJ.e both Arnold and John Stuart Mill seem to have returned
to the view of Gera.1:d upon thc1 binding force of e:motions.

suggested that poetry attaches emotion to the idea,
While Mill propo~rnd that poots are "those who a:ee so
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constituted that emotions are the links by which their
ideas, both sensuous and spiritual, are associated together. 11

Finally, the infectuous theory of art by Tolstoy (briefly
treated in Chapter Two) revived Plato's ethical concern as
well as influencing· Richards' modern theo~y of affective
criticism.
Of particular interest in the nineteenth century,
though, was .the unique affective theory of Edgar Allan Poe.
Poe's obsession with creating bizarre and exotic effects
led to his· proposal of a dispas.sionate role for the poet as
'

.

a technician .of effects in others.

He claimed in "The

Philosophy of Composition" (1846) that the most intense
effect to be.produced in poetry is the experience of beauty.
His composition of "The Raven" had .accordingly been structured, he claimed, to create this effect of beauty in the
common reader.

He also claimed to have planned the poem,

"step by step, to its completion with the precision and
rigid consequence of a mathematical problem."

He had

accordingly chosen as "the most poetical topic in the world'i
.the death of a beautiful woman, created a "close conscription of space" to frame the scene, and often repeated the
refrain "nevermore" to intensify the reader's expectations.·
In his review, "Hawtbor~e•s Twice-Told Tales," he.extended
this theory to fiction, and in "The Poetic Principle" went
so far as to limit the proper length of all literature to
the length of time a single 'effect may be sustained.

Poe

thus placed an unprecedented emphasis upon the emotional
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response induced by literature, but his theory was also
uniqu,~ly artificial in his implication that the poet n.e.ed
not experienc(; the emotion he stirs in hi.£, readers,.

'I'he

poet's feelings presum,:1bly dcri.ve from h1E; creative r:it.r.·uggle

to fabricate this emotion, a dispassionate critical awareness radically conflicting with the them:y of Longi.nu.s that
the poet communi.ct1tes emotions by e)l:pres_sing them, by

responding to his own emc::.tions.,

Parado;.dciJ.lly, according

to Poe's theory, the poet may feel a pleasant sense of
accomplishment as a craftsman when he successfully instils

forrm,:i.lated!' thoughl' this view has becomc1 commonplace in the
twentiet:.h century, for the poet is now conventionally under~

stood to be engaged in the relatively dispassionate search
for. cs,.tylitlc iigents to produce fm exact effect upon the
reader • 10

Our objection to both Poe and his relucta.nt

modern dc~scendtmts would be .in the artif .icd.. ali ty of the

creative act they proposee

The most successful means of

instilling particular :f:E1(~lings in a r<-::ader would yet

SE:H~m

to be tht~ acciu:ate response in language to one• s own feelings.

If the writer can comp,~tently and honestly express his

feelings, it would seem inevitable that his choice of words
Will automatically induce a compm:·able rosponse in h:ts
readers.

One O s i.mpr(ission of Uriah Heep in Dav}.:...1 ~012,;e_p.r.E,~,

for E~xample q undm.:tbti~dly reproducef, the i.ni tial a tt.i tu.de of

Dickens himself as he stirred his own imagination to the
threehhold of eidetic realization.
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of our parad.i<~Jrn i.n i:nformat.ion theory g
.

.

.

.

.

.

poet!s effort--measage--imagery--emoiions
I would sug-9·t-:1r:Jt that this i.s a da.ngc.irous limitation and
perhaps accounts for t.he mE!diocri ty of most of his works.

trying to evok,::: r- but the~J(~ impuh:,EH~ a:t:e supplementary 6 not
a tot.o.l subr:1tit,ution fo:i:: these ft1r:1:lings.

The complex

emotions succrrna:i,fully con-mmnicated by a writer like Dlckens

writer immune to them.

'l'he fear and wonder he m.ight think

he arouses in a product like "The Raven" is more than likely
to be flawed bE:~cause of its mechardc,11 gimmick~ and" :i.n-,

evitably, its sentimental:tsm.
of thc1

11

Tone has be.come condescenr:lion,

craftsman II weaving a spell over his credulous

audience.

The sensitive reader feels maneuvert'Jd and thus

deprived of rapport.

II.
The b1entic~th century revival of affective criticism was
la:i::gely initiated by IeA. Richardsp with the result that most
critics defined the:i.:r. views with respect: to hiB, much as we

indicated i.n Chapter Two.

Most reacted against what they

thought to be his behaviorism, but a few have proposed that
his af:fecti,.re fx:ame of reft~rence ni:-:!Hd not be el:i.m:lnated but
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turpa.nded or mod.if:i.ed..

'l'hese are the critics who now concern

us, c1.t:1 well a.s the philosophers Santayana and Dewey, who

In ~~>tici~~!~

~

PoE;~tryv published in 1937, D .. G. ,Jam.es

took Richards to task from a Kantian perspective with results
comparable to our own.,
use of the coirwept

II

He attacked Richards' indiscriminate

impulfi.ell and its emphasis upon our

reception of sti..rm:1.li in li, terature rath{;ir than their imagin-·

atlve recombination:
In the "impulsE:'!u" wh.ich is the inclusive name for the
entire procer:H3 from stimulus to att:i.t.ude. nothing is

. indicated to show the creative act. which is prer..;ent and
fundarnent:al to the reste

We hear a. great deal a.bout

.

sensation, tied and free imagery, references, emotic.ms,
and ,ittitudes; hut nothing of the primary activi:ty with-

out which sensation, imagery, and reference are abst:racticms, and ,~motions and atti t.udes impossible o

Hamlet without the Prince.

It ir3 all

If we are to remedy this

omission, we rnuftt:. cease to speak of the reception of

"stimuli" which cause certain results which may be valuable,
and speak instead of an "active agency" which creates its
object and in that creation enjoys: certain emotional and

volitional accompan.i.ments.11
James also insi,::.ted upon a central "act of apprehem,don" dom-

in aesthetic experience, as in perception, which subordinates particular impulses to an imaginative synthesis:
• •• that th,? act. of awarenef::.o is a creative act ·which

JA2

may require for its occurrence the

prem:➔nce

of certain

physical fac:tors, but which cannot be reduc,-:!d to them.

m1r1ceptible of such a conveniE~nt reduction to neur.:al

events as Mr~ Richards would have us believe.,

Hence the

primary si tuat.ion whi.ch we have1 to hear in mind is not

m.:i.r neural susceptibility to stimuli,. but the imaginative
sy.nthc~sis of sensations which a:i:1:~ presented to the mind

on the occurrence of certain physical and neural proceeses.12
James thus pi tbc:.%1 hixnself against Richards 1n a controve1:sy
that may be traced to the eighteenth century choice betweEm.

Locke and Ka.nt a.nd later between Wordsworthian perception
and Coleridgean imagination.

James rejected the psychological

theory of perception ixnplied by Richards ,for a Whi tehea.dian
concept of

II

pr.lf:lhension II and organic uni. ty.

He disconcert-

ingly invoked rt~ligion in his argument, but his specific

attack upon Richards was remarktibly like our m-m.

He em·~

phasized that the active outgoing effort of the reader syn-

thesizing experience is more important to aesthetic appreciation than the passive reception of effectso

Effects are

only part of the process ·which occurs through the effort of

the imagination to reach beyond itself to experience.
Approximately the same time, R.G~ Collingwood proposed an e};:press.ive theory of emotion that more specifically

explained this active effort of the reader. 13

He proposed

an important though overlooked distinct.ion between the
initial "pertur.h;:ation" or excitement. in emotion, an oppn:rnsi:ve
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experience beca,rne we do not: yet recognize it, and its

com.b1ned grati.f icatio:n a.nd i:nt(~rrnif i.cati.o:n. once it is
· :r.ecognizc1d, ·· iunu1lly through its expresi;don in language ..
Catharsis · is the t·(~co9nition. of emotions and even thEdr

resulting exacerbation, not their release through gratification as haf, been usually Z:n.1ppor,<:?d.

Simply becom:in,;:r aware

of exnot.ions .is tantamount to the:b: grati,f:i.ca:tion., and
t.hi.~ subtler ca:tha:t'tic response g.i:ves li tr.;n:a:ture its purpose,
both in the .ix1.dividt1al a:n.d collectively u to acquaint us

with the full orchestration of our emotions.14

The poet 1 s

gratification. in his dis(:overy of language i.s comnmnicated

to hlE> reade:t:s, who are led to nv.:tke a comparable discovery
within thei): c.rwn experience..

l'his proces/3 (o,:

1

11

tri11rnact.ion, iY

as it will 1.atE~r be cal.led) of aesthetic C.'"'Ommun.ication

obli.\Jes the

p{J(;;t

to be entirely candid about his o·wn emot:!.onii p

confident that. they are shar1;;:1d by his public, and to recogniz~~ that h:ts pr:Lmary motivation is to communicate his

feelings, t.o effect their simila.r recognition by his publice
His .relationship with his readers thus becomes integral to

his aesthetic experiencep fore "What he says will be somethi11£r that his audience saya through his mouth.

11

He must

accept his public as "co11abo.rators 11 who have the s.aroe
feelings and responsibilities as he, "for their function as

audience is not passively to accept. his work, but to do .:i.t
over.· again for themselves. 11 15

His discovery of his emotions

in poetry mediate~ their discovery (comparably dynnm:lc) of
Such had been implied by Shelley in his conception
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of poets as our "unacknowledged legislators," and would
later be proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre, in a strictly
political sense, of using language to encourage engagement
in one's public.
Max Eastman was another critic whose views extended
the scope of affective criticism.

Eastman has been aggres-

sively attacked as a Trotskyist renegade whose principles
were brought to th.e 'brink of absurdity when· he became a
Readers Digest editor, and by New Critics in particular for
his supposedly "vulgar" enthusiasm for heightened exper.ience to· the neglect of quality in literature.

Lately he

has been perhaps mercifully overlooked, but his views
deserve careful re-examination.
.
'

.

In "A Note on I. A. Richards,"

(1932) his attack upon Richards' polarization of science
and poetry anticipated Richards' later theory of projection.
He showed that the semantic objectivity advocated in The
Meaning of Meaning leads quite naturally to Richards' theory
of poetry as "pseudo-statement."

By divesting science of

the subjective factor in intuition, Richards paved the way
for similarly divesting poetry of its objective validity
as truth or meaning which merits belief:
Indeed, once they [Ogden and Richards[ had isolated
science as a pure pointing to things without a·tti tude
and without reference to behavior, it was quite inevitable, I suppose, that Ogden and Richards should turn
round and detine poetry as a pure evoking of attitudes
and organization.6f. behavior without pointing to things,

. II.The- coup d I eta.t of Ogden am:1 Richards. confiists of cutting

off knowledge from life!, and then dec.ltu::tng poetry once
more the mistrc,i:;s of life e"

To t.he c(,mt:t>ary,

claimed,

hl1

objectivity is ;;;. strictly subjeGtive activity, he claimed,

Coleridge on Imaqination:
-----'•---~--..,-The world i~ not composed of

11

thingir;. 11

It would be as

true to say that the world is organized into
by cru.r thoughts.,

11

thingi:a, 11

And this org.rmi~;ati.on is car:i.:-ied out

in the main, especially in its earlier phases, primarily
with the view to establishing attitudes and patterns of
behavior..

It is rat~her rno:re a classif .i.c2,tion of r-e·-

sponses to what the world presents than of the material
presente.d~ 17

find in the world about us, and~ posterior~ the description of "things!, in language and poetrye
However, in

11

'.t'he History of English Poetry, 11 first

published unde:~X' the title, "Division of Labor in Po,~t:t:-y, 11
Eastman himself Sf;H'.:.ms to have propos<:~d the Ernpand:icng polnr=

ization of knowledge and exper..i~~nce as an explanation of

the history of English literature$

lie claimed this division

culminating with the pr,actice of modernists like El:Lot and
Cummings, jt.rnti.f.ied by the ep.iotemology of Ogden and R:i.. chardr;,,
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has reduced poetry to an obscure, meaningless impotence.
Knowled9e and t::xperience had been synthesized in the Renaissanc:e imagination, when poetry was stimuliited by science's
infancy but yE1t. r::.e,-mied th-r1 highest vehicle of knowledge o

With the metaphysical poets there was "a transition from
poetry as an assumption of knowledge to poetry as a
serious piaying with .idecu::i, 1118 a slight b~t sign.:tf icrmt
change initii.ati.ng the separation of knowle:d90 from exper-·

ience.

By

the Restoration, poetry was ass:ig.m~d a dis·-

tinct role of its own 6 providing a "refined intellectual
pleasu:re, 11 a major sacrific(:! of.her former un:.lversalJ.ty,
alt,ogether eliminating the pursuit of knowledge.

rhis

1

su'bo,:dinate role was only briefly challenged in romantic

criticism, and then a further division of labor occurred

in the aestheticism of Poe and others and'fi11ally the
modern

11

cult of tmintelligibili ty

0

11

Eastman regrett(:;:d this

development and particularly deplored modern obscurity.

He

preferred the Renais8,?mce synthesis, and optimistically

assured his reade:cs, "The division of labor we are discuss-

ing is, in short, not absolute, and never can be, either
among people or among books~"

He appealed to the "very

great poets of the future" to understand this problem and
presumably to rectify it by somehow restoring harmony between knowledge and feeling.

The ultimate harmony he

sought is perhaps indicated in his brief article, "A Word
With Lewis Mumford," in which he praised the Golden Age in
Greece, when Empedocles, Parmenides, and others simultaneously
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initiated . both science and poetry.

Eastman's particular affective theory of poetry was
roost pers~asively- explained in his essay, "What Poetry Is,"
in which he proposed. that the primary function .of poetry···

is paradoxically to heighten consciousness by obstructing
our response:

11

It seems . then that consciousness is, arises

out of, or depends upon, two things--a blor::kage of action,

and an identification of one experience with another so
that action may be resumedo 1119

He used the example of

putting on a coat--if our arm easily passes through its
sleeve, then our act.ion is entirely automatic; but if our

arm gets stuck, perhaps caught in a torn lining, then our
attention is stimulated, whereupon we search for a means
to get our arm through.

Once our arm is free and our action

has begun ag-ain, consciousness lapses.

'11

he

difficulty of

the task., the problem posed, had briefly stimulated our
attention, which ceased when we could carry through our
response.

This close relationship between consciousness

and obstructed action impressed Eastman as the fundamental
explanation of the effect of literature.

In particular he

cited the theory of Margaret Floy Washburn that, "A per-

t

ception does not become conscious unless a responsive
action is !nitia!~d, but it also does not become conscious
Unless the initiated response is obstructed. 11 20
original)

(italics in

An obstructive delay supposedly inhibits our

automatic response, arousing our attention and directing it
to the task. of finding a solution.

As long as we are at this

14H

"br.:i.nk of action," we en9age in thinkingq but if our

f erred, we lose consciousn,1ss in this particular area.

"brink of action" seems identical with Richards

0

This

"incipient

response" and extends the principle in a useful fashion,_

overextending its application to

though Ea,s tman.

crit.:i.cism~

He :Lrrnisted upon the primary_, unqualified

importance of h(dghtened response .:i..n our literary experience:
11 ~

irnp1:·actical identific;ition that you can induce some-

body to listen to is poetic, because it is the essence of
an at.tent.ivfi com;ciousness@
brink of action."

It is mind SUftpended on the

(italics included in the original)

The

:i.mpra.c:tical has a heighbrming effect, he claimE:d, becaurne
it creates a problem without an evident solution, apparently

the ultimate single purpose of art:

"To me it seems obvious

that such realization, or heightened consciousness of life,
i.s desir(~d foi: its own sa.ke ~ 11 2 1

Art for art.' s sake b,~cerme

srt for heightened consciousness's sake, a principle per-

~aps unfairly ridiculed by Richards when he suggested that
oeing tortured would fit Eastman's definition of art.22

But

the strength as ·well as weakness of Eastman's theory lies

Ln its breadth of application.

All modern art may be

~valuated in terms of heightened consciousness, an asriet
Eew theories possess, though more explicit fc:ictors w·ould

:>bviously have to be brought into account regarding any
?articular aesthetic experience.
In his articles,

11

What. is Poetry" and "Art and the Life
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of Action," Eastman ingeniously applied his principle to
poetry, part.i.cular_ly in his unique explanation of metaphor ..
·He claimed that metaphor heightens consciousne_ss through

the obstruction of impractical comparisons:

"'l'he metaphor

provokes the bxain function with its truth.-to-·perception,

.

but inhibits it with its untruth-to-action .. "

A

poetic

metaphor is an !E~racti:.cJt.~ ide!}tificatiqn of· two exper-

iences, and its function is to arrest action and arouse
consciousness. 1123

He claimed his theory of mt:!'taphor to be

dynamic, and purposive in contrast to R:i.cha.rds

w

u

which is

relatively static and descriptive, though it should be
noted that he proposed his theory in 1932, four years before Richards explained himself in The Philosop)ly_ of Rhe~oric.

Eastman also extended this principle to form, claiming that
the succer:.sfu.l use of fol:m requires a clash of: .impuli:H::?s

which arouses our attention and then gratifies us with its
successful resolution:
The forms that elevate mere impulses of expression into
works of art. are i.ntc~:r.esting forms.

That is, they are

inhibitions of those impulses by others equally authentic,
so that instead of being successfully expressed and lost,
they are in-pressed and the feelings attending them
brought into vi.vid being and sustained. 24

But Eastman also shared with E.D. Snyder a belief in
the hypnotic ef feet. of poetry, a theory which would seen1.

to conflict with that of heightened consciousness.

Eastman

explained the regularity of meter in terms of this effect,
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claiming- that. a "lulling" rhythm produces a hypnoid condition which brings literary experience to the threshold
.

of haliilcination~

.

.

.

.

To a· certain. extent

he

ascribed the ·

same lulling···effect to poetic diction, for example advocat.i.ng the rn:.;(~ of anach.ronistic locution!!, such as oho _!~,

and alas {much to the consternation of those
. who otherwise
respect his thtH'.iries)

~

One c.>f his most -useful insights ex-

pla.:tned how a. rdmil.ar momentum in emoti.ons increases the.

sense of verisimilitude:
Those inward feelings [emotions, defined as aroused but
inactive consciousness] are a part of experience, and so
belong to his effort as ends0

But they are also that

part which he can really and not only imaginatively evoke
with wordsf and so enter into his technique as means of
giving intensity to the whole. 25
We may pa.raphr:ase this important but obscure passage by

saying that tht3 reality of inward feelings or emotions

evoked by literature (we actually laugh, cry, exult in
triumph, etc.) gives the events described, however fictive,
a sense of re~lity livede

A feedback occurs--these events

which seem realistic generate emotions which~ real, not

a matter of verisimilitude.

These.in turn suffuse the

Ir entire experience to make it real and personally significant.
~y
i:

,r;;

The truth of emotions succet•rnfully evoked sp:reads to give

certitude to the entire effect.
Thus a cleavage seems to have existed in Eastman's
criti.cal theory between his theories of heightened con-
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sciousness and hypnotic effect~

He advocated alertness

and attention in read.:i.ng, a matter of obstructed u heighte.:med

consGiOusnese, but alee the hypnoidal experience of reality

and inertial, perhaps an affective counterpart to the
concepts of uin.i::formity and va.rit,::,ty or E~_ra Pound's theory
of the constant and variable elements in poetry.

Actually,

both would be essential ingredients of our aesthetic re-

1896 0 George Santayana had proposed an affective theory
similar in many respect,t::. to Eastman I s.

S;u1tayana defined

beauty as value which exists in our act of perception
projected upon whatever appeals to us in our <:mvironm121nt.
He mcplained this process with the simple formula o "Beauty

is pleasure re9iU:'dE~d a.s the quality of a t.hing. 112 6

b.11

experience, he claimed, anticipating theories of both
Richards and Eastman, involvf~S the hypostatized concept.-

ion of "things'' outside ourselves in our field of vision.

We have learned to define and judge things by their few
omnipresent qual:l ties we e}cperience v in effect the priroary
qual:t ties proposc1d by Locke.,

Santayana dt1plored the

success of science in making things thus abstracted seem
to exist independent of our experience, in contrast to the

aesthetic idea wh:tch u

II

r<~tai.ns the emotional reaction, the
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pleasure of the perception, as an integral part of the conceived thing."

With art, he proposed, the act of perception

remains dynamic . .:u:1d has not. yet b<:.~en re if led as the rr~lation···
ship between sub~jec:t -tmd :::mr:t·ound.i.ng objective entities.

'I'he

"thing" perceived aesthetically is not a radically abstract
reduction of: gupposedly inherent qualities to the fewest
possible, but involves a projection of our pleasurable

Santayana later claimed that the most important effect
of art cannot be .:ittributed to its materials, but to their

denied..

If "things" a.re an as::,nunption about composite

patte:r.·nr:) of effect, as Santayantt himself proposed, then the
timc;-worn dichotomy must be abrmdoned between things and
~

qualit.:ler..;, ore in li ti:~1.rature, we might add, between form and
content.

Though form and symrnet:cy SfH::.m to exist object-

ively in the world outi:dde our8elves, all that matters in
art is whether they arouse our responsaG

Santayana tangent-

ially suggested this almost solipsistic ultra-subjectivism

in his insistence upon the integrity of our response:
the thing itself actually please?

"Does

If it does, your taste is

real; it. may be different from that of others, but is
equally justifif~d and grounded in human natu1:e. 1127

Whatever

affects us, including form, is what our human nature leads

us to find appealing in our environment.
A more s.oc:ial approach to affective criticism was
,tn·oposed by J"ohn Dewey :i.n his book, Art as Ex_Eerie~ce,
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published in 1934.

Contrary to Santayana, Dewey emphasized

the contin.u.ity hat.ween artistic and o.rd.'.Lnary experience,

asserting that art should be a :refinement by degree, not
kind, of what we do and see in our everyday livese

He

formd that capitalism has separated a.:i:·t fr.om experience by

putting it on a pedestal, in a frame, and in the museum ..

He

claimed the result has been detrimental to both art and
experience because the first has become esoteric 0 relinquishing much of the vitality acquired frorn living experie:ncE1,
while the SElC<.md, isolated fl:om aE:1sthetic ful:fillme.nt, has
become vul9ar and mass produced.

He propor;ed the most

important. step in the solut.ion of this problem to be a new
convergence of art. and experience through the dynamic per-·

caption of art in which a "yielding of the self occurs,n as
Richards advocated, but with an active outgoing effort to

"take in 11 the experience:
Perception is an act of going-out of energy in order to
rece.i ve, not a with.hold.in~; of energy o

To steep our•~

selves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into
it.

When we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms

us and for. lack of answering act.ivi.tyt we do not percei.ve
that which hears us down$

We must sutrffncn energy and

pitch it at a responsive key in order to take i~. 28
Dewey sugg(~sted the reader must himself be a poet to a

certain extent, with at least incipient capabilities in
this direction, be.cam::H~ he must select and r(~cornbine the

material of the text in a second, derivative act of poetry:
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For to perceive, a beholder.must cr~ate his own exper.·i.ence~

And his creation must lnclude relations

co:mparable to t.hose which the or.igi.nal producer under-

went. ••

o

Without an act of recreation the object is

not perceived as a work of art.

The artist selected,

simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed according to his interest~

rhe beholder must go throu9h these

1

operations according to his point of v:i.€rw and

intc➔ rest~

In both, an act of abstraction, that is of e:x:tracd:ion
of what is signi.fica.ntP. takf~s pl,H.::ee

In both, there is

a compreherwdon in it.a literal i:.dgnif ication--tha.t is, a

gathering.together of details and particulars physically
scattered into a physical whole.

There is work done on

the par·t of the percipient as there is on the pa:t:'t of the

This work done by the percipient, in our case the roader,

certainly involves {l) a concent.:¥:ated act of attention
upon the intended meaning, as Richards proposedp but it also
requires, (2) a reconstruction of the details and particulars judged according to one' s own exper i,::nce, as proposed by Dewey, and (3) a crit.ical comparh;on between the

intended meaning as understood and other possible meanings
one c.r.m find.

Affect is involved in each of these act:ivH:.ies

to tht.1 extent that we are motivated to do l ts job •

The

second and third seem to require more effort and the exp<:m-·

diture of more affective energy, but without adequate

PPlication to the first, the direct act of attention, our

:r~econsti tut:ic:m of the xnater.ial would be personal a.nd
i:eralevant.

Also, the t:H:1:cond and third modes of response,

though propor:ied in a sequence, may be more profit.ably
treated as ocour1:ing simultaneously, our comparison with

other mE:ianings mltking reconstruction possible and our act of
reconsti~uct.ion invel'.:sely suggesting comparable meanings •

.

Dewey .~lzo stressed the importance of emotion in the

cr<1at:i.cm of (;u:::·t, a 1:equir:(~ment which may easily be extended

to the a,:;t of r·e~crea tio:n by the reader..

According to

Dewey, emotion is not e};:traneous to aesthetic pleasure, . a
frosting to be added or w:tthhf::ld at the choosing of either
the poet or readc~r, but intrinsic to this experience:

1:'he

111

a.ct of <1xpression is not. soznet:hing which supervenes upon an
inrzpiration · already complete..

It is the carrying forward to
~

completion of an i.nspiration by means of the objective

material of perception and imagery. 113 0

Dewey even proposed

(as did Eastman) that emotion is the matrix of form, that
our emotional response determines both what we select to
respond to and its shape or pattern that we recognize:
That art is selective is a fact universally recognized.
It is so because of the :t·ole of emotion in the act of

exprest·don.

Any predominant mood automatically excludes

all that is uncongenial wi.th it.

An emotion is ·more

effective than any deliberate challenging sentinel could
bee

It reaches out tentacles for that which is cognate,

for th.i.ngs which feed it and carry it to completion.

Only

When nmotion di.ea or is broken to dispersed fragments, can

matex:ial t.o which it ls alien enter cmnzcionsnc1ss

0

ThE~

selective opc,r;J.tion of mat:<0:eials so powerfully exercised
by a develop.in~;r emotion in a se:riE,1s of continued acts

extracts m.atter from a multitude of objects, numerically

and spatially separated, and condenses what is abstracted
in an object that. is an epitome oft.he values belonging
to them all.

This function creates the "universality of

a work of art."31
In other words 5 a. work of art is universal because the
artist· is ~iti.mulatt1d by shar('.1d emotions to make shared dis-

tinctions oft thought but ne 8 e:r. so well ar:i:·anged.

Dewey

did not bE:1lhw(1 that emotion entirely dominates the ex-

perience of art, but he did feel it is an integral part
which helps determine the choice of form.

He treated art-

istic experience as a unified act of perception
including
,

the events perceived, their successful choice and .arrangement, and the emotions exercised in this act.

In his est"·

imation form is the "operation of forces" which results from
the healthy interaction of these components.

Unlike Richardsr

he connected form with affect and the two with belief,

abstract ideas, and any other mode of thinking possibly
relevant to the experience of literature.

Finally, Louise M. Rosenblatt has recently adopted a
"transactional" theory of criticism based upon the theory of
knowledge worked out by ~fohn Dewey and l.\.rthur :fl. Bent.lli.?Y

by Dewey, Ros<1nblatt says, "to designate situations i.n

1 f"f

.,\,.) I

rvhich tho elements o.t· f actor:s arc, one might say I aspects
::>f the to.tal situation in an o:nqo:lng proce:HJ,..

Thus a

;;he tr,uu:H'ii.cti.on between a particular ind.:i.v:i.dua.l and a pa.r;:icular environment.. 1133

Ros,.mblatt proposes that f)Xactly

:.he smne proc:eBf~ occurs with poetry because a person be-

mmes a re:~a.der

11

by virtue of his acti vi t;Y in re lat.:i.onship

:o a text, which he organiZf:'!S as a set of verbal symbols

This transaction is a dynamic act of selection, a

II

~tal "situation" rather than a linear process and singllar because both the poet and his readers uniquely com•ine their funds of experience.

Rosenblatt also insists

pon our making a semantic distinction between the Text
.nd the

~~,

he text.

the latter the lnvolvemm1t of t:h,e reader in

The reading of a poem, she claims, is an organic

ccretion of feelings and attitudes in response to the

eaning added to another.

'I'here was an active trial-and-

rror, tentative structuring of the responses elicited by
he text, the building up of a context which was modified
r rejected as more and more of the text was deciphered0 34
11

he empha.sizt1£.; that this activity of finding and interelating "cu.es 11 cannot. simply be divorced from e,~perience,
Lit must be recognized to be the effort of the re;:iader in

ls dynamic
e

••

11

transaction" with the text:

that the reader is active.

registering a ready-made message~

He is not a blank tape
He is actively involved

1::i8

in building up a poem for himself out of thEi lines

e

HEJ

selects from the vu1~ious referents that occur to him in
response to tht:~ verbal symbols.

He finds some context

within which thc,se refe.rents ccm be related~

He re-

interprets earlier parts of the poem in the light of

later parts.

Actually, he has not fully read the first

line until he has re.ad the la.st u and _interr.:--;lat:ed t:hern. ~
TherG seems to be a kind of 1:1huttlin\J back and forth as

one synthesis--one context, one persona, etc~--after
another suggesta itself to him. 35
In this transaction catylized by the texte modifications
organically expand the reader's experience of the poem,
which thus becomes a human "~vent." a selective and synacti:vi ty.

The ideal reader and his ideal inter-

pretation do not exist and cannot even be profitably
hypothesized, since each reader must bring to t:he t.0)xt m~w

values and experience leading to an altogether new transaction.

Each finds a fresh synthesis critically adequate

to the extent the text is felt and understood, and likewise,
in reverse, to the extent he is stimulated by the text.

But

within this strictly quantitative limitation there remains
a wide variety of acceptable responses.

Poetry is dynamic,

the active experience of the toxt, not the te,ct iti:ielf.

III~
Affective cri.ti.cism may be generally and almost mean-

inglessly defined as that which emphasizes the effect of
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literature upon its readers.

This brief history has amply

shown the wide variety of cri ti.cal apprm.1ches 1oos<:;ly

fitting this description, though these often seem unrelated,

or overlapping and cutting across each other in an interaction difficult to eJtplain.

'l)ht1y are often even contra-

dictory with no clear resolution of their differences
apparently to be found~

'.L'he qucn.;tion n~tn:irally arises

with at least a few of these difficulties explained as a
matter of confusion or mixture among these categories.
Riclu::i.rds attempted such a t.axonorny with his list of sixteen

thc;)!o:r.ies of be<'J.uty, though his Ci:"l,t.c~gorieti do not sc,::m to
have ad,::,qua.tri!ly covered many of thE.:: t.heori.~2:s rnen.tioned in

our history~

Wimsatt also made a rapid survey of approaches

in his articler

11

The Affective Pallacy, 11 .including the

emotive, intentional, vividness, physiological, ,~nd halluc-·

ination theories, as well as that of the grand style and
undoubtedly others. 36

But his categories seem loosely

organized, hastily concocted to 9.ive at least a sen1blance

of order to the wide range of critical theories he consider€::.d fallacious.

'l'he superficiality of his categories

-probably resulted at least partly from hie distaste for
these theoriEis ~

A new typology seems in order, and one may be tentatively proposed from the theorif:.1s we have surveyed, of

Which three ba:'Jic kinds of af f(~ct:l.ve c.ri ticism seem to emerge t
of {l) omotion,

( 2)

11

transaction, 11 and (3} projection.

•rhe
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11

emotive 11 e>r.planation would include the Platon.:i.c and Aristot1.1l~

ian theories of intensificatidn and c~tha~sis~ Shaftesburian
sentimentalism, synaesthesis (the dandellatiqn of _emotions),
and the 1.:.-sychoanaiyt.:i'e· · afal archetypal interpretations of ·
unconscious gratification& 37

The "transactional" explanation,

emphasizing affective communication between the poet and his
readers, would include Longinus' rhetor:x,cetl theory of the
sublime, Horace's "pragmatic" choice between dulce and ut.il~,
Poe I s emphasis upon craftsmanship, and the approachern of
Dewey and Rosenblatt specifically labeled as being "t:r.ansactional.1138

Finally, the "projective" approach, emph.:u.dzing

the interaction bet.we.en affect and la.ngmlge to project an
aesthetic re~lity, would include the neglected eighteenth
century theories of Abraham 'ruck.er and Alexander Gerard v the

aestheticism of Santayana, Richards' interpretation of
Coleridge, and, in certain contexts, the theories of D.W.
James, and Max Eastman.

A fourth affective approach might

also be mentioned, intriguing but well beyo:nd the scope of
this study, the
Man's ~~~

.t2.!'.

0

adaptive" theories of Morse Peckham :i.n

Chaos (1965), Arthur I<oestle:r. in The Act of,

£.!:~-~~! {1964), and, most recently c Stanley Burnshaw in
~

Sec-unless

!V~i?..

(1970).

These bring the theory of affect

Ultimately to issues of experience as a biological quest': for

Few of the critics treated in this brief history may be
neatly categorized in one or the other of these groupings.

Ost combined two or even three, but their emphasis and mode
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of combination helps dtd:ine their part..icul;;i.r approaches

e

Thus Longinuc gave equal emphas:!,.s to the emotive a.nd trans-

actional approacher,, whereas Ear;tman' s theory combined th€.~
emotive with the projective..

Richards brought. all three

into a,ccount 17 f .irs.t E~n1phasizing the emoti.v~ a:nd then the

projective, whilE~ Dewey se{:;ms to have :found a baJ.ance among

the three.

This threefold distinction (excluding the "adapt-

ive" theories) is admittedly crude, but it has its basis in
roughly comph~mentary dynami.c::,; of li te:cary experience:

our

response to the: poet, .induced emotions O and the stiJ:rn:i.lated

projection of aesthetic experience.

Moreoverr these cat-

egories seem ernpirically uBeful as a prt:?li.m.inary bz1sis for
d.if fe.r,:::nt.iat.ion among these critics, Et:nabling us to sort

out rnany of t.he more complicated theories as• combinations

of others.

The "stratificational" theory we proposed last

chiipter may accordingly be understood as an integration of

transactional and projective approaches, while the particular
experience of emotion has been left for a inore technicml ex-

planation next chapter.
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concept of the "ideal~ reader, which would justify the
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neglect of affective critical issues*

If our response

were a rubber stamp, either to form or the inspiration of
the poet., there would be little more to tJay about the matt.er.

Fortunately this is not the case--if it were, literature
would be meaningless, a rote experience.
lO•rhis analogy with catalysis was· of course suggested
by ToS• Eliotu who was indirectly influ~nced by Poe through

Baudelaire and the French symbolists.

Eliot has had few

affinities with Poe except in the "catalytic" theory of
composition, which can be traced back to Poe and little

farther.
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Particularly in the work of Ernst Kris, Simon Lesser, and

Norman Holland.
38 sartre's theory of the artist as a propagandist
instilling a sEmse of en.9a_srement i.n his readers. may b<~ added

,o this list, and in fact seems an important link between

affective and Mar.xi.st c1:it.i.cal tipproa.ches. ·
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Chapter J:>"i ve:

"Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and Affective criticism"
The foregoing critics and aestheticians included in
the wide category of affectiv,Z! cri.t.iclsrn may also be te.nt:atlvely grouped in two clusterSt, ( 1) those bror.-adly con-·

to a text., including Richards r DE.rwey, and Eastman, and
(2) those particularly conce:cm:1d with the rolt1 of emotion

group have devot.<~d their i:nquiry to t.hH ovc1rt1ll p:robliems of

into account, which we obviouslv feel to be self-evident.

-

-

The second group have been concerned with the relationship
between cognition and emotion in this response, an area
of investigation with manifold unexplored implications~
Foxmalists and obj0ir:tivists ha.ve tried to sepa:cate cognition

from emotion 0 suggesting that the ideal reader, or one
approachinsr such a p~cototype, ml1st have the discipline to

eliminate emotion or at least subdue it in his experience of
poetry~

In reply, the affective critics of the latter

gr:oup have ti:·ied to show that the two are organically inter-

related and not to be artificially divided.
To settle this and related disputes it would eeem profitable to survey recent trends in the psychological theory
of affect.

The literature is vast and beyond the scope of

th.is E,st,,?J.y, but a brief summa:ry would seem :tn order.

Thf~re

lfi 7

has unfortunately been a pervasive vulgarization of psychoanalysis among critics, both sympathetic and hostile, and
then again almost a total barrier separating experimental
psychology fr.om li t.erary cri tici t,m.

'l'hir; wall of :i.gnor,:u1cci

has encouraged facile conclusions in criticism, the most
notable of which having been the treatment of cognition as
an experience that may be isolated and r~rified.
The first influential modern explanation of emotion,
the James-Lange theory, proposed simultaneously by William

with an appropriate pattern of adjustment to an external
stirnu1v.s v and then our t1xpe:r.:-ience of emotion is the ccm.sc.1ous

awareness of this physical response, though we.make a shortcut to treat it as a direct rcspons~ to whatever triggered
this reaction.

The body thus acts as an intermediary that

generates emotion, without which we would be devoid of
feeling~

"Without the bodily stat.cs fo11owinq on the

pf1r•w

ception, the latter wo~ld be purely cognitive in form, pale,
,
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affective
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deriv€~d from this theory.

He p:r.'oposed a comparabli:?

relay" judgment. of poetry, that we first. havei

,i

It

circuit

total re~;porrne

to a poem and then jud9i~ it. by t::rvaluating our. reBponsE~.

That this proposed response, the .act.of appreciation, is both
cognitive and emotional rathc~r than bc~ing strictly emotional.

according to the ,James-Lange thE\Ory, se12;.m.s a relativf.:ly minor
differenco@

For our purposes in cr.:i.ticis.m, though, the

,Jamtrn-Lange theory mostly seems to support the cognitive

approach,.

Emotion is ident:if :i.ed · an physical activity in ·a

polar opposition to.cognition and is moreover limited t.o
relatively crude patterns of response t.hat involve overt
phisical behavior.

Our emotional response is treated as a

spil:U.119 ovc.~r of behavior into consciousness, a. geyser of.
physici;i.l release which rn.::1y be arrested and cut. off from

experience if we have enough conscious w:i.11 power.

In

fact ~Tames rec om.mended that we ex,;rcise repr.esflion to "con·"
'

.

qut~,:- tmdesire,\>.<ble emotional tendencies in ourselves 1 11 for,

"the suppresBion of the actual movements has a tendency to
supp1:ess the nervous ci,n:rents that incite them., so that the

external quiescence is followed by the internal. 112

Here

·· James' s proposal seems to have anticipated th«:.? Pavl_ovian

therapy techniques of behavioral psychology (actually first
by Plato)

in advocating the inhibition of impulr~es

order to eliminate themf compr.'i.:r.-ed with cathartic theory

psychoanalysis, which seeks to eliminate them through
e:x:pressi.onc 3
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Lange theory, which I think perhaps considerable, James's

a surplus dissipa.t,ion. of erH:!rgy frorn the body w'hich ma;/ be

centrate our attention upon interpreting poetry:

"When

we teach children to repress their emotional talk and display,
it is not that they ma.~r

1 more--gu1te the reverse.

It is

currents are diverted from the regions below must swell the
activity of the thought-tracts of the brain." 4

Our neural

energy may presumably either be discharged in emotion or

this neural energy James wants to channel.will later be shown

he equates with emotion are its extreme manifestation in
preparation for an emergency of some kind.

Under normal

circumstances, the body is simply alert, vaguely echoing our
conscious attention, while we exercise a more refined emotional
response in our conscious feelings, for example in our ex=•

perience of poetry.

We usually do not have a physical re-

action to poetry, though figures such as Housman a~d Emily

spine.

Those of us less inspired by the muse nevertheless
cortical response which is emotional:

if a poem's

associations generally confirm our experience, we feel a

'Benne of gratification; if they seem to hit us with new
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insights, we respond with appreciative wonderment; if we
mu.st: briefly c.h.sagrc:e, there iB conce:cn a.nd perhaps hei9ht.,·

nation; if we partly agree with what we mostly reject, there
it~ reluctant acknrnv·.ledgement; and if we feel we ju£,t don wt

understand, t.he:re i~J impatient baff lemt.:;rrt:.

A.11 of thc;'.se

a.x.:-oused by the bodily reaction desc:ci.bed by James.*

These feelings we have about poetry may be identified

which nw.y also be :f:ict.ively aroused, rnof,t obviously, for

cxa.mpler in the: v.ica:r:imrn g:r-21t:iJ:icatJ.on of .pornography ..

Affective critics such ao Richards have been entirely concernc⇒ d w;i,

th the primary re.sponse u bnt if our "suspension

of verisimilitude can lead to the incipient bodily response
described by James in this vicarious gratification.

In

pornography this response would be sexual arousal, technically
conation rather than emotion though certainly accompanied by
emotions.

If sufficiently stimulated, this mounting inclin•=

ation toward gratification can altogether dj_vert our attention
from the primary reading response into a train of our own
fa.ntasies ~

•ro a certain extent the fantasy content of lit·-~

eri:1.ture which might fit: the ,James=Lange theory probably
:teinforfv,,:op,d nvt·C""ld"'-'
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point it becomes a distraction.

The ideal interaction, a

hydrofoil, might be to indulge our fantasies in moderation
as we skim over the ~0xt, high enough for an easy flight but
also close enough to maintain our support in the more criti.

.

ca 1 primary response to the text itself.

This compn:nn.i r;P:

arousal, for example the shame, guilt, and fear evoked in

fully ma s an intellectual experience of a full range of
.
emo t~J.on:3 brought to the threshold of incipient behavior
proposed in the James-Lange theory.
Of course the theory of affect has been cnnsiderably

eighty years ago, and these modifications generally seem
to confirm the principles of affective criticism that we
support.

The first major challenge to the James-Lange theo~y

the "Cannon-Bard theory"), developed through the twenties
and early thirties on the basia of considerable neurological
investigation.

Cannon proposed that the emotions are gener-

ated in the thalamus and hypothalamus, not the body, which
he proved to be relatively slow, insensitive, and indiscriminate in its response.

He also performed lobotrnnies on

· anirr@lB to establish that those decorticated suffered extreme
emotions v unua. .lly to the pi tc:h of :r..:1.qe p while those~ ·whose
th.::tL:unur, and hypotha1amrn:; wer(~ darnaqc!d became predict.ably
Xcitahlc-'
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damaged in the thal.:Hni.c re9ions.,

Apparently confirming the

James-Lange theory in one respect, however, he found the
cortex to serve a largely inhibitory function, restraining
the activity of the tha.Ja.1111-rn and hypr.Jth:.:d.amus ~ 5

Cannon I s

1927 explanation of this process may be .profitably quoted in
full despite its heavy use of jargon:

with conditioned processes which determine the direction

they are roused and ready for discharge.

That the

thalamic neurones act in a special combination in a
'
t'
1 exprossion
.
given
emo:iona_
is proved by the reaction

patterns typical of the several affective states.

These

neurones do :not require detailed irmervntion from above

action is a primary condition for their service to the
body--they then discharge precipitately and intensely ••••
When these neurones dischaxge in a pa,:rticulax combJnation r

excite afferent paths to the cortex •••• The poculiar

' - sensa~ion
t .
,,vhcn
quulity of the emotion is added to simple
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the thalamic processes are roused. 6
With slight modifications Cannon diagrammed this process in

.

R

r·c; c:r1 E)t.t1:r" {

'.!.'h

thalamus

B

body response

,

etc,)

This diagram seems to differ from his earlier explanation
in indicating an almost direct path from an external stimulus
to the thalamus without intermediate cerebral interference,

whereas his earlier explanation had suggested an initial
cortical response before the c~ntripetal stimulati.on of the
thalamus.

Unfortunately, the diagram seems to repreEent

more accurately the commonly a.cc:c1pted thalamic theory that
the primary £:unction of the co1~tc:x i.n the cxpcricrnce of
motion rerna.ins inh.ibi tor-y f s.i.rnply sh:i.f ting the seat of emotion.~:
rem the body (according to the James-Lange theory) to the
Thus a clearly compartmentalized distinction yet
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seems to have be.c;m ma..intaim~d i.n the thalnmic theory b,::!tween

cognition, a cortical activityp and emotion, thalamic activity
inhibited by the cortex.

The categorical difference be-

tween emotion a.nd. cogn.ition assumed by ,John Crowe -Ransom in
-Nt~i'r ~:r:i.tici:r:?-m - (1941} would seem tc, have bc,en justified by

current neurological research.
Cannon at least brought the source.of emotions closer
to the cortex, and subsequent research gave the cortex a
much more sign.if icant role in the grmrn:E,,tion -of emotions ..
The investigations of Dussr-!r de Barto:nrt1'} and W. S ~ McCullough

in 1939 cast doubt on the concept that cortical influence
is entirely inhibitory since the stimulation of.neurons
· leading from the cortex to the thalamus apparently brings
an increase and n6f a decrease of thalamic activity. 8
~

Other

exp6riments also demonstrated that afferent excitation is
not essentia.1 to emotion, contra:cy to the James-Ltmge thc?ory,

and that emotion without corti.cal activity is an automatic
reflex, usually an outburst of meaningless rage, not the felt
expc1rience of emotion.

Parts of the brain outt~ide but neiu:

the thalamu::I were also i.denti.f:ied as being involvc~d in the

experienco of fea:r. and rage, and the success of pre-frontal
lobotomy upon the cortex to eliminate fear and anxiety (with
side effects of increased tactlessness and aggressiveness)
suggested a direct involvement of cortical activity in the
- e:xper.ienc(~ of emotion.

It was co.ncluded that the normal

~experience of emotion would seem to involve _the interrelationship betwet::m the two rc1.ther than an exclusive activity of
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one or the other.

Since the mid-thirties psychologists have

therefo::re tried. to develop a mor<o,: com.proherrnive: theory of
emotion, though incor;0rating both the James-Lange and

thalamic theo:t::i.esv n<~ithe:r of which may be_ entirely dis-·

.
. a comp ..J..l.Ct;h:e
.;. d
oc:curs ::tn
Arnold proposed that emotion

process would begin with the activity of attention (compar-

almost simultaneously both the cortex an.d thalamus 1. with the

cortical response initiating additional nerve impulses to the
thalamus, which in turn relays them to the body to produce
autonomic effects observed once again by the cortex.

The

(climinRting her schematically unnecessary distinction be-

R

receptor

SR sensory relay station

Ev cvalua.tion
E

emotion

NS nervous system relay station
B

C

cortex
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fn this diagram th~ i~teraction between cortex and thalamus
may be seen as essential,.· to emotion, probably in an incessantly active circuit, while the body response relayed by
the thalamus throu;Jh/th~ nervous system feeds back an awareness of our physical ~timulat.ion when our emotions reach a ·
\

threshold of sufficient· intensity.

However, the common

process involved in the experience of emotions would be
-cortico-thalamic interaction, and Arnold goes so far as to
define all experience in terms of this relationship:

" ••• that

there is a psychological experience whenever there is corticothalamic or th.alamo-cortical transmission of nerve impulses .. " lO
Emotion and cognition have become different faces of the same
process of interaction in conscious experience.

Cognition

emphasizes the cort.ex and emotion the thalamic regions, but
neither may entirely eliminate one or the other of these
poles, because all experien~e involves the interaction be-

tween the two.
Since tais explanation proposed by Arnold in 1950, the
psychological theory of emotion has advanced even further
with new discoveries in neurology which keep unsettled the
issue of the exact relationship between emotions and cognition.
The lymbic system, a coordinating center linking tpe cortex
and hypothalamus, has been found to play an important role:
and another center, ·the reticulum, which controls waking and
sleeping, has been discovered to control the activity level
Of both the cortex and hypothalamus.

The stimulative influence

the reticulum would suggest once again a possible modifi-
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cation of the Jamei>:-Lange t.he.ory t that an cmtir.ely new
· , body function. creates emotions by stimul;,lting cortical

activity, thcugh I am told the reciprocal influence of the
co.rtex upon the reticulum has yet to be adt:K1uately •St.,:1died. ll
On tho other hand, exptffiment.B by Schachter and Singer :in the

control of &drenaline supply have established that cognitive
factors are the major determinant of th~ experience of
emotion,, not appetites or low,u:- brain center functions.

These experiments also indicated that few physiological
patterns exist to differentiate our efuotional responses,
fi~ach of which st.i.mulates a gen(-;r.ali.zed high l~vc~l of sympath~·

etic activa.t:ton in the autonomic nervmrn syst:cm. 12

In a

study of perception published in 1960 by Solley and Murphy,
the close r.e1a.t.io:nehip between cogn.i tion~ .?ind emotion again
Revi.ewin9 considerable e:-{""

seems to have been conf .irmed.

pe:r imental evidence, Solley and Hm::phy prcipose di vi.ding

perception into a five stage p1:cH.::ess:

{l)

expectancy,

(2) attending, (3) reception, (4) trial-and-check, and
(5) percept, with a sixth stage, autonomic and proprioceptive
arousal, influccnce.<l by· the third and fourth stages and in
turn i.nf lmmcing the fourth and fifth stages.

They diagrammed

this process of perception as follows:
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Shifting the ter111s to be int.cqra.ted from emotion and cogni ti.on

to motivation and perceptionv they p:r.opcrncd that motivation

is an essential ingredient of all these stages.

Without the

energizing force of motivation, they claimed, the act of
perception cannot occur:
Motivation raises ox~ lowers the level of consciousness

with which perceptual ~cts are carried· out; it functions
to guid6 the selectivity that wa observe in perception;
it serves both a facilitative and an inhibitory function.
In short. 9 motivatJ.on does govern t.he direction. and strengt,h
of perceptual actsi indeed, w:i.thout motivation effects it

is doubtful that we would perceive at a11.13
current theories in psychology thus seem abundant in confirming our view thnt cognition and emotion a~e organically
connected while the relatively crude incipient physical
response often identified with emotion is a side effect
which influences our conscious experience only when a certain
threshold of intenGity has been reached~

Though this physical

response may be controlled, minimized, or even possibly
eliminated, the dynamics of cortico-thalamic interaction
(conceding both to be stimulated by the reticulum) puts
.
.
. an 1nsepara
.
1,
'
t~.1.ng
'
emo t~-1.on
an d cogni. t.1.on
1.11
>.i.c f :,,.ntcrpenet;:I:a

relat.:i.onsh.:i.p.14
Research in experimental psychology would thus indicate
validity of Gerard's proposal in the eighteenth century
Dewey's in the twentieth that our perception and undering of literature are dictated by emotion, or, if the

word

11

dictated 11 seems too strong, let us say suffused and

directed by emotion.

At both levels we suggested earlier,

the "primary" act of attention and the subsequent mixture of
catharsis and fantasies triggered by this act, emotion seems
an important if not predominant factor.
Trends in the psychoanalytic theory of emotion have
been roughly parallel to those of.experimental psychology,
though differences between the two ,fields are tantalizing
for those who try to reach an acceptable synthesis.

On

one hand, the psychoanalytic model of personality dynamics
has little similarity to brain processes traced by neuro~ogists.

The libido may be tentatively identified somehow

as involving the activity of the hypothalamus, reticulum,
and other lower brain centers, and the conscious and unconscious may be located in the cortex in some pattern of
interaction among neural shortcuts,-as William James briefly
proposed in Chapter Six of Principles of Psychology.

But

this contorted application of Freudian theory is at best
tenuous and probably useless in experimental psychology,
certainly in the study of neurology.

On the other hand,

psychoanalysis successfully explores patterns of behavior
that presently cannot be explained in. terms of either
neurology or experimental psychology.

Their labored con-

clusions tdo often seem the initial assumptions of poychoanalysi~bey9nd which it leads us to clearly significant
insights in the.dynamics of personality.

In the theory of

(or emotion), these differences between the two
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co:r-tico=th

At the beginning

psychic energy discharged to attain gra~ification and causing
Ironically, p2r-

a side effect in our fee]ing of emot

t cortico-thalamic theory for our

sm because language could be

"By pt·ovid.i.ng an opportunity f:o:r- the:
to aischa~ge itself in wnrds the ther

power the idea which was not
Such a simple r~inciple of catharsis

much to our gratification as critics, but Freud 1 s early
theory was soon drastically modified because it confu~ed

affect with drives, our emotions with our appetites.
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ion in language, and (2) in an affect charge of the motor
or secretory functions.

He thus treated ideas and affects

were seen as externalizing cathcxes, structure! seeking
exprcssio11 in an indirect, sublimated pattern of gratification,
while af fee ts were seen as interna1.i,d.n9 proct:~ss•~s of

discharge experienced in the body which~ lacking structure,

held by Freud as late as 1915, when he published his import-·
ant article,

11

'l'he Unccmscious, II bore the ~;ame impl:tcat.:.ions

del<~terious to aff ectiVt":: er i tic ism as the J ames-Lan9e the
tJ1.i11a.mic theories did.

If idea and affect. can be pola.rized

into ~::xac:tly oppor;ite dri.ve representations, the on<c~ a process

involving the body and the otlHl:r a structure i:nvolvinq the

mind, then the New Critical distinction between affective
cu1d e:ogrli.ti ve approaches to cri ticisrn would seem valid, a.

major premise of formalist (or contextualist) approaches.
The separability of affect and cognition in the dynamics of
pexsona.l:i ty would justify their compartmentalizai.:ion in the

field of criticism.

To our insistence that both must be

involved in a comprehensive theory of literature, the proponents of

11

cQgnitive 11 criticism might reply with a measure

of justification that Freudian theory itself suggests they
and they (the proponents) prefer to do this,
dealing exclusively with perceived structures and letting the
vaguer and less clearly discriminated process of affect automatically take care of itself.
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However, with the publication of The E~o

~

the Id in

1923 and Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety in 1926, Freud
shifted to a new'perspective more in agreement with the
cortico-thalamic theory in combining affect with cognition.

He proposed that the affect-charge becomes structuralized

.

in the personality as an "ego function" which may be used to
signal an attitude without affect discharge~actually taking
place.

This patterning occurs in .affect-discharge channels

for the release of emotion, innate to begin with, which
proliferate and become st:r:ucturalized as part of the personali ty.

In this proce.ss the existence of a "super-affect" has

been proposed which once formed would be continuously present
as a structuralized affective state, a character trait, or,
in the words· of Rapaport, a "comple_x quasi-;st,able substructure

of the personality. 11 17

Rapaport himself tries to combine

these thr~e stages of Freudian theory of affect into an
acceptable synthesis.

He defines affects as safety-vdlve

drive representations which at first use inborn channels
and
thresholds of discharge
much in accordance with the
I
.
James-Lange theory of· ,affect.

The?, in the development of

personality, he proposed that "the damming up of drives by

defenses makes for more intensive and more varied use of the
//

affect discharge.cbanne'is ••• ," resulting in the increased
importance of subtle affect discharge-channels and a comparable deemphasis of "massive affect attacks" in the overt
expression of emotion.

As a result, he proposes, "a con-

of.affects extends in all shadings from massive affect

183

'I'his

comprehensive explanation by Rapaport seemn harmonious

transrnj r.rnion of :nei'il<;:S .impulses.

'I'he child r:10:re easily fits

the James-Lange theory in his frequent outburst of emotion,
but with the structuralization of the mature Ego in countless
subtle discharge-channels, affect would ~e moderated to become a .sustained influence upon tho personed. it.y in i t~1

interaction with its environment, either in a normal or
pathological pattern of response.
~i'htn, expcr irnental pr;;ycho1ogy nnd psych.:)c\.nalyru..s seem to

bring us by different routes to the same conclusion.

Affect

(or emotion, loosely its pattern of behavior) is a function

even our most abstract reflections.

It guides our choice of

cannot be el~ninated or successfully compartmentalized, for

this likewise evoke feelings, however subdued and restrained
by our purpose.

Likewise, affect cannot and should not be

eliminated from the experience of reading literature, e1ther
in our "primary ret1pons:e 11 or. vicarious gro.tifi.caticm.

Whether we like it or not, our experience of literature
e.moticma:1~·-·to deny th:i.s is hypo er. i ti cal" to ad voe ah~ its
cessation iB to ask the i1npossi.ble, to make it

absurd.

,3.

11

f allac-y"

Our task is not to deny affect, but to encourage

the most satisfactory affective response to literature,

fully cultivating our attention in synaesthesis, as I.A.
Richards proposed~ but also exploring our emotional involve~

ment, nnr f rrntasieg as a corn.1"ili trnent to t.hie adventures of

identification. ..
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2william James, p. 752.
3The best introduction to behaviqr t~erapy_and ~ts
successful treatment of neuroses is by Joieph Wolpe, The
Practice of Bch-a.vio:e 'fherap:y_ (1969).

4william James, p. 754.
- 5 For the layman it is almost essential to rely upon the
summary of Cannon' r::: e:?:tensive investigfati.ons.

Those I have

found most useful (and c:ivai.lahlG) for my purposes a.re,
.An ex:tensitm of La::1..gc' z 'l'l.'H:::ory,

"Emotion as Vi.sc:ern l Action:
by M.A. W,;:~.w1er nnd

II

An Exci t.ato:ry Theory of Emotion r

•

II

11

by

Magda B. Arnold, both includc<'l. in Feeli~1g~. z.. nd Emotions,

edited by Martin L. Reymcrt (New York, 1950), a collection

of articl.es making frequent references to Cannon's theory.
For developments in the theory of affect since Cannon, the
article,

11

Affectp A.'i,.Janmess, and Performance,

11

by Carroll

Izzard et aL, includ<::;d in Affect, ~09-ni.tion, and Personality,
edited by Sylvan Tomkins and ca;:·1:oll Izzard (New York, J..965),

is qui.t.e useful.
6 Reymert 6 pp. 12-13; quo·U.:!d by Arnold from

11

'1'he Jam(;:!s-

Lang<::l ThcO:t::l' of Emotion, 11 ~ · l1. Psx:_choL 39 (1927), Pe 120.
7 Reyrnert, p. 13; fr.om

II

l\g;.dn the ,James . -Lan.g.e and the

'l'halamic Theor.ies of Emotion,

11

!:._E_>.-'chol.

!3~·, 3R

(1931), p. 282.

8 Reymert, pp. 17-·lB; cited by Arnold from ,J. N12u1·c rl_1:~i{)l_.,
1

0.938), p. 69,.
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9 Reymert, p. 19.
lOReymert, pp.·30-31.
11 1 am informed of this by Angus McDon~ld, a psychologist
and personal friend.
1 2s. Schachter and J.E. Singer, "Cognitive, Social and
Physiological Determinants of Emotional State." Psychol. Rev.
6 9 ( 19 6 2 ) , pp • 3 7 9- 3 9 9 •

1 3charles M. Solley and Gardner Murphy, Development of
the Perceptual World (New York, 1960), p. 52.
14 other theoriris apparently bearing out the same conclusion, by Eliz.abeth Duffy, D.C. McClelland, and S.S. Tomkins,
are surveyed in "Affect, Awareness, and Performance," by
Carroll Izzard et. al., op. ,cit.
15 The best account of this evoluti~n is by David Rapaport,
"On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects," in Psychoanalytic
Psychiatry and Psychology, Clinical and Theoretical Papers,
Austen Riggs Center, Vol I (New Yor~; 1954), pp. 274-310-hereafter cited as Rapaport.

Also useful are Rapaport's two

books, Emotions and Memory (New York, 19·12) and Organization
~

Patholog¥ of Thought (New York, 1951), in passim., as well

,as Otto Fenichel's The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis
(New York, 1945), again in passim.
l6cited by Rapaport,.p. 278; from "On the Psychical
Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena."
(London, 1946) •

17 Rap~port, pp. 30o-jo1.
~8Rapaport, pp. 304-305.
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by Saussure, a repository of words and grammatical

pos

Nevertheless, our
words and even syntax while speaking, the parole

fined by

Sau~sure, necessitates first recognizing words and syntactic

ch,>it'.'' ,.r ... ,·,r,1
• . . . '\..~

,_. ,J,.., \,.,_.,.

.,,,,...·,.,.,c
,J

(~.J.!t~.,,-b-,•,

In this complex act both cognition

188

formalist equations and theor
this fundamental certainty.
The locus clasBiCu.~ in th 2 modern hitstor:r of
1

.,

by F'crd:Ln,'ind c1e~

compiled and puhlishc:d by f,,ome of his · strn1ents af tl':!r his

formalist in sbparating language from p~rsonality ahd emotion,
but he made a numhcr of linguistic distinctions subsequently

fields, primarily anthropology in the structuralism of

is mostly ignored to concentrate upon n , ~tructural description of phenomena relatively impervious to time, for

A denial of history is implied, apparently a reactionary
opposition to theories of social progress, particularly
Marxism, though Levi-Strauss hi.mself has maintained that he
does not wish to deny the progressive theory of history 0 but
to supplement it with a comparable theory of pre-historic
At any rate, this distinction between
synchrony and diachrony has also been applied in the int~r-

pretation of literature, in the search for static forms to
the exclusion of dynamic process either within the text itself

or its

II

transaction,-:i 1 u :re 1(1.U.orwhip with the reader:.

Prob·"
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the interpretation of Baudelaire 0 s

~

Chats by Jakobson

and Levi-Strauss and its extension by Michael Riffaterre
integrating linguistic and poetic structures.3

Riffaterre

claims that our previously cited paradigm of information
theory must be d):'asticallyreduced tQ the message and the
addressee, a reduction which actually seems further limited
to "message--decoding" without the final "hearer."

He .

,

concedes that the purpose.of the message is to draw a response from the hearer, but insists that this response be
a comprehension of linguistic structure devoid of content,
,,.//

'

either in idea or, we may presume, affect.

His critical

position is technically affective since he is concerned
with response, but in the sense of poetic structures being
auplicated or s.tereotyped by our minds i-n their exact pattern.
Mind-shape duplicates poem-shape, while cognition and affect
are eliminited from consid~ration as choice-making activities.
Diachrony, in this case the growth of our response, the ·
accretion of emotion, ideas, and language, is altogether
denied.
Saussure's distinction between ''signifier" and "signified"
(more or less word and its referent) also has formal implications and curiously appeals to our conservat_ivc inclinations.

The relationship between the two, defined

miathematically as a.n axis, is described as "arbitrary" and
by implication autocratic so "the masses have no voice in

tne matter~"

Instead a "contract" exists between the two

'Which is a "heritage of the preceding period," implying the
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•
·1
t· - - i 1
receiveQ
ar b'1~rary
syrn0O.s.

The "prime conservative force"

in this historic contract shows the "impossibility of
r,2vol uti.on,

11

he claims, a prospt~ct likc:wi:;:;,e .:u:sua.qing our

f 1:'?:ar of poli.tic;:,J.. uphea.v,11 in these troubled times~ 4

J:'or a

few pages Saussure thus rosorted to political metaphors
- which mi.9ht be v,:'tlid strictly appl_ii;.,?d tq langna~re u though

one cannot help noticing

.:-:i

peculia:r. conr.wn;;u1cc be.tween his

rejection of process in linguistics and the conservatism
implied in his metaphor's vehicle, a rejection cif process in
history toward ba.rb;irous domocratic vi~ita.s.

Agrd.n we scc-rn

to be brought ba.ck t.o the erstv.rhi.1c virtlH:;S of t::::ynehrony,

the preservation of existing strrn::'!trn-:er;;, the most demon-

affecti.Vf? cr:i..t.ici.sm, however, a fund,<trnental mod:tf.icnt:ion .1_s

required to accept this dichotomy bet·ween "signific?.r" a.nd

"signified" in the total "sign sit.ua.ti.one 11

Saussure pro-

posed simply that the "signi.f:i.ed" is wha.tever object might be
arbitrarily indicated by a word, for example with eqnos
representing a horEH:!, the picture of which was actually
He repeatedly suggested a.n. expl:i. c:it,

included in his text.

fixed relationship between the,two, bridging an.enormous
gap be.tween objf:ict.ivt~ immediacy and the language act:, as if

words naturally consist of signs representing discrete
-Lockean things a.nd events~

'l'he inter.n,edia.te stages i.n our

consc"'C)t1C: ~n 1f._,,.,.~
-·pg..-,"'1-i(·1n
r,f C'"-'1)"""•1',:.rnr•,CI c:e---e·•Pl 4·.c',
• .lu
,,,,.~J-- .,
.,,6....

_,,.,..

~ ....

ia.f

.._,,1

,4(\,

..._.t,.

__ ,Cl,,

'\-,t~

L.

,\

\t,

}'!c"ff"'
I.
.\ \: --...,,

bcPn f>"!im-·
_.. ....-, •

,-.,, •·· ,.,

inat.ed from this radic.a.lly attenuat.rJd expl.an.:.'i.tion of the
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sign event.

In Elements of Semiology, Roland Barthes, a

modern proponent of Saussurean lingl:\istics, assures us
that Saussure did not intend the "signified" to be a thing
but its mental representation, an important distinction.

It

is possible to find thi's meaning in Saussure, but he did

not adequately clarify this point, and neither he nor Barthes
seems to have been much concerned with the intermediate
stages of conscious experience.

Barthes proposes that Saussure

meant the objective horse to be particularly depicted by
its mental representation, which in turn is particularly
and arbitrarily represented by the word horse or equos, so
its mental experience is in effect an intermediate stereotype linking the horse with its name without adding or subtracting·any further connections of meaning.

We would argue

that experience is virtually eliminated from language. in
this theory, and what we have left is reduced to two homologous
planes parallel to each other, one of content, the signified
objective world, and the other of expression, language as
the signifier of· this objective world.

Language-wielding

homo sapienssimply transposes pattern from one plane to the
other.

For Barthes and other radical formalists influenced by
Saussure, literature understandably becomes the "classical"
assortment of meaningful counterparts between these two
~lanes, language and reality.

However, in the context of

\

affective criticism we must particularly reject this entire
conception of language because of.the vital importance of
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"to lunguager cc~tainJy in our early stages
of childhood but even to a

Saussure's exJmple brings us
.
t h.1eJ.S-

. t

r0pres0nt2tional

f)()l.n :

fcrwartl, a silent,
•

with profound, unspok2n ropport,

between signifier and Dignified advocated by Saussure, or

word I

r:;

and atomistic, but like a

meanin9'

penumbra, an nrca of undefined, recollected experience.
Often, as Santayana proposed, it has enough clustered supera fa:i.rly
ation, for 0xamp1c

J

n our conception of a. ho:rr;e.

Yet, th.Lr;

directly in our lives

the! 1,or:d
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upon our conception of horse.

It is a radical abstraction

lock our minds into a one-to-one equation, a pseudo-Platonic
abstraction, for example the drawi.ng of a-horse used by

.

Instead, while reading we must dynamically sort
through these associations, a tangle of ~ordc and impress-

ions, and the more venturesome our effort, the more worthwhile we make literature.
Barthes tries to explain this
expe:ri.ence as "connotad;ion" strictly in term:c; oE 1:1.ngu:\.r,tic
signifiors, but his theory seems entirely inadequate.

He

of connotation by including a signifying system with a new

a.d in.fin:i.tu.rn ,,

Non-verbal experu~nce thus may be explained

in terms

through the inc~usion of all

possible asnociations
l
•1 J..G
~
symDO
..

.,r~ l
<"'(1-i-• -i
X
LT.h~
.• ·-on •.~,.

5

of
This ingenious theory suggests

Richards' proposal in The
Rhetoric, that all
- - PhilosoDhy
_____
I;_~__ of

thought is metaphoric, involving comparisons of one sort
or another; but Richards did not reduce this concept to a

11. expc:r:tence
.
:1
a.i..
re d uceei,

as in Ramist logic, to an infinite regression of binary
'l'he

II

loort(:IH::ss II of his proposal r:ccms to have
(,:xper.i.encc

194

ingredient of the language act which helps to interrelate
r,tords, and o.f eounm i.s i tsc1f shaped ,.md directed by the

probess of experience, any proposed hierarchy of s~gnifying
systems sei;Ims mostly a matt,:it.' of forma.liat. ingemd..t.y,.

The last of Saussure's dichdtomies which concern us

.

:tr;

t.he ent.ii:·e system o.f language i:\.nd its particular combi.n-

ations when we speak or write.

Lanaue
ia a s_vstem,
a
... '
.l

...,.

synchronic pattern of ~peech habits we share in order to
communicate with each other f while

f::~E.£1:!:. ir.; the diachronons

act of choosing particular combinations from this system in

different as system and process and mus~ be studied separately.

Again, his distinction is useful but misleading.

It

seems to be supported by recent investigations of structural
and transfor:rn<1tiona1 litVJJJistics O but both schoo1~3 have

un.o,ba.shcdly restricted their discovery procedure's to the
investigation of synchronic patterns i.n !~_ucf prt,cis-=.ily
accounting for thi~d.r limitath'm in explaining th~: actual-

processes of speech.

Immediate con.sti tuenbJ sought by

structuralists and the generation of sentences by transformationalists have practically nothing to do with our actunl
formation of sentences while talking, and their results rnny
he e>~pected t.o reflect the lirn:i ts of their methods..

'11

In

A gJ~ammar docs not tell us. how to synthcr..izr~ a spec:i.f:ic
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given utterance.

In fact, these two ta

s which the speaker
the same, and arc

[according to gen-

both outside the

emphasis of linc::Jnistics upon Ianquc
....~· ...,,,....,,,..,...
._.._,_,..

f

the syr,tem of lanquaqe
.
..

irrespective of its use, has led quite r0turally to the

vast internali%ed system which entirely dominates our
thought.

All we can do, i+ seems, is pick and choose tram

its E,t:nwture,~ u a quaJ.i.f ied voli tiona1 choice amon:g non~"
vol:iticm.a.1 pat.tern::,, with the b::1.lance of authority lying- in
itself, rather than our feelings and

motives in the selection we make.
Quite the contra~y, we insist, the act of speaking or
writing is an entirely different sort of behavior.

While

eng·aged in this act we almost sirnul tfU\emrn: ly pr.ojcict mean~·
in•;J f orwa.rd in t.irne, find words to particularize this mean-·
ing, and syntactic patterns to connect these words among
themselves and with our present context of thought.

Linguists

acknowl.edge a linear dimension of language, but what they
.
. J .:u:; a sequence S(:.>en o.,.)Ject.1..
r'
. VG.!, y .(:rom
r
US\U:L1)
... y have .1n
rn:u:tc;.
an

seen on a page or a voice filling the dimension of time
understood spatially.

It would seem more useful to describe

this forward projection of meaning by imagining ourselves

d.irnension, perhDpr, throu~rh

a tunnel or over a ·highway towar.d·a vanishing point on the
horizon.

Like scenery along a Nebraska road, impressions to

be expressed in words but a good deal ahead seem vague though
upcoming.

As we approach, particular words materialize

like barns and houses, while possibilities for syntactic,
arrangement almost simultaneously materialize to connect
them among themselves and in relationship to our present
context.

Then,once our words have been syntactically com-

bined, in effect locked in the act of expression, they and
their combination remain in our memory to help project
connections toward new words and meanings.

It is a swift,

unmeasurable process, yet its sequence generally seems to
progress from feelings and pre-verbal ideas to particular
words, especially substantives, then verbs, modifers, and
finally most of the form class words (prepositions, conjunctions, etc.).

Substantives and verbs seem to carry the

burden of meaning,·while syntax, a mortar b;i.nd~ng them, is
effected through the function of pronouns, form class words,
etc., and of c6urse_the position among words.
The. overwhelming importance of substantives and verbs
may be seen in poetry, where John Ciardi has suggested the
healthy ratio of noun~ and verbs to adjectives and adverbs
to be approximately two to one.

Form class.words are even

fewer and carry little meaning except to connect other words.
In Frost's stanza, for examplev the sequence of form class words
alone seems entirely cryptic (his a to if there the the of
and) while the sequence of substantives carries a great
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deal of the meaning (lie harness bells shake mistake sound

sound's sweep wind flake) and virtu

ly completed with tho

addition of adjectives and adverbs (He gives harness bells
shake a.E.;k some r:tista.ke only other sound u r, s'iveep (':)nt,y w1.nd

downy fl2rJ::.1::!).

Even Lf the sequence :is ffd..xcd i.t wcn.d.d still

words .cd.one or combined ·with jabberwocky ( 11 kee dabs his

harbob dums a glake/ To ung if there ot mungs piflake./
'l'hE.1 arly itheir ba.g 1 d the.~ gleep/ Of icrgly <:;lind and. bowzy

plake."). Thus syntax would seem not dominant but subordin~tc

coherence to the rest
Even with regard to syntnx alone, though, smaller
syntactic units, for example the prepositiortal phruse and
adverb clausef apparently take precedence over the unity
of the entire sentence~
to

ha.V•.':}

Local synta.ctic conr1ections seem

immed:La.te pi.iori ty, while total unity

without more interference than necessary.

if:;

accomplished

This unpopular

m1pposition amon9 mo~:;t linguists bears important irrtplica.t···

ions in literature.

As Christensen has demonstrated in

the equational limitations of the nubject-predicate reof
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of appositives and· pa.rent.betical .i.nc.lus:ions v:i thin the

sentence.

The accumulation of these modifiers forces us to

pay more attention to local syntactic connections rather
than total r,entence unity.,

This local emph::isis seems a

syntax, particularly the artificial Subject-predicate
'

equation which is binary.

Moreover, as £.S. Lewis has

(1942), the syntax of a poet such as Milton matters little
compared to the roiling ,:ind expanding · sequence: of: words.

Milton's involuted, Latinate sentence pattern justifies
this sequence in a conventionally acceptable syntactic

stitute the poetry, which lies more in the progressive
sequence of words with impinging auras of expericnce.9

This

i.s precisely the "interanimat.ion" of. w·ords in p:roximi ty with

each other which interested Richards in both Coleridge nn
the Imagination and The Philosophv of Rhetoric~
-- ----·

...1...... ......_....... - - - - - -

It must be emphasized that we cannot entirely deny the
Whorfian hypothesis regarding the influence of syntax upon

t.hinki.ng, for example in the logical bias of the subjectpredicate relationship, but we suggest that the choi¢e of

words more significantly influences our thinking than does
their syntactic arrangement, largely a by-product of this
choice, and that the primary relationship for both is with
tho experience evoked.

In a passage often conveniently

overlooked r \vhorf hi.msel f has conccdod thf? pri.m:i ty of non·~
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verbal conscious processes to language:

"My own studii:s

suggest, to me, that language, for all its kingly role, is in
somo sense a supcx:f i.cia.l cnnbrcidory upon deeper -procf,•sses of

consciot.H'.,i.,sss, which are necessary befo.re any communication. g

signaling, or symbolism whatsoever can occur • • • 111 0
"d,~eper.

procEH:"lfH1s

11 ·

These

.

involve our experiential gr.asp of "obj1:~ct-

our choice of words and their syntactic arrangement.

There

seems to be an interlocking stage at which words and experience arc· tct:.ted and confirmed wit.h regard to each other

with a certain degree of parity and often even the dominance of languager but anterior non-verbal dynamics of con-

ulated phylogenetically in the evolution of eie human
species aR a language-wielding animal, ontogenetically in
the infant's acquired capacity to use and understand language,
and, we insist, i.n t"he ordinary process of choit:e among

words whenever we speak or write as mature adults.

The

words arise (or erupt) in consciousness to describe and
specify our experience, not vice versa,

any high school

teacher knows about st~dent compositions.

If a student com-·

pensates for ignorance by relying upon language or jargon
alone, his prose is awkward or vapid and repetitious, but
if he

11

knows 11 what he is writing about: for example an

.incident .i.n his own life, then h:L!~ l~:1.ngua.~Je f lcn,,s, hi.a £:,k.1. ll

as a stylist demonstrably improves.

Likewise, EzrR Pound

ha.~3 repeat,edly insisted thc,.t a poet mi.mt have a fund of
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actual experience to write about, and language nlone does
not fill this bill.
.,,n·,.,..,f·
· .. "" 11,,..,"
Mo·r c.0 • ..,.r.A2-.;
.....:u..,,,.i.

v

·: ·~th
, :. ..

1
,~.. egt:t-'. u.
4

---~

,.:.o tr
.:.1c J.an.guage a.c t-

4

in our wonder about snowfnll, we do not necessarily begin
with the intention to use the synaesthetic word "sweep"
and hold it in abeyance until_exactly_the right context.
Beginning with feelings and impressionsu we gradually unwind ourselves in la:ngtw.ge until the word "svmep" bodies

forth into our immediate cluster of experience shaped and
articula.ted by lD,:ngu.a,ge., beccnn{;-:S "locked,, as a word i.nt.o

syntax, and is finally uttered.

The lag or diRcrepancy ln

time between first reaching the threshold of consciousness

such a lag seems essential, especially for poets, who mist
loiHi with meaning thei words they fina:U.y choose,

The

longer a particular word remains suspended at the threshold
of speechr the more weight in meaning it probably accumulates
in conscious associations and syntactic possibilities, that
is to say, the more it would seem to gain in relevance to
the poet's total experi~ncc.

Vice versa, the more words

and combinations a poet may ~1a.ther and hold for ripening in

this cluster at the threshold of speechr the more adequate
Will be the context of his expression.

A facile talent

narrows this discrepancy, quickeni.ng the turnover of gathered
Words, but profundity would usually oblige its expansion.
The reader has exactly the same task in revcrse--he must
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"rewind" the fc;yntax and vocabulary in a comparably de-·
liberate fa,shion to asser.a; most fulJy the meaning cind ft!()li.n.gs

The best defense I have found of syntax as the dom-

i:i:uuwc~) is FU)man Jakobson' s important distinct.i.on bi:1tween

metaphori~ and metonymic style~.11

Jakobson claims there

are two basic typi?:s of aphasia, "<::ontiguity disorder," in

which words are loosely associated without being syntact...~ ca 11"1'•r c"'0 nnc.:.,•·!·
........ e· rl
.. , an d

II

1 d.l.
c~:
• ...
· ~ :t
• "·
-::i.·~• 11 · ...
.; n
•- -~
}·,.
·"·1-.mJ.
1..y ·•1·
, ...·11 ••"",or.d c~
w,u.c

-~:t

c:• " TL
1·.. '"'
.,,•
,,.,,,_

suggest a polari.. ty between two radically diffe:nmt kinds of

style t the mttt.aphoric ;:,,nd rnetonymic, wi t.J1 cc)rn.parable difL~r.-·

ences in experience and literary genre~

Metaphoric style

and thinking is supposedly subs ti tutivr~" involving Eia.sy

accessibility of particular words and (as Richards proposed)
a deemphasis of syntax, most clearly

observable➔

in poetry.

As Eastman suggested, it would disrupt the continuity of
syntax to arrest our attention upon the manifold implications
of particulm: words.

In contrast, metonymic style would be

predicative, progressing· syntactically from subject to
predicate, from modifiers to "hea.d words.-" or vice vc.irsat

from "head words" to rnodifiersr creating the soquence of
language characteristic of prose.

Metaphoric style would

directly and expa.nsively connc.:c::t the

Word is used, with its

11

11

vehicler" what.ever

tenor, 11 the conger.ten of rn0an.ing

represented; while met.onymic .style would minimize this
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may be syntactically connected.

No

be exclusively devoted to one or the other of
since both the lexical and syntactic functions are obviously essen

aI to language, hut a writer's style may be

e;-,rp1:1cted to

ultra-metaphoric and the late style of James ultra-motonymiG.
Likewiset the current linguis

c conce~n with ··~---'"~···~•-·
l
its syntactic manifest0tion in particular sentences might

be considered a metonymi.c approach, while the concern we

metaphoric.

The beauty of this distinction,

t both functions of language proposed by

on may

as bcin.g dyn
.;;llf app:1rently

;;1.nd af

tive

not do this), suggesting

to express ourselves.

Also,

to a certain extent, Jakobson 1 s metonymic pole recalls

style, that any word, event, or figure of speech implies
those which follow, so that narrative is a. mode bf synecdochic
overlay, each part elaborating the meaning of those which
prec<c~de it arid requiring comparable elvboration from tl1ose

Which f61low, a regressive pattern analogically suggested,
.
1 paper cups 1_ying
'
conica_
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b;:i.si.s fox.· cornpar·ing s.t.y lc~s
rne::t.c)r).yrni. c.; t!.o/:t .r'·(:rne: s

~. '"1
<i'

~-t ~:,

The

simultaneity of tenor and vehicle (or simply word and ref e:tent} w11i

sequentially connecting associations, that is, in emphasizing
the sentential context of n word as its true referent rather
than its meaning, or, more

, its verbal rather than

its mental context.
Actually, all of these polarities seem to boil down
without too mu~h simplification to an orthodox linguistic
distinction between the lexical and syntactic d
language.

SJ,C)llG

Of

The metaphoric sty

synecdochic and pred
progrerrn f orvJ

' ·t:1rnr?:'
.1:-n
or across the page.

'I'hc:'. prcb lem

construed to imply ,::. self·-suffic:tent fo:nnal combination of

syntax and figuration exclusive of conscious processes
anterior to the forrna.tion of ,,10:r:ds and sentence,;.

A fine

example of th.is forrnali:,,t 1:-easonin9 may be found in another
article by Jakobson, "LinguL:;Lics and Pord:ics, 11 .in \-':hich: he•
proposes :rep.resent.1119 verbal comrnunica.tion with a complex
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n.~
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cont€!::t;t, etc.
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I...J",J'f.. •.,~.. ...-•. ,x

~oct•~~as
-~Ni~~
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~p
•~_-:.a

~he
l., .

...

though aJso proposing a threefold division

of gf:.nrer,. based upon the conjugation of verbs that would
see:m to intc~grate one other component of tht,! paradigm for
(1)

the epic in the third pe:ri:;on i.nvoI·vet3 the

referential function;

(2) moral poetry in the second person

..

is linked with the emot.1ve :r.unccion.
p

,.

'.

situation" of po;;~tzy thris becornf!S multi·-·dirnr::~nsiona.1, but
defined. as firnch by grammatical categories.

He also propo:rn~

a quadrant to represent the two modes of arrangement in
verbal behavior, selection and cornbinat:i.onf respectively
the.1 metaphoric and metonymic poles described .:1bove ~

'fhe

vertical. a;,.;;is ir,, of selection, rep:ter.,en ted by metaphor, while

the horizontal axis

of combination, represc.mted by rnc?tonymy o

'I'he "poee:'d.c function," he cJ.a:i.ms, "projects the principle

of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of
B::t this he mee.ns the choice of words accord-~

ing to cquivnlcnce of meaning on the axis of selection

~-

(ew.10::;.
x·cpresent:i.ng tl'w horse we sec)
........

is duplicated on the

a.xis of eorn.bina. t:ion by th(:.: pr i.nciple of Y.'.epet:U:ion. in mctr:i.ci.~
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and sound pattern.

In other words, sounds and rhythms

duplicate each other in poetry just as the signifier
duplicates the signified on the axis of selection in other
modes of verbal expression.

The usual pattern of variation

on the axis of combination (different words following each
other) is thus intertially balanced by a pattern of repetition,
'

the principle of which is borrowed from the axis of selection.

Varieti and repetition successfully interact on· the

axis of combination alone, enabling the total elimination
of meaning and feeling, the cognitive and affective functions
of poetry.
In comparable fashion Eugenio Donato, a protege of
I,,evi-Strauss, has sum."Uz.rized Lac an to the ef feet· that
"metaphor is the substitution
of one signifier for another,
. .
'

whereas metonymy is the displacement of 011:e signifier by
another."

This appar,ently harmless formula suggests that
,,./
/

each signifier, the vehicle for another in metaphor or
..

\

\

metonymy, must itself be the tenor for a new signifier in
another mode of figuration, ad infinitum. 14

As Barthes

uses a regressive sequence of planes of expression to

represent connotation (ref. p. 48), Donato quotes Lacan in
proposing~ simil~r pattern of regressio~ which ~ffectively

elimin~tes the signified except as another signifier.

Each

signifier represents a signified, but in turn each signified
is itself a signifier representing another signified, again
ad infinitum.

This pattern of ::regression in signification

would suggest linguistic solipsism excep~ that Donato extends
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c,f

to

-

proposed t)y noL::ind na:cth,;;-:~~ in E h,~mr:.nt:::: ·-·
c,f {;crrd oJoqy.
.._.,,._,.~,. ~· -~

'fhe

reduce psychoanalytic theory to figurative and linguistic

claims t is "the rn~:\pping of the domain of tlie si':Jnificr
c.pon i.t:sclf; '' eliminating the si9uif :Led. and wit.h it the
.
.
organic
processes o f consciousness

•rhe

human being becomes a congeries of symbolic functions, a
repository of mathematical terms:

"The structuralist

subject is empty, uninh~bited by consciousness, emotion,
affectivity, and so forth.

It is only a term within a

general set of functions which in fact constitutes him as
subject and these functions take precedence over the elements
they articulate. 1115
Sau:scnrc • :;. di.chotrnny of si.9ni.fier: and sign.if ied is
thus used a.~; J'.'"wdi.ca.l al).,,;tract.ion f o.r inter.:telating symbols

tc
.... c.
·,1 U.:.,
,,,.;... \,n
··,· o.,..r
•, ~-1·1
\., .-o c, .....

,·, .... ,.•.. -,.(,.y,•:u1.g·
1u1<.1s:i.,

of consciousness.
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Jakobson's theory of aphasin likewise excludes conscious

dmnain of f ig1rca.tion (};.::.radoxi.cally, a.s Richards f .Lr st
..••'•"""'"
..,;.:,..
""
~- ~ ,
I,~---or>o

l)y·
.,_

m-,J··
ng.
,ftC/2 ~~ ...
,
·1.·

1· r:~;;:_~
;,-. t'·,._c:.a.1~ILA
;,';.,;,..,o·· A.;,>· ..l.;.. t- ~
"·(•]
·11:
;:. ,,,,,

~
c~

met
-, ,.t,·;':l""l"'o-\
..... j:_..•·
L
.o\

J

it,

Both

approaches to language encourage formalist extravagance,
the search for linguistic self-sufficiency in literature
·•

independent of expc~riencc-;! • 1 6

If the cm1,nections between

language and consciotume:1::a may be treated as being non-

existent, or a new and slightly different pattern of signification, then literature has been conveniently extricated
from the confusion and uncertainty of affective criticism.
The "empty subject" i:::: not. humanly addressed by :U terat:ur:·e;

has no "trans2ctional" relationship with it, but applies
himself dispassionately to i tr.;. formal int.-/:r.1.,:reb1t.:i. on.

His

•
1
•
emot1onflL
respcnBe is
inconsequential--form and languag3

alone would be of the essence.
We must of course deny this position, even in its
_moderate guise.·

Syntax and words involve conscious pro-

cesses that transcend any proposed one-for-one equation in

s.ign funct.ionsi a.nd though figurative explanations might
be useful to help clarify these processes, they must be
treated as paradigmatic analogies dangerous to the extent
that they lead to the misunderstandings summari.zed above:

As we amply demonstrated in our explication of the Prost
st,.u1~:a, every word involves complex feelings and a.sso<.~intiorrn

that constitute a total possible meaning both 6xpnnded nnd
somewhat defined by th,:! word' n contL\Xt.

Both the explicit
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d.enota.tive reference {if er,tfrely ponuible:) and itr: pennwbr,1

of connotations are essential ingredients for the genu

same nsvrly meaningless vnlue as a foreign word we c~n

barely trAnslate.
Richards insisted, this penumbra is ~co inclusive and

results which both g~neratcs and def

different fashion.

There are rela

vely few syntactic

functions ccnnpured to our resources iri vocabulary, ana
these few are constantly applied in the

tion cf every
~

sentence we usec

As

R

result, synt~x becomes second nature,
Like other habits, it

serves consciousness without often penetrating it while we

concentrate our effort upon the use of words.

both to remcmbc~ and arrunge the words we use.

Nevertheless,

It also

possesses magnificent flexibility in its subject-predicate
equation as well as its patterns of modification.

Adjectives

of course modify nounsp adverbs verbs, etc., much ris we
learned in school, but words anJ their nITTdificrs also fotm
groupa which in turn act as modifiers, for exan~le the

predicate of: a snntencc I which may be und<:.:rr,tood to rnodify
the totuJ subject~

h bi.Ji.omi.Il divi~d.o:n may be found ,1t every
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level of combination in a sentence to link each word or
group of words with its most direct modifier, usually
adjacent, also a word or group of words.

As a result, we

may construct a pyr(l.mid of binomial relationships to indicate the full extent

of

modification in a sentence.

The

clearest paradigm of this process would probably be Eugene
Nida's tree diagram of immediate constituents which rests
this pyramid on its apex: 17
The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog's back.

Each horizontal line indicates a binomial unit, and its
arrow shows the direction of modification, usually forward.
Nida uses an "X" at the bottom horizontal line to indicate
the equation betwe~n subject and predicate, but for our
,

purposes it may be replaced with an arrow to indicate that
the predicate modifies the subject in the sense of extending and clarifying i t s l1eaning.
into immediate. constituent

This binomial division

may also be turned. on its

pyramid base.in order .to i lustrate the generative rules of
transformational iinguistics.

Each so-called "kernal

sentence" in this approach is constructed (or "derived"}
\

:no
with step-by-step binomial exp~nsions bcgizining with the

in which one supposedly modifies the o
They interact with each other evcn if

ng to particularize

particulari7ed it g

partly predmninate over successive words simply because
their effects are felt first,

stantive.

E2ch suggests a quali.ty (quickness and the col.or

brown) which merges with our more general image of a foxr
also a quality but with enough tangibility to give it the

ph~nse progresses is of the act of quickness seeking its'

actor, the color of brown seeking its bearer, and the fox
.
1 1.y part:i.cu.
'
·1 21r:x.z.u,s;
. '
.
f J..n,L
arw.1 l )C.U\V
p2rticul.arized by these
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If these words were kept separate, each would bear random
sluggishly isoli:i.tr;:1d as:mciations u but their syntactic

Xf'.-

lat.ionship ri.?:infor.ces their sequent.i.a l interan.in1.::It.i on

to

bring them to an eidetic thresholdo

Without much diffi.cu.1ty

we can visualize a fox in nature, perhaps a field, abruptly
·•

com:i.ng i.nt.o sight:, pausing lor:.g eno.ugh to be clearly stc::e:n i
and then jus.t as quickly d.isz.:..ppearing in ·a nfiw d.irr.Jct:i.on r

have once seen a fox in such a moment, but the three words
prc>pe:r.Jy combined provide this c~ffect much mere readily, r1nd
of cou:r~e a sentence, stv.n:,:;;a o:c ent.irc) poem by a. competent
~

.t
.
wri:er
can give
us a.n infinitely more convincing
It was stated earlier that a poet usually tries to
minimize the arbitrary limitations of syntax by concentrating
upo.n fnc:c~-float.ing word comb:i. nations such at.: appositives

and sentence modifiers, smallerv less assertive, and les&
syntactically demanding than the simple sentence, which
emphasizes tht'.':! abstract equation beb:ecn subject a.nd pred-

, ica.te.

We must now slightly mcxli.fy thi~: vie·w,,

Syntax

obviously cannot be:~ eliminated short of free association

as almost any two words adjacent to each other in literature
(and not separated by terminal punc:tua.t:lon) may be shown to
have a. syn tact:t.c re J a t.ionship, however dh.d::a.n t ,

What I

would propose is simply that poets rcauce the importance of
syntax by concentrating upon local relationships among

21:

adjacent words rather than constructions emphasizing the
re:

:Lp ,i:rn.ong •;,,:or:dF r3epat'atcd by other

ions and often, paradoxically, by complica

ng the sentence

with an accurrrulation of these constructions to obfuscate
and deemphasize its subject-predicate relationship.

As a

among adjacent w

t:

In poetry as simple as the Frost stanza we have
freedom is also effected by rh~ne
diffusing the logical in

ta.

of the sentence structure.

sequence as U1cy rise to consc

local relatedness rather than abstract syntactic connections.

anim~tion of experience among words, both adjace11t and
syntactically connected, as co~nunicntcd by the poet to

s
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experience and bring us to ll1c threshold of eidetic fulfillment he wants us to shar0 and understand.

mes~~ge, the ultim~te :~ofundity of poetry.

This is the
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Postscript. to Cl~apter Seven:

Chon1sky' s Review of B .F. Skinner

B.F. Skinner's book Verbal Behavior (1957), reputedly
the first systematic effort in behaviorist psychology to
provide a functional analysis of language, is too concerned
with the rudimentary conditioned response to be particularly
relevant to our task of explaining the process of writing
and speaking, especially in poetry.

Likew?,se, cfomsky's

1959 review of ~kinner's bbok (inclu~ed in The dtructure of
Language, edited by-Fodor and Katz, 1964, p~54\:2_7-~), a
closely reasoned reply,now more influential than the book
itself, seems largely.irr6levant to our tas~though most of
its arguments .are -probably valid.

In the J ast two sections

of his review, how.ever,·Chomsky briefly proposes his own
~

theory of verbal be~avior which significantly conflicts with

\

our own.

With all due respect to Chomsky's contribution to

the field of linguistics, we must heartily take exception
~ith these pariicular views.
In the first.place he assails as a "very implausible
speculation

11

B.F. Skinner's proposal, similar to our own.,

I

that ~e generally choo~e nouns, verbs,- and adjectives first
in our formation of sentences, and then arrange them by
"autoclitic resp9nses,

11

that is to say, through the use of

function words to connect them in syntax.

Chomsky proposes

instead that we might actually recall function words first,
as would be indicated by the fapt that we usually pause before
nouns and ve.rbs if at all,' suggesting greater uncertainty in
their choice (p. 547).

But this common experience need not

.I

2.15

point.

Wo pause before nouns

the expression of our ideas a

function

t:;

we cannot go on wi.thout

(of

arranged to fit in among other nouns, verbs,
and adj

function
more referen

s thus enable us to con
al (and eruot

) concern in our utterance.

Experience seems to corroborate this.

If nouns, v0rbs,

and adJectJves quickly and easily flow into consciousness,

words grope around fruitless
ification.

in search for their just-

We do not claim that the ci1oice of nouns and

on a.n adverb or even a p.i:eposition { "Net cm.ly

J.3

he :t.:n

here the abstract lexical meaning of tho function word
is particularly emphasized.

In general, however, a loose

hie:i.: archy seems t:.o extend fro1n subc,tant:ives to verb;;~

adJectives, adverbs, and then the non-adverbial function

point with the remat'k, "It is evident that rno:ce

1.r;

invoJ:vcd
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in sentence structure than

tion of lexical items in

l fr~mcs," clearly a criticism di

theory of Skinner.
1.ikew

at

Our view is that Chomsky's accusation

seems to put the cart before the horse.

~he slat

tely criticizes is no less

and filler approach he appropr

correct in this sense than his own ins1stence that the

in our minds and then we

sentence first establishes itse
the word:,,

choose and interre
No such process occurs!

We often begin sentences with no

idea how they will turn out.

the sut,jcct w:i . 11

ing to its pattern.

We are confident only that

ing us to an appropriate predicate, which

in turn enables us to use pert

sentence modifiers, etc.,

fulfilling local syntactic necessities to
justify the use of words we want to express.

or r;upc~rimpos

In this sense,

upon the ideas we want to express. but a

dynamic pattern in forward progress perhaps best suggested
by Kenneth Burke's analogy with synecdoche mentioned above.

•
1c.
. •
1~ f.ram a separate
it
01;Jccc1vc

fulfilled in _space.

In our progress forwurd each word chosen

for its meaning must be syntacti.cally justified in the context
of previous words already thus justif

, i)nd in t:u:cn it

lar mo<lificatidns in the
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choice of subsequept words.

These auxiliary modifications

which facilitate the passage of language on the axis of
combination proposed by Jakobson (ref. p. 204) may be defined
as syntax.

Each word has a range or what we might propose

·to be a "lexicon" of sy\actic /obligations" to the expectations. arouse¢! by previou1f words, mostly within the
sentence (though pronouns would be an obvious exception)
and usually within the· last three or four words.
I

Each word

also has a range of syntactic "influence" in the expectations it itself triggers, also mostly within the sentence
and usually not more than three or four words in advance.
For example in the sentence "The quick brown fox jumped
over the lazy dog's back," the word brown has a syntactic
~

obligation to the to be a modifier which may follow it
preceding the substantive it introduces, and also perhaps
an obligation to quick to be one more adjective using up
the supply acce'ptable in English before ge.tting on to the
substantive.

Its relatively minor syntactic influence,

then, would be in reinforcing the expectations earlier
triggered by both the and quick fo~ the impending use of·
a substantive.

These obligations and influences occur,

of course·, in the forward progress of the sentence; in
our conscious initial formation of the phrase, however,
there is retrogressive movement as well.

The word fox

probably occurs first; next it is immediately contracted
and promised with the determiner the, after which we are
'

'

'

-

at leisure to inse~t adjectives which correctly modify it.

Once the backwards and forwards progress

this noun

shift to the verb

t

instantaneous progressive-

through small. clu ters

th

c influence to intensify and clarify the

:ftxlf i 1 li.1.1.~J

symbolic express

Chomsky perhaps suggests

ss, really tho pa_.__ defined by Saussure,

he does not deve

opt.ion
;

0

and in turn it would create

nc11

of current options

options as we move along

that those options of a word, really its syntact

funet1.on,

.1 ()C:t-t t:i.()11) generally

seconaary to its lexical meaning except in function words.

properly reside in the word itself, net the sentence, its

1~. "'c~s

1
._,_,.ex
1.. cJ<..111

options, its inflnence and obligations

duced when enough word3 arc co~)incd with consonant sets

?19

phenomenon held unaccountab

by Chomsky (p. 577).

The

child does not lc~rn complex sentence patterns, but this

lexicon of optiona for words as well as their full meaning

pejorative description of "racntal

tic" linguistic~, but

it seems empiricnlly more accu~ato in a~scr~bing what

act1.wlly h2:,ppcnr,: 1:;hf:n we spE\,'lk, and it brin9s the emphar:;ir::

with affect, which concerns us the most.

Footnotes, Chnpter Six

1T . . )Ir1ki ,.,,,.
_ ~-

1"•'.')ei
'"'Tl~)
•·r.,,:,
·l; .i.~l.\\t..
1lyt/'.~1,,.

'\.,.,..t."-1,:,.

'li..~i•

1...,

~--J·r:, c•nv,!-,•,,-r-·i pt-v
l·.Jl;,·,.s!--,
"---.i
\.,~

.}

,_

a.nd h abit--,·. 1.'n h.i.s monl?mt.~ntal fp__ ,,,r_ ,,.,-."1,.,·nc,
e .,,,-, ...,l,·
w

-

\,

2 Cl,.t.-..."'l"it.l..f~.
:i-

•

;:1.f fect

J(".\A"J.f"l

l .. ;-\"...,~.. ,t.

,,.,,,,1,11. 4,.,.,,,. ~--, ... ,. ·•••

~r.A.1'..!\.I.

\.J''t.;r..!l .. l ' t ;

'i\•f"f'---,r,"-..Lt....... t:1

./,11~ .

___

71..-,.-•-1---...-•)pi'l ,, ...,,.
.h.,.cl
.. ,.LL~- _..)AU~;;
.,_
...,_

... ··-

4

(New

pp. 336·<-l? ,,

PP~ 67 t 71-74 ~
5°''1'}C·'
J. - =--·

C~,I..,'l.•-f'.,,_,,,
CD .....
-.•or,r•.r>
~- •=•>,

nG

temporal

jrnr-1ort,,1.nt

by Lessing, the definitive exploration of this difference,
La Pont..=dne, the Abbe Du Bos, a.nd Edmmd Burke re.trn.rk-ed

upon the ne·cess.i ty of making this distinction.

A uscd:u1

brief account of their views may be found in Wimsatt and
Brooks, op. cit., pp. 268-70.
6 A\.
r>o•-- J-· a-- ·•--l'" H '.l.l' t·J;r.,·•
5'f..~~..,
b

.J...,. .

..,rc•

l .. -A.o,.f.ti. ...,~

~

lqc.:•71
."r\'l
Ir

.,._ ~-

~

... .

•)n
J. .1:"°'

f

Elements
Semiolcqy
.l..., '· 'k;
New Yorkr
---~- of _____
,......,,"..-~- ( ,gr,,·.~,
~"..,_,,.,.,_._,,,,,,,.,11,....

09 -- ..C)()•·"'

,,:,:.

____

7 Nornn Chc•nYodty, f:ynt;J.ctic ~~trnct:.1.ires
..,.,._,.,..... ,.~ ...... ~.--...............,,
...~___.,,..,,

-

p•

(rt'he Ha~ru.e,

.-n.
Sn~
,·1·•.,(~,{.'"'J'i:!
effectively used Jabberwocky
#,'\.,.S-'-.• . . -c:

1067},

221

of Secondary Epic,. "

hereafter cited as Jakobson.
-·

-·•J_ _ n,_.c,,
~~- i_·-:,~.£.(r,. . ~.:.• ~"}f· .,.,·, ·l t ...~, r

·.1_0,_',•.•;. .,.:_
-

-•"1~--~-

·....,

.•... ,.;,,,•••••·>-~

,•··1--~,:.
,,,.•..11
',?

Pnr,'"
•'.-.~.t..;<::

t\ 11,.-..,l,t,_,.._-14.:,
"' -t-,,-,-,-.,

1967); for his theory
analogy with the arpegg

141._.~7 •1~~~1,)•
~--:,t .. J.1..A."'

n0~~~0.
,_...,.J._,.._x t-.,. p
l\_ ..

after cited as Donato.

, p. 75.

"O~
...
,h,

This article

sympathetic account of
ur~l1st theory.

1s

an extremely useful

.

l .

.

.

1.rnp .. J.ca t:1.ons :i.n

The best unsymp~thotic account of formalism

that I have found remains Chapter V ("The Formalist School
,f:
C,.,

1
n,) "}t
rl •·ic••
..:,,.-;__
...v•v
,,.r ,:..,

J
Leon ~eroi:.r-;:y,,
J,

c,m" \J

'·1 ··,..............
rv -j ,
LC/

{ .·1u,.•'"
0 ? A )

Ruc;.::i:m Formn.LL:~,m,

..•
1.n

0 •
f._· .
I_,J·. ~.-.e_,~_
P.
\ .., ,·1_ ❖•.
, 1.11··.·.·
.
~

1 . l,
'i11:lC!l

'

:-.;.,,·,_,',·1

vt,"

fl,(,-::·'- 1,f('
~--.-.)·.:....•'
.1._l~-·~ • h_'r'
•___, .1. '•'.
,.ti
___,'.__
.-~-•~

1
1,
t·oo\,
J th
Irotsi:y
· e yonng

. '
cr.1.t1.c

('I'he Haguc 1 1:l65) by Victor .Erlich, a

222

for formal sel

Roland Barthes, whose eclcc
length

.1\ppend

0};:1.:t. ,.1960}.

r.·

sufficiency in literature

c forTualism is treated at

223

List of Works Consulted
Abrams, Meyer H., ed.
Essays.

Literature and Belief, English Institute

New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

Abrams, Meyer H.

The Mirror and the Lamp.

New York: Oxford

University Press, 1953.
Arnold, Magda B.
~

"An Excitatory Theory of Emotion.

Emotions, ed. M. L. Reymert.

11

Feelings

Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1950.
Bachelard, Gaston.

The Poetics of Space.

New York: Orion Press,
I

•

1964; trans. by Maria Jolas from the French, La poetique
de l'espace.

Presses Universitaires de France, 1958.

Barthes, Roland.

Elements of Semiology.

New York: Hill and

Wang, 1968; trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith from
I

✓

I

the French, Elements de Semiologie.
Bate, Walter Jackson.

E<!itions du Seuil, 1964

From Classic to Romantic.

Cambridge:

Harvard Uriiversity Press, 1946.
Belgion,.Montgomery.

"What is Criticism?"

Criterion, 10 (1910),

118-39.

Bell, Inglis, and Donald Baird.
of 20th-Century Criticism.
Black, Max.

Chicago: Swallow Press.

"Some Questions about Emotive Meaning," A Symposium

on Emotive Meaning.
Blackmur, Richard P.
Agent.

English Novel:~ Checklist

Philosophical Review, ~7 (1948}, 111-26.

"The Critic's Job of Work," The Double

New York: Peter Smith, 1935.

Bradley, Andrew C.

Oxford Lectures on Poetry.

New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1965.
Brooks, Cleanth.

"Implication~ of an Organic Theory of Poetry,"

Literature and Belief.

ed. M. H. Abrams.

<. ,

.,., -~-~-

. :- :
_,,:L ·+> ..

224

/

Brooks, Clean th.

)~The Formalist critic."

Kenyon Review ( 1951) ;

in The Modern Critical Spectrum. ed. Gerald J. Goldberg
\

et al.

Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962.

Brooks, Cleanth,

1-6.

The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure

of Poetry:

New Yark: Harcourt, Brace, 1947.

Bukharin, Nikolai~
Aesthetics.

"Poetry and Society." The Problems of

ed. by Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger.

New

i

¥ork: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1953.

Burke, Kenneth.

Philosophy of Literary Form.

498-514.

Baton Rouge:

Louisiana S~ate University Press, 1967.
Burnshaw, Stanley.

The
---

Seamless Web.

"The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical

Carnap, Rudolph.

Analysis of Language."
Ayer.

New York: Braziller, 1970.

Logical Positivism.

Glencoe: Free Press, 1958.

Chomsky, Noam.

ed. by A. J.

,60_;81.

"A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior.",

The S-tructure of ·Language:. Readings in the Philosophy
of Language.

Chomsky, Noam.

ed. by Jerry A. Fodor ~t al.

Syntactic Structures.

The Hague: Humanities

Press, 1957.
Christensen; Francis.
for Teachers.
Collingwood, R. G.
of Aesthetics.

Notes towarQ

New York: Harper

~

New Rhetoric: Six Essays
&

Row.

"The Expression of Emotion." ·The Problems

ed. by Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger.

New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1953.
Crews, FredE?.rick.

343-57.

"Do_ Literary Studies Have an Ideology. 11

~ , 85 (1970}. 423-28. ·

Dewey, John.

Art a,s Experience.

1934; rptd. G. P. Putnam's

225

Sons, 1958.
~

Dewey, John, and Arthur F. Bentley.

Philosophical Correspond

New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964.

1932-1951.

Donato, Eugenio. "Of Structuralism and Literature."

~ , 82

(1967) ,549-74.

Eastman, Max.

.

Enjoyment of Poetry with Anthology.

New York:

Scribner, 1951.
Eliot, T.

s.

Selected Essays.

New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960

Erlich, Victor.

Russian Formalism.

The Hague: Mouton, 1965.

Fenichel, Otto.

The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.

New

York: Norton, 1945.
Fiedler, L~slie.

"Aichetype and Signature: A Study of the

Relationship between 13iography and Poetry."

Sewanee

Review,· LX (19!52), 253-73.
Fiedler, Leslie.

11

My Credo."

Kenyon Review, XII (1950),

561-74.
Frank, Joseph.

"Spatial Form in Modern Literature."

Sewanee

Review {1945);. rev. in Criticism: The Foundations of
Literary Judgrnen.t.

ed. by Mark Schorer et ·a1.

Anatomy of Criticism.

Frye, Northrop.

Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1957.

Harding, D.

w.

Hegel, Georg
Baillie.

\

"I. A. Richards."
//'

w.

F.

'

~

Scrutiny, 1 (1933), 327-38.

Phenomenology of Mind.

trans. by J.B.

New Y6~~~ Humanities Press, 1910.

Holland, Norman.

The Dynamics of Literary Response.

Oxford, 196 8 •
.
Hotopf, W. H.• N. Language, Thought and Comprehension.
Indiana University Press, 1965.

New York:

Bloomir.

226
Hulme, T. E.

11

R9manticism and Classicism."

Essays in Criticism: 1920-1948.

Critiques~

ed. R. W. Stallman.

3-16.
Hyman, Stanley Edgar.

The Arme.d Vision.

New York: Random

House, .1955.
Ingarden, Roman.

"Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object."·

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXI (1961),
289-313.
Izzard, Carroll.

"Affect, Awareness, and Performance."

CognitiQn, and Personality.

ed. bys. Tomkins and

Affect

c.

Izza:

New York: Springer, 1965.
Jakobson, Roman.

11

Linguistics and Poetics. 11

ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok.

Style in Language.

Cambridge: MIT Press.

Jakobson, Roman, and Morris Halle.

350-77.

Fundamentals of Language.

The Hagu·e: Humanities Press, 1956.
Jakobson, Roman, and C;Laude Levi-Strauss.
Baudelaire."
James, David G.

L'Homrne, 2(1962), 5-21.
Scepticism and Poetry.

Noble, 1937..
Criticism.

London: Barnes and

Chpt. Two rptd. in Critiques and Essays ·in
ed •. by_ Robert· Stallman.

James, William.

"Les Chats de Charle~

472-87.

The Principles of Psychology.

2 vols.

Mag-·

nolia, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1891.
Kampf, Louis.

11

The Scandal'of Literary Scholarship."

Dissenting Academy. ed. by Theodore Roszac.

The

New York:

Pantheon, 1967.
Katz, Herrold J. and Jerry A. Fodor.
Semantic Theory."
Fodor and Katz.

"The Structure of a

The Structm;e of Language.

ed. by

Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

4 79-518,.

227·

Katz, Jerrold J., and Paul M. Postal.
of Linguistic Descriptions.

Koestler, Arthur.

An Integrated Theory

Cambridg'E:!: MIT Press, 1964.

The Act of Creation.

New York: Macmillan,

1964.
Krieger,.Murray.

The New Apologists for Poetry.

Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 1956.
Kuntz, Joseph.

~oetry Explication:.A Checklist of Interpretation

since 1925 of British and American Poems Past and Present.
Chicago: Swallow Press.
Lacan, Jacques •. The Language of the Self: The Function of
Language in Psychoanalysis.

trans. with notes and com-

mentary from the French by Anthony Wilden.

Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.
Leavis, F. R.

"Shelley."

Critiques and Essays in Criticism.

ed. by Robe·rt Stallman.
Leavis, F. R.
3 (1935) ,

162-80.

"Dr. Richards, Bentham and Coleridge."

Scrutiny,

382.,;.402.

Lessing, Gotthold E.

Laokoon.

ed. by D. Reich.

New York:

Oxford University Press, 1965.
Levi-Strauss, Claude.

The Savage Mind.

of Chicago Press, 1966.

Chicago: University

trans~ by George Weidenfeld and'
/

Nicolson Ltd. from the French, La Pensee sauvage.

Librairie

Plon, 1962.
Levi-Strauss, Claude.
Books, 1963.

Structural Anthropology.

New York: Basic

trans. by c. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf fr0m

the French.
Lewis,

c.

S.

Preface to Paradise Lost.

Press, 1942.

Oxford: Oxford Qniversity

228

Lukacs, Georg.

-

Realism in our Time: Literature and the Class

-

Struggle.

-- ------ -- --

New York: Harper

&

Row,· 1962.

Trans. from the

German by John and Necke Mander.
Nida, Eugene.

A Syn_opsis of English -syntax.
.

Norman, Oklahoma:

'

Humanities Press·, 1960.
Peckham, Morse.
the Arts.
Plato.

Man's· Ra.ge for Chaos: Biology, Behavior, and
Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1965.

"Ion. 11

criti·c:ism: The Foundations· of Modern Literary
Ed. by Mark Scherer et al. 9.

Judgment.

Plato. "Republic."
Judgment.

Criticism: The Foundations of Modern Literal

Ed. by Mark Scherer et al. 1-9.

Poe, Edgar Allan.

Literary Criticism of Edgar Allan Poe.

Lincc

Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.
Pound, E:zra.

ABC of _Reading.

Pound, E:zra.

Literary Essays.

New York: New Directions, 1934.
ed. by'T.

s. Eliot.

New York:

New Directions, 1968.
Ransom, John Crowe.
of Orthodoxy.

God without Thunder: An Unorthodox Defense
Hamden, Connecticut: Sh~e String Press, 1930

Ransom, John Crowe, and Donald Davidson, Allen Tate, etc.
~ ~

Stand.: The South and the Agrarian Tradition.

I'll

New

York, '1930.

Ransom, John cr·owe.

The New Criticism.

Norfolk: New Directions,

1942.
Rapaport, David...

Emotions and Memory. New York: International

Universities Pres~, 1942.
Rapaport, David.
Phenomena."
Rapaport, David..

"On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical
Collected Papers, 1:24-41 (1946).
"On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects."

229

Psychoanalytic Psychiatry and Psychology: Clinical and
Theoretical Papers.

New York: Austin Riggs Center, I

(1954), 274-310.

Rapaport, David.

Organization and Pathology of Thought.

New

York: Columbia ·university Press, 1951. ·

Reymert, Martin L.
Symposium.
Richards~ I. A.

Feelings and Emotions: The Mooseheart

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.
Coleridge on Imagination.

New York: Harcourt,

Brace, 1935.
Richards, I. A. "Emotive Language Still."

Yale Review, 39

(1949), 108-18.
Richards, I. A.

"Emotive Meaning Again," A Symposium on

Emotive Meaning.

Philosophical Review, 57 (1948), 145-57.

Also in Speculative Instruments, PB• 39-56.
Richards, I. A.

T.he Foundations of Aesthetics.

(with C. K.

Ogden and James Wood), London: George Allen and Unwin,
1922.

Richards, I. A.

"The Future of Poetry."

Other Poems, pp. 105-27.

The Screens and

Also appears, with notes, in

S o ~ Nearer, pp. 150-82.

Richards, I. A.

The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the

Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science
of Symbolism.

(with

c.

K. Ogden), London: Kegan Paul,

1923.

Richards, I. A.
Definition.
Richards, I. A.

Men·cius onr -the
Mind: Experiments
in Multiple
-London: Kegan Paul, 1932.
The Philosophy of'Rhetoric.

Lectures on the Huma~ities, III.

The Mary Flexne;r

New York: Oxford

230

University Press, 1936.
Richards, I. A.
Judgmen~.

Practical Criticism:~ Study of Literary
London: Kegan Paul, 1929.

Richards, I. A.

"Practice of Interpretation."

Criterion,

10(1931), 412-iO.
Richards, l~ A.

Principles of Literary Criticism.

New York:

Harcourt, ~race, 1924.
Richards·, I. A.

Science and Poetry.

New York:

w. w. Norton,

1926.
Richards, I. A.

The Screens and Other Poems.

New York:

Harcourt, Brace, 1960.
Richards, I. A.

§_£ Much Nearer: Essays toward a World English.

New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1968.
Richards, I. A.

Speculative Instruments.

Chicago: University

.,

of Chicago Press, 1955.
Riffaterre, Michael.

"Describing Poetic Structures: Two

-

Approaches to Baudelaire's les Chats."
.

Yale French

Studies, 36-37 (1966), 200-242.
Rosenblatt, Louise.

"The Poem as Event."

College English,

XXVI (~964), 123-28.

"Towards a Transactional Theory of

Rosenblatt, Louise.
Reading."

Journal of Reading Behavior, I, i

San~ayana,·George.

The Sense of Beauty.

(1969), 43.

New York: Charles

Scribner's Sons, 1896.
' '

'

'Search for a Method.

Sartre, Jean-Paul.

New York: Alfred A.

· Knopf, 1967; translated from the French, "Question de
✓

'

'

'

Methode," the prefatory essay'in Critique de la Raison
Dialectique, Vol. I .<~allimard, 1960).

231

Sartre, Jean-Paul.

What is Literature?

New York: Harper

&

Row, 1965; translated from the French, Qu'est-ce que
la litterature (Gallimard, 1949).
Saussure, Ferdinand de.· Course in General Linguistics.
New Yqrk: McGraw Hill, 1966.
\

Schachter,

s.

and J.E. Singer.

"Cognitive, Social and

Physiological Determinants of Emotional State."
Psychological Review, 69 (1962), 379-399.
Schiller, Jerome,.

I. A. Richards' Theory of Literature.

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
Scherer, Mark, et al.

Criticism: The Foundations of Modern

Literary Judgment~
S.ebeok, Thomas A, ed.

New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948 • .
Style in Language.

Cambridge: The

M.I.T •. Press, 1960.

Shelley, Percy Bysshe.
1840.

"A Defence of Poetry."

1821, publ.

Criticism: The Foundations of Modern Literary

Judgment, 455-470.
Skinner, B. F.

Verbc;1l Behavior.

New York: Appleton-Century-

Crofts, 1957.
Solley, Charles M. and Gardner Murphy.
Perceptual World.
Sontag, Susan.

Development

2f

the

New York: B~sic Books, 1960.

Against Interpretation and Other Essays.

New York: Dell, 1961.
Stallman, Robert
1920-1948.
I

Tate, Allen.

w.,

ed.

Critiques and Essays in Criticism:

New York: Ronald, 1949.

Essays pf Four Decades.' Chicago: Swallo~ Press,

~--

1968.

Tolstoy, Leo.

What is Art? and Essays~ Art.

trans. by

232

Aylmer Maude.
Tomkins, Silvan

s.

London: Oxford, 1962; first publ. in 1898.
Affect, Imagery, Consciousness.

New York:

Springer, 1962. ·
Trotsky, Leon.

Literature and Revolution.

Ann Arbor: Univer-

sity of Michi~an Press, 1960; first published 1924.
Vivas, Eliseo.
Theory."
Vivas, Eliseo.

"Four Notes on I. A. Richards' Aesthetic
Philosophical Review, 44 (1935), 354-67.
Creation and Discovery.

Chicago: Regnery, ·

1966.

Vivas, Eliseo and Murray Krieger.
New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Wasserman, Earl R.

The Problems of Aesthetics.
World, 1953.

&

"The Pleasures of Tragedy."

ELH, XIV

(1947), 2.83-307.
Wellek, Rene.

"On Rereading I. A. Richards."

The Southern

Review, III, 3 (1967)~ 533-54.
Wellek, Rene and Austin Warren.
York: Harcourt, Brace,
Wenger, M.A.

&

Theory of Literature.

New

World, 1949; first published 1942.

"Emotion as Visceral Action: An Extension of

Lange's Theory."

Feelings and Emotions: The Mooseheart

Symposium, '.ed. M. L. Reymert.

Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1950.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. ·.,''Languages and Logic."
Thought, and
Wilson, Edmund.

Reality.

Language,

Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1956.

"Historical Criticism, 11 a lecture delivered

at Princeton/efnive·rsity, October 23, 1940.

Critiques

and Essays in Criticism: 1920-1948, Robert Stallman, ed.,
449-460.

233

Wimsatt, William K., .Jr.• and Cleanth Brooks.
Criticism: A Short filstory.

Literary

N.ew York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1957.

Wimsatt, William K., Jr.

The Verbal Icon.

Kentucky: Univer-

sity of Kentucky
Press,·. 1954.
.
Wimsatt, William K.·, Jr_. and Monroe C. Beardsley.

A;fective Fallacy~"

Sewanee Revi~w, 56 (1949).

Wimsatt, William K., ;//~ ·and Monroe

Intentional Fallacy."
Winters, Yvor.

\

,
I

"The

Sewanee Review, 54 (1946).

Denver: Swallow Press, 1947.

The· Practice of Behavior Therapy.

Pergamon Press, 1969-

I

Beardsley.

'

In Defense of Reas.on.
Wolpe, Joseph.

c.

"The/Experimental. School in American Poetry.
//

\\

"The

New York:

11 ·

